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FIRST APPENDIX

TO THE

# DICTIONARY OF THE TECHNICAL TERMS

USED IN THE

SCIENCES OF THE MUSSALMANS,

CONTAINING

THE LOGIC OF THE ARABIANS,

IN THE

ORIGINAL ARABIC, WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

BY

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CALCUTTA:

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## PREFACE OF THE TRANSLATOR.

EVER since the sixth century of the Hijrah, the Mussalmans abandoned the path of observation and of the acquisition of new facts altogether, and considered all sciences merely as dialectic exercises. It was therefore found expedient that, the first of the compendia, which are to form the Appendix of the Dictionary of technical terms, should be a Treatise on Logic.

The Risálah Shamsyyah having, during six hundred years, been the principal text book on Logic in all Mohammadun schools, appeared to have the best claims to represent the Logic of the Mussalmans. It is therefore here published with an English translation.

Regarding the author of this treatise, I translate a passage from the Nafáyis al-Mâthir (see my Catalogue of the Oudh Libraries, I. p. 46). It is said in the biography of Amyr Kolong, "Mawláná Najm adyn Kátiby Qazwyny was a profound philosopher and a pupil of Athyr adyn Abhary. He is the author of commentaries on the Talakhkhuç, on the Mohacçal and on the Hikmat al'ayn and of the Risálah Shamsyyah and the Jámiy' aldaqáyiq. He died on Friday the 3rd of Rajab 675, (11 December 1272.)" Hájy Khalyfah says, that he was a pupil of Nacyr aldyn Túsy, and No. 7667 he places his death in 693, but he gives the correct date under No. 4586.

There is another treatise called Sollam, which is very celebrated in India, and which is considered as the aeme of acuteness and conciseness. It has been added in Arabic, with a short biography of the author, but without translation, to enable the Arabic reader to exercise his acumen on it.

The translation is literal. Technical terms of the Arabic language have been rendered by such English words as appeared to the translator by etymology and usage to express most nearly their meaning, and the same representative is used in the translation throughout for the same term of the original; for instance, English Logicians in speaking of nouns use "singular" and "common" very nearly in the same sense as they use in speaking of propositions "particular" and "universal." The Arabs use the same terms in both instances, and as juzyy is derived from juz "part" and kullyy from kull "all" "universe;" the translator has, wherever the word juzyy occurred, rendered it by "particular," and wherever the word kullyy occurred, by "universal;" and so in other instances, placing where required the word which an English Logician might have employed between brackets. Explanatory additions are placed between parentheses. Both the paragraphs and notes have been numbered in order to facilitate reference."

The right way of studying Arabic Logic would be to take the Arabic translations of Aristotle's organon and by comparing them with the Greek text to ascertain the original import of the terms, and then to observe how their meaning has been changed in the progress of time. Such a labour can only be undertaken at Paris or in the Escurial; no translation of Aristotle's works is to be found in Indian libraries.

It was the intention of the translator to consult, whilst he was engaged with his works, as many Arabic books on Logic as he might have access to, and to point out in notes their differences with a view of throwing light on the history of Logic among the Arabs. But he had hardly commenced his task when he was compelled by ill-health to apply for leave to Syria, and he had to make up his mind either to publish his translation in an imperfect form or to suppress it altogether. Luckily he found a man, who has a most intimate knowledge of Logic, and who was good enough to go over the translation with him. This man is the Revd. W. Kay, Principal of Bishop's College. He has corrected a great many mistakes not only in the language but also in the sense, for his skill in logical reasoning enabled him in most instances to discover errors at first sight. To him the translator is under great obligations.

The translator was obliged, owing to his departure from Calcutta, to leave the correction of the greater part of the original text to his friends Mawlawies Mohammad Wajyh and 'Abd al-Haqq. No men are better able to furnish a good text than they, particularly as there are several good editions with commentaries extant, of these two treatises.

Calcutta, 1st April, 1854.

## THE LOGIC OF THE ARABIANS.

1. Praise be to God, who has created the system of the universe, who has produced the essences of things in conformity with their existence, who has made by His omnipotence the different species of mental substances (i. e. logoi or demiurgs), and who, in His bounty, has given motion to the heavenly bodies.

Blessings be upon those noble and holy essences (inspired persons) who are pure from human defilement, more particularly upon Mohammad, the doer of signs and miracles, and upon his family and his companions who followed him [and thereby became] his argument and demonstration.

2. Whereas, agreeably to the opinion of all men of mind and liberal education, the sciences, more particularly the positive sciences, are the highest pursuits in life, and whereas the professors thereof are the most noble among human beings, their minds being sooner prepared to be absorbed into the angelic minds (that is to say, the demiurgs or logoi), and farther, whereas it is impossible to comprehend the subtilities of sciences and to preserve the aeme of their verities except by the assistance of the science which is called Logic, and which teaches us how to discern between what is correct and erroneous, Shams aldyn Mohammad, a son of the Wazyr Bahâ aldyn Mohammad, has desired me to write a book, which shall comprize the principles of Logic, and contain its fundamental doctrines and rules. Ready to follow his directions, I began to write a book on Logic, making it a rule not to omit any thing that belongs to it. I made some beautiful original additions and acute observations, avoided mere compilation and followed plain truths, which will never be controverted. I gave it the name of Risálah Shamsyyah on the Principles of Logic, and divided it into an Introduction, three Books and a Conclusion. My reliance is in God.

## INTRODUCTION.

It contains two inquiries:

FIRST INQUIRY.

On what Logic is and its utility.

3. Knowledge is either apprehension, and nothing further or apprehension together with judgment. Apprehension is the perception of the image of a thing in the mind. Judgment means referring (literally leaning) one thing to another

affirmatively or negatively. The whole [apprehension and a judgment combined] is called declaration.

- 1. Taçawwur, "apprehension" is a verbal noun derived from çûrat "image." Simple apprehension is called taçawwur sadzij سادة The latter word is derived from the Persian عبادة plain.
- 2. الشي " thing" is one of the most general terms in the language and includes both the res and conreption of western Logic.
- 3. 'aql "mind" is sometimes defined as "a substance free from matter in its essence and in its operations." It answers to the Greek word logos and is also used like logos for demiurg: in this case it is rendered by logos in this translation as in § 30, 31, but for the adjective 'aqly invariably "mental" is used. More on this subject in philosophy. The commentator uses also the expressions "apprehension in the soul" مصور في النهن and "images in the intellect" عمور في النهن النهن as synonymous with apprehension in the mind. There occurs also مور النهن "intellective apprehension." Soul is defined as a substance free from matter in its essence (in itself) but not in its actions; and intellect is defined as the faculty, made for the acquisition (perception) of limits (definitions, i. e. apprehensions) and views (judgments).
- 4. Tagdyq "declaration" is the verbal noun of the causative form of gidliq "true" and means to declare that a thing is true, assertion. It is used in phrases like this "the assertion that negative and affirmative cannot be united" "the assertion that the world is not eternal." The verb of this root is used for to "be predicated" to "be applicable." Arabic Logicians also use Kádzib "false" to express "not predicated." If we say Mohammad is a prophet, and he is not a poet, it is as much as to say the being a prophet is true of Mohammad and the being a poet is not true of him. As the terms seem to be well chosen they are rendered literally in this translation.
- 5. The Commentator says 'to lean a thing on another' is to pronounce that the relation takes place between them or that it does not take place. If we say homo est scribens, we pronounce that the relation takes place between homo and scribens. The commentator enters into some metaphysical details, he says we must in this instance first perceive man then the notion of scribens, then the relation that "writing" can be affirmed of man and then whether that relation is taking place or not. The relation of the two terms is called judicial relation [Limits | Limits | Lim
- 4. Neither is the whole of either of these two things entirely intuitive, else there would be nothing we do not know; nor entirely deductive, else our reasoning would be a circle, or an [interminable] chain.
- 6. Natzary "deductive" from natzar "to inspect to consider" is used in opposition to badyly intuitive (literally sudden) and also to practical. Thus medicine is divided into deductive (i. e. theoretical) and practical Instead of natzary the word kisby "acquired" and instead of badyly the term dhorúry "necessary" axiomatic" are also used?
- 5. Part of each is intuitive, and part is deductive, and the result of reasoning, i. e. of such an arrangement of known things [in the mind] that they lead to [the knowledge of] unknown things. But this arrangement is not always correct, for some thinkers contradict others as regards the results of their reasonings, nay the same person contradicts himself at different times; therefore a canon (a code of rules) is required, acquainting us with the ways of deriving deductive knowledge from self-

evident [knowledge], and marking the boundaries between sound and bad reasoning. This canon is Logic. It is described as the canonic organon, (i.e. an instrument consisting of rules), the observance of which guards our intellect from error in reasoning.

Logic is neither entirely intuitive, else there would be no need for learning it, nor is it entirely deductive, else it would be a circle or [interminable] chain, but some [of its doctrines] are intuitive and others are deductive, and founded upon the intuitive ones.

#### SECOND INQUIRY.

## On the Subject of Logic.

- 6. The subjects of a Science are those of its accidents which are inquired into, whether they belong to it immediately, that is to say, belong to its essence, or whether they belong to its parts or whether they belong to it [mediately, but are] co-extensive. The subjects of Logic are apprehensional and declarative notions, for the Logician inquires into them so far as they lead to unknown apprehensional or declarative [notions], and in so far as there rests upon them that which leads to apprehension; he inquires, for instance, whether [such apprehensions as lead to other apprehensions] are universals, particulars, essentials, accidents, genera, species, or differences—and in so far as there rests upon them that which leads to declaration (assertion) whether it rests upon them proximately—they (the declarations which lead to other declarations) being, for instance, propositions or conversions of propositions, or contradictories of propositions; or remotely—they being, for instance, subjects and predicates.
- 7. It will be observed that the use of the term accident differs widely from the use in western logic, the commentator says, accidents are of six kinds, for the accident of a thing either belongs to its essence (to the thing itself) or to a part of it, or it belongs to some property of the thing which is not included in its quiddity. As to the accident of a property it may either be co-extensive, والمادة عند المعاونة (i. c. it may be a mediate accident of all the individua under that species as risible in reference to man, it being the effect of joy and common to all men,) or it may be more peculiar limited) or more general اعداد (kimited) or more general اعداد (extensive) or it may be heterogeneous عند. The first three of these accidents, viz. the accident of the essence, the accident of a part of the essence, and the co-extensive mediate accident which is co-extensive with the thing of which it is the accident) are called essential accidents اعداد العداد الع
- 7. It is usual to call that which leads to apprehension oratio explicans [or mo'arrif "definiens"]; and that which leads to declaration, argument. It behaves us to premit the former to the latter in our system, because apprehension precedes declaration in nature, inasmuch as every declaration must contain [firstly] the apprehension of the subject itself, or of an assertion regarding it; and [secondly either the apprehension itself of the thing] whereby the judgment is formed,

(predicate), or an assertion regarding it; and [thirdly] the judgment, for judgment is impossible if one of these (three) things [subject or predicate or judgment] is unknown.

- 8. Hojjat "argument" is derived from a root which means to contend.—The author of the coghrà takes dalyl "demonstration" and hojjat as synonymous.
- 9. Qawl "oratio" is used to denote an expression which consists in most cases of more than one word, but it is not pecessarily a sentence, thus "rational animal" is a qawl.
- 10. It will be observed that judgment is used in the text in the two different meanings which are explained in note 5. The commentator says "judgment is one of those words which have two meanings, one is the affirmative or negative relation, apprehended between two things, and the second is the decision that that relation is taking place or is not taking place." He continues to say that the author of the text uses the word in the second meaning where he says "judgment is impossible".

#### FIRST BOOK.

It contains three Sections:

FIRST SECTION.

## On Words.

- 8. That a word is the indication of a meaning (idea), by reason of [its] appointment for it (so as to represent that idea), is [called] coincidence, as, for instance, that "homo" is the indication of (is used to express the idea of) "rational animal." [That a word is the indication of an idea] by reason of its appointment for that in which it (the idea) is included is [called] implication, as for instance, that "homo" is an indication of an animal. [That a word is the indication of an idea] by reason of its appointment for that to which it (the idea) is external is [called] nexus; for instance, that "homo" is an indication of "capable of instruction" and of "acquiring the art of writing."
- 11. The word معنى "meaning" which has in common use the same signification as in English, is explained by the Commentator p. 93: المعاني هي الصور الذهنية من حيث أنها وضع بازايها الالفاظ "The images in our intellect in reference to the words which have been appointed to represent them are called meanings."

Lozúm الزوم "adhesion" with its derivatives is one of the most troublesome terms in Arabic Philosophy.

"C adheres to B or is inseparably connected with it," لنوائل means "hence it follows." C in the first example is called lazim "alhærens" and B is called malzúm "substrate." Thug fire is the substrate and heat the adhærens. Talazum means cohesion and is somewhat differently used as the substrate and B are coherent or inseparably connected," in this instance either C or B may be considered as the adhærens. [سالزام] means "to necessitate" "to require" "to render it necessary" بستازم به الرام means "C requires B" or "B is a postulate of C," in this instance C is the substrate and B is the adherent.

9. It is necessary in the indication per nexum that the external thing be in such a condition that the apprehension thereof adhere in the intellect

to the apprehension of the thing named, if this be not the case the word will not convey the meaning thereof. But it is not necessary that it be in such a condition that its actual existence be connected with the actual existence of the thing named. For instance the word "blind" is (per nexum) the indication of sight, yet these two things are not connected in their actual existence.

- 10. Coincidence does not (always) comprize implication, as, for instance, in indivisibles (i. e. things the quiddity of which is not composed of parts see notes 18, 19 and 27) and it may or may not comprize nexus; this is uncertain, for it is not known whether there exists an adherens (inseparable property) of every essence, the apprehension of which is connected with the apprehension of that essence. [The opinion of Imám Rázy] that the apprehension of every essence comprizes [per nexum at least if nothing else,] the apprehension that it is [that essence and] no other, is not admissible. From this it is clear that implication does not comprize nexus, they, in fact, are (only) found along with coincidence, for the sequens cannot possibly exist as sequens without something of which it is the sequens.
- 12. The Commentator observes, that the text ought to run ومن هذا عدم تبين استلزام التضمن الالتزام Hence it is not clear whether implication comprizes nexus."
- 11. If any part of the (term which is) indicans by coincidence, is intended to indicate a part of the total meaning, it (the term) is [called] complex, as a thrower of stones, else it is [called] simple. If the simple word is not by itself fit to be a predicable, it is [called] a tool (syncategorematic), as "in" and "not," and if it is fit to be a predicable, and indicates by its form one of the three times, it is a verb, else it is a noun.
- 13. The Commentator shows that in an expression like 'abd Allah, if used as a proper name is not a complex term.
- 14. Tool is the instrument with the help of which a thing is made and not the matter out of which it is made, the term is therefore very appropriate for a syncategorematic. In Grammar particles are called مرزف "letters" and a verb is called نعرف "action." The reason of a double terminology is that grammar was worked out by the Arabs independently, whereas they took Logic from the Greeks, and these two Sciences were cultivated by the same class of men long after their terminology had been fixed.
- 15. The Commentator observes that the words "by its form" are used in the text with a view of excluding words whose substance indicates a time as "yesterday."
- 12. A noun has either one meaning or more than one. In the first case if it individuates that meaning it is called a proper-name, else (there are two cases possible: firstly), if its conceivable (literally intellective) and real individua are [all] equally represented by it, it is called univocal (literally agreeing, consentient,) as "homo," "sun;" [secondly,] if it applies to some [of the individua] more forcibly, and in preference to others, it is called doubtful as existence in reference to the being which exists of necessity (God), and the beings of contingent existence (the creation.) In the second case, [if a noun has many meanings] it may be, by appointment, equally applicable to those several meanings, like spring [the spring of a clock, a spring of water],—in this case it is called equivocal: or it may have been appointed for one meaning and then have been transferred to a second. If the original meaning has become obsolete the noun is called a transferred word, it depends whether it has been transferred by common usage

[as the word "omnibus"] or as a law term, or as a term of science; in the first case it is called "a conventionally transferred (word)," in the second "a juristically transferred (word)," and in the third "a technically transferred (word)." If a word has not quitted its original subject (lost its original meaning), it is called, in relation to it, proper, and in relation (to the signification) to which it has been transferred, trop. Example, lion, in reference to the animal of that name and in reference to a brave man.

- 18. A word is in reference to another word synonymous (literally riding on the same camel, one behind the other,) with it if they agree in meaning, and heteronymous (literally distinct) if they differ in meaning.
- 14. A compound (oratio) is either complete, that is to say, it has a sense by itself (literally, silence after it is admissible) or incomplete. If a complete compound predicates something true or false, it is called information or proposition, and if it does not predicate any thing it is called interjection. If an interjection has by appointment the meaning of a request that a thing be done, and if (it be uttered) with an authoritative voice, it is an order (or an imperative) as, beat thou! if (it be uttered) in a humble voice it is a question or prayer, and if in a middling voice, a request. If it has not the meaning of a request that a thing be done, it is a warning (exclamation) expressive of whining, or weeping, or wondering, or exclaiming, or swearing. If a compound is not complete, it is either a limitation as "rational animal," or it is not a limitation, as if it consist of a noun and a tool, or of a verb and a tool (adverb).


## SECOND SECTION.

## On Simple Meanings (Predicables).

- 15. A notion is particular (singular) if the apprehension thereof of itself excludes the taking place of association, and it is universal (common), if it does not exclude association. The terms indicating these two things are called particular and universal respectively.
- 16. Mashum "notion" means literally comprehensum, it is therefore the exact equivalent of comprehension as used in western Logic.
- 17. The reason why the author defines "particular" by an apprehension the idea of which excludes plurality, is that terms like "sun" may not be put down as particular.
- 18. The Commentator observes in reference to the terms "particular" and "universal" "Universal is generally a part of the particular, thus [the notion of] homo is a part of Zayd, in like manner animal is a part of homo and body is a part of animal. The particular is therefore a whole the universal a part of ""
- 16. An universal [notion] is either the whole of the quiddity of the particulars under it, or is included in it (i. e. is part of it), or is external, [but joined] to it. The first is called species, whether it contains many individua [or only one, in the former case] it is said in answer to [the question], "what is it?" in regard both to association and peculiarity as homo, [in the latter case] if it does not contain several individua it is said in answer to [the question] "what is it," in regard to its peculiarity only, as "sun." Species is therefore an universal, which is

said of one or several things which agree in their verities in answer to [the question] "what is it."

- 19. Mahyyat "quiddity" is derived from ma quid or from ma howa quid out Acc. English logiciana usu "essence" to express milhyvat. But in Arabic there are two other words which have nearly the same meaning, siz. dans and Angyast and as for each of these three words a representative was to be chosen in English it was found convenient to use essence as the representative for draft. Hagygat is rendered by verity (see note 21). The word manyyat is the most definite, being the contents of the veritable species, thus rational, living, bodily substance endowed with voluntary locomotion are the parts which constitute the mahyyat of Zayd, Bakir, &c., Joriány, p. 205, defines máhyyat "the quiddity of a thing is that by which the thing is what it is (i. e. its ipserty). Of quiddity in itself it can neither be said that it exists or does not exist, nor that it is an universal or particular, nor that it is general or peculiar." The same author, p. 99, gives the same definition of Asqyqat as of mahyyat and then he adds "the verity of a thing is that by which the thing is what it is in reference to its verification (or existence, i. e. we take an actually existing thing, e. g. a straight line on paper and ascertain its properties). Ipscity Library has the same meaning in reference to its individuality : and quiddity has the same meaning without any reference." On the whole the sense of verity seems to be more vague than that of quiddity, and hence it is a favorite term of mystical philosophers. Dzit means "self" "essence," and dzity "essential." It will be observed from note 22 that it is sometimes used in a less extensive meaning than quiddity, but generally it has a more extensive meaning. Joriany says in p. 112 "the essence of a thing is the self of a thing and it consequently comprehends its [inseparable] properties. The essential [part] of a thing is that what peculiarizes it and distinguishes it from every thing else.
- 20. The Commentator blames the author for giving separate definitions for species, in case there is only one individuum under it, as "sun," and in case there are many individua, and says that in doing so he has wandered beyond the limits of Logic.
- 21. Haqáyiq "verities" is the plural of haqyqat, and is derived from haqq "rerum" (germanicé das Wahre) this word is the opposite of bútil "vanum." The word might have been translated by characteristics, but thereby would have been obliterated the affinity of this idea to tahaqquq "to verify," "to ascertain," to motahaqqaq "ascertained" to haqq "verum," and to haqqqy "veritable" which are all of very frequent occurrence.
- 17. In the second case [if the universal is part of the quiddity it must be one of two things, either a genus of the quiddity or its difference], it is called a genus if the universal is the totality of that part [of the quiddity] which is common to the quiddity and to another species. It is said in answer to [the question] "what is it?" in regard to association only. Genus is described as a universal, which is said of many things differing in their verities, in answer to [the question] "what is it."



18. The genus is called near, if the answer [to the question] regarding a [given] quiddity and regarding certain [other species] which are associated with it under that genus is the immediate answer regarding that quiddity, and regarding all [the species] which are associated with the said quiddity, under the same genus, as animal in reference to man.

The genus is called remote, if the answer [to the question] regarding the quiddity and regarding certain [other species] which are associated with it under that genus, is different from the answer regarding the quiddity, and those other [species mentioned above as coming under the near genus]. If the genus is remote by one degree, two answers can be given, as living being in reference to man; and if it is remote by two degrees, three answers can be given, as body in reference to man; and if it is remote by three degrees, four answers can be given, as substance in reference to man, &c.

23. Man, horse, tree and quartz can all be brought under the same denomination or genus "body (matter);" man, horse and tree can be brought under the denomination of "living body"; and man and horse can be brought under the denomination of "animal." Now if you ask

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What is man?
What is quartz?

What is quartz?

What is man?
What is man?
What is horse?

What is man?
What is man?

What is man?

What is man?

What is man?

What is man?

What is man?

What is man?

What is man?

What is man?

What is man?
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- 19. If it (the universal notion) is not (or does not comprehend) the totality of · that part [of the quiddity], which is common to it (the quiddity) and to another species [i. e. if it is not a genus, one of two things must be the case]; either it cannot be common [to both] at all [being peculiar to the quiddity as rational is according to the Arabs to man] or it [is only] a portion of the part which is common to both; although co-extensive therewith. Else (if it were more extensive it would follow that) it must be common to the quiddity and to some other species [not included in the genus] but, agreeably to the above supposition, it must, in reference to such other species, not comprehend the whole part which may be common [to the quiddity and that species], but only a portion of it [and so by assuming that the notion is part of the quiddity of another species we should only rise to a higher branch on the tree of Porphyry]. (This reasoning) does not lead to an [interminable] chain, but to something which is co-extensive with the totality of the part which is common (or genus). This [universal] consequently divides the genus, and whether it distinguish the quiddity from what is associated with it under a genus or under "existence," [which may be considered the summum genus] it is [called] difference (literally.division).
- 24. This paragraph and the commentary thereon are considered the pons asinorum of Arabic Logic. I therefore insert the words of the Commentator in the original with translation and examples between brackets.

فذلك البعض اما أن يكون مبائيناً لتمام المشترك أو اخص منه أو أعم منه أو مساوياً له لا جائز أن يكون مباساً له لا المستول على الشيئ مبائناً له ولا الحمولة و من المحال أن يكون المحمول على الشيئ مبائناً له ولا الحمل المحمولة و من المحال أن يكون المحمول على الشيئ مبائناً له ولا الحمولة و من المحال الم

بدري الدفعي فيلزم وجود الكل بدري الجور و انه مجال ولا اعم الى بعض تمام المشترك بين الماهية و نوع آخر بدري تمام المشترك تحقيقاً لمعنى العموم فيكون مشتركاً بين الماهية و ذلك النوع الذي هو بازاء تمام المشترك لوجودة فيهما فأما أن يكون تمام المشترك بين الماهية وبين نوع ما من الانواع وأما ان لا يكون تمام المشترك بين الماهية وبين نوع ما من الانواع وأما أن لا يكون تمام المشترك بين الماهية تمام المشترك بين الماهية وبين الوع الذي هو بازائها و الثاني تمام المشترك بينها وبين النوع الثاني الذي هو بازائها و الثاني تمام المشترك بينها وبين النوع الثاني الذي هو بازائه تمام المشترك بين الماهية و بين النوع الثاني أعم منه لكل موجودًا في نوع الاول و حينند لو كان بعض تمام المشترك بين الماهية و ذلك النوع الثاني أعم منه لكل موجودًا في نوع آخر بدون تمام المشترك الثاني فيكون مشترك الماهية و ذلك النوع الثاني الذي بازاء تمام المشترك الماهية و الثاني و ليس تمام المشترك بينهما بل بعضه فيصمل تمام مشترك ثالث وهلم جرا فاما أن يوجد الثاني فير متناهية

<sup>&</sup>quot;This portion must either be heterogeneous from the totality of that part of the quiddity which it has in common with another species or it must be more peculiar (less extensive) or more general (more extensive) or co-extensive. It cannot be heterogeneous, for we are speaking of the predicable parts [of the totality] and it is impossible that what is predicable of a thing should be heterogeneous from it. Nor can it contain less, for the more general (or more extensive) is found where the less extensive is not found [e.g. "animal" is found in "horse" but "man" is not found in it. ] It would therefore follow [from this assertion] that the whole [e. g. "animal"=a living, sensitive, corporeal substance with voluntary motion] can exist without some of its parts parts [e. g, "living" or "sensitive".] This is impossible. Nor can it be more general (or more extensive) [as "living being" in reference to "animal,"] for if a portion [e. g. voluntary motion] of the totality [e. g. "animal"] of what a quiddity [e. g. "man"] has in common with another species [e. g. "horse"] is more general than the totality ["animal"] it must also be found in another species [e.g. "tree"] in which the totality is not found, for this is the meaning of "more general." But as it is found in these two it is common to them, i. c. to the quiddity and that species which is independent of the totality (the genus of the quiddity.) It is impossible that what they (the quiddity and this other species-tree) have in common, should be the totality, for the condition is that it should be a portion and not the totality. But if it is not the totality but only a portion of it, the quiddity must have two totalities (genera) in common [with two several species] :- The totality which it has in common with the species which is independent of it (or co-ordinate with the quiddity) and the totality which it has in common with a second species, which is independent of the first named totality. And then if the portion of the totality which the quiddity has in common with a second species is more general than the totality, it must be found in a species [e. g. mineral].in which the second totality is not found, and it must be common to the quiddity and this third species which is independent of the second totality. But again it cannot be the totality of what they have in common, but it must be a portion of it, and so we come to a third totality and so on. Now either we must admit that a quiddity may have an endless number of totalities in common with other species or we must finally arrive at a portion of a totality which portion is co-extensive with the totality. The former supposition must be false, unless we assume that a quiddity consists of an endless number of parts."

<sup>21.</sup> The Commentator points out that the expression [interminable] chain is not used in the text in its proper meaning.

- 20. Difference is described as a universal predicated of a thing to the question "what thing is it in its substance?" It follows that if a verity is composed of two—or several—co-extensive things, each of these two things is its difference, for it distinguishes it from those things which are associated with it in "existence."
- 22. The commentator says that "in its substance" is added to the question, lest an inseparable property might be said in answer. The difference is therefore also called المديز الجوهري "distinguens substantiatis" (distinguens accidentalis."—Ancient Logicians, among them Avicenna in his Shifa, defined difference as an universal said of a thing in reply to the question "what thing of its genus is this in its substance."
- 21. The difference which distinguishes a species from what is associated with it in the genus, is called near (specific), provided it distinguishes it in the near genus e. g. "rational" is the difference of "man" [in the subaltern genus "animal," distinguishing it from other animals]. And it is called remote (generic) if it distinguishes a species from what is associated with it in the remote genus, e. g. "sensitive" is the difference of "man" [in the remote genus "living being"].
- 22. The third [universal is external to the quiddity but joined to it]. If it is inseparable from the essence it is called adherent (property), else it is called separable accident. The adherent adheres to the existence [of a thing], as blackness to the negro, or it adheres to the quiddity, like being even to four. The adherent is [called] evident, if the apprehension of the adherent together with the apprehension of the thing to which it adheres, is sufficient to convince the intellect of the cohesion between the two, as the divisibility of four into two equal parts; and it is [called] not-evident, if a medium is required to convince the intellect of their cohesion, as the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right angles. Some say that an adherent is evident, if the apprehension thereof adheres to the apprehension of the thing of which it is the adherent. The first [definition] is more general. The separable accident may either pass quickly, as the blushing of shame and flushing of anger, or slowly, like greyness of hair, [under the use of certain medicines which are supposed to have this effect], or youth.
- 23. Both the adherent and separable [accident], if they are peculiar to singulars of the same verity, are called peculiar, as risible, else they are called general accident, as locomotion. The "peculiar" is described as a universal said, as a accident, only of things of the same verity. Common accident is described as a universal, said as an accident, of singulars of the same verity and of other things also in the way of accidentality. The universals therefore are five: species, genus, difference, peculiar (accident) and common accident.
- 23. The commentator justly observes that according to the author's division of the accident the universals are seven and not five. We have the inseparable peculiar accident, the inseparable general accident which answer to "property"; and the separable peculiar and separable general which answer to the "accident" of our Logicians. Sayyid Jorjány says in the Kobrà on this subject "that universal which is external to the verity of its individua is called "Peculiar," if it is restricted to one verity. It distinguishes the verity from others by accidentality. Consequently "a Peculiar" is an universal which is said in answer to the question what thing is it in its accident? as "saible in reference to man. If [the universal] be common to two or more verities it is called general accident as "walking" which is common to animals."

#### THIRD SECTION.

## Pive Inquiries on Universals and Particulars.

#### FIRST INQUIRY.

24. [There are] universals, whose existence is impossible in reality, but not the conception thereof of itself, as "an equal to God." [There are universals] whose existence may be possible but they do not really exist, as "a griffon." "[Under some universals] there is only one [individual], and it is impossible that there should be another, as God; or it is possible that there be others, as the sun; or there are many but they are limited in number, as the seven planets; or they are unlimited in number, as the rational souls.

#### SECOND INQUIRY.

25. If we say of "animal" for instance, that it is a universal, three things are to be observed. Animal is to be considered in itself, and as a universal, and as the compound of these two things. The first is called a physical universal, the second a logical universal, and the third a mental (metaphysical) universal. The physical universal is existing in reality, for it (animality) is a part of every animal which exists, and a part of what exists has [of course] existence. In regard to the other two universals, opinions are divided as to their existence in reality. The inquiry on this subject does not belong to logic.

#### THIRD INQUIRY.

- 26. Universals are co-extensive, if one is true of just as much (i. e. of as many individuals) as the other, as "homo" and "rational." There is absolute generality and peculiarity between them (i. e. one is more extensive than the other and contains it wholly), if one of the two, is true of all of which the other is true, but not vice versa; as "animal" and "man." There is generality and peculiarity between them in some respect if either is true only of a part of that of which the other is true; as man and white. And they are heterogeneous if neither of the two is true of any thing of which the other is true; as man and horse.
- 27. The contradictories of two co-extensive [terms] are co-extensive; for else one of them (contradictories) would be true of that about which the other is false, and it would follow that one of the two co-extensive [terms] is true of that about which the other is false—this is impossible. [E. g. every non-man is an irrational being and every irrational being is a non-man.] The contradictory of an absolutely more general [term] is more peculiar than the contradictory of an absolutely more peculiar [term,] for the contradictory of the more peculiar [term] is true of every thing of what the contradictory of the more general term is true, but not vice versa, [non-man contains more than non-animal]. Were the first [of these two assertions] not founded, the peculiar [term] itself [i. e. not its contradictory; man e. g.,] would be true of some things of which the contradictory of the more general [term e. g. non-animal] is true, and

hence it would follow that the more peculiar is true [of certain things] and that the more general is not true [of the same things]—this is impossible. As to the second [assertion viz., that the contradictory of a more general term contains less than the contradictory of a more peculiar term], were it unfounded the contradictory of the more general verm] would be true of every thing of which the contradictory of the more peculiar [term] is true, and hence it would follow that the more peculiar [term] is true of every thing of which the more general is true—this is impossible. There is no generality whatever between the contradictories of terms one of which is more general in 'some respect,' because it is certain that such a generality exists between the absolutely more general [term] itself [e. g. animal] and the contradictory of the more peculiar [term, as for instance non-man;] whilst there is universal heterogeneousness between the contradictory of the absolutely more general and the more peculiar [term] itself. The contradictories of two heterogeneous [terms] are heterogeneous, and their heterogeneousness is [called] particular heterogeneousness, for if [two terms] are in no case true simultaneously [of the same thing], as non-existence and non-nihilum (non-existence and existence), it is [called] universal heterogeneousness; and if they are true simultaneously, as nonman and non-horse, it is called particular heterogeneousness, because one of the two heterogeneous terms is necessarily true [of certain objects] of which the contradictory of the other heterogeneous term is true. Particular heterogeneousness is, therefore, surely an adherent [of the contradictories of two heterogeneous terms.]

## FOURTH INQUIRY.

28. [The term] "particular" is not only used in the abovementioned sense [see § 15]—in which it is called "veritable particular"—but also to denote any more peculiar [term] which is under a more general one, and in this case it is called "relative particular." The latter term is more general than the former, for every veritable particular is a relative particular, but not vice versā. The former is the case (i. e. every veritable particular is a relative particular), because every individuum comes under its quiddity, which denudes [the individua under it] of their individuality, (i. e. which abstracts from the individuality of the individua); and the second is the case (i. e. the reverse is not true), because the relative particular may be a universal, but the veritable particular cannot be a universal.

## FIFTH INQUIRY.

29. The species which is of the description mentioned above [§ 16] is called the veritable species; but the term is also used of any quiddity, if to the question "what is it" regarding the said quiddity [e. g. what is "man?"] and some other quiddity, [e. g. what is "horse"], the genus [e. g. "animal"] is primarily said in answer. This is called the relative species.

 "homo" the primary answer to the question "what is a Turk" being "Acmo." Variety is a species limited by universal accidental attributes, as Turk, Greak.

- 30. Species has four degrees, for either it is the most general of all species, and in this case it is called the high species (summa species), as "body;" or it is the most peculiar, and in this case it is called the low species, as "man," this is also called the species specierum; or it is more general than the low species and more peculiar than the high, this is called the intermediate species, as "animal" and "living body;" or it is detached from all other species, this is called the singular (or solitary) species, as logos, if we say that substance is the genus of logos.
- 25. Qothy says that there is no example of the singular species in existence; but that it is illustrated by logos, for under logos are the ten logoi which agree in the verity of logos, yet logos is not more general than any other species, there being no species but only individua under it nor is it more peculiar there being no species above it but only the genus, viz. substance.
- 31. Genus has the same four degrees, but the high genus (summum genus), e. g. "substance," and not the low genus, e. g. "animal," is called the genus generum in the gradation of the genera. Examples of the intermediate genus, are "living being" and "body," and an example of the singular genus is "logos," supposing that "substance" is not the genus of "logos."
- 32. The relative species is to be found without the veritable species, as in the intermediate species. Again the veritable species is to be found without the relative one, e. g. in indivisible verities. These two kinds of species do not stand to each other in the relation of absolute generality and peculiarity, but either of the two is in some respects more general than the other, because they are both true of the low species.
- 26. The author refutes here the opinion of Avicenna who mentions in his Shifu, that the relative species is absolutely more general than the veritable species.
- 27. Indivisible verities are, logos, soul, unity and rationality, they are not resolvable into a genus and a difference, and therefore they cannot form a relative species.
- 33. If [only] a part of what ought to be said in answer to the question "what is it" is said, and if that be [a] coincident [term,] it is called jucens in via [questionis], quid est, e.g. if we ask regarding man, "what is it," and receive the answer "animal" or "rational," in reference to (or instead of) "rational animal." If [only] a part is said in answer to the same question, and if, what is said, be a term for it by implication, it is called inclusum in responsione (i. e. pars responsionis) [ad questionem] quid est, as "living being," "sensitive," "endowed with voluntary motion," animal being indicated by these terms by implication.
- 34. The summum genus may have a difference which establishes it (or is an essential part of it), for it may be composed of two or more co-extensive things; but it must necessarily have a difference which divides it (separates its significates). The low species must necessarily have a difference which establishes it, but it can have no difference which divides it. The intermediate [genera] must have differentive which establish them and differentive which divide them. Every difference

which establishes the summum genus establishes also the low genus, but not vice versa; again every difference which divides a lower genus divides also the summum genus but not vice versa.

28. "Divide" has not quite the same meaning which it has in English Logic, the Arabs use "division" for "difference," see § 19.

#### FOURTH SECTION.

## On Definitions (i. e. the ways of defining).

- 35. The definiens (definition) of a thing is [an expression] the apprehension of which involves the apprehension of the thing defined, or its distinction from every thing else. The definiens must not be the essence itself [i. e. homo is not a definition for man], for the definiens is known prior to the definitum, and a thing is not known prior to itself. It further must not be more general (more extensive) than the definitum else it does not answer the purpose of definition (or limiting), nor must it be more peculiar (more limited), else it conceals (or excludes some of the individua). The definiens must be co-extensive in generality and peculiarity.
- 36. The definiens is called a limes perfectus (perfect boundary) if it consists of the near genus and near difference, [as rational animal for man]; and limes imperfectus (imperfect, boundary) if it consists of the near difference only, [as rationalis for homo], or of the near difference and the distant genus, [as a rational body for man]. And it is called complete description (literally sketch,) if it consists of the near genus and a property, [as the risible animal for man], and imperfect description, if it consists of the property alone, or of the property and the distant genus, [as risible body for man.]
- 37. Care must be taken not to define a thing by what is equally known or unknown, as if we were to define "motion" by "absence of rest," or "couple" by "what is not single." Nor must a thing be defined by another thing, which is known only through the former. It is equally objectionable whether it be immediately known through it, e. g., if we were to say "report" means an "account" and "account" means "report;" or mediately, e. g., if we were to say the number two is the first pair; pair is what can be divided into two equal parts, two parts are called equal if neither exceed the other and the parts are two.

Care must also be taken not to use barbarous unusual words, whose indication (meaning) is not intelligible to the hearer, for in this case the purpose is lost sight of.

29. The example of "the number two" is not very clear in the original, and it has become still more obscure by the want of a dual in the English language.

#### SECOND BOOK.

#### ON PROPOSITIONS AND RULES REGARDING THEM.

This book is divided into an introduction and three chapters.

#### INTRODUCTION.

Definition of proposition and its primary division.

- 38. Proposition (literally a decision) is a speech, which allows that he who utters it be told that he is true or false (right or wrong). It is called categorical, if its two extremities (terms) are resolvable into two simple [ideas], as Zayd is informed, or Zayd is not informed, [or from "the Sun is rising" follows "the day is approaching,"] and it is hypothetical, if they are not thus resolvable, [e. g. if the Sun rises day will approach].
- 30. The commentator shows that a hypothetical proposition is resolvable into not less than two categorical judgments: such a truth necessitates such another and such a truth is opposed to such another.
- 39. The hypothetical [proposition] is either conjunctive (conditional), or disjunctive. It is called conjunctive, if we pronounce in it a proposition (i. e. one of the two propositions of which it consists) to be true or untrue, under the assumption that another (the other) proposition be true. [Example of an affirmative conjunctive] "if this is a man, it is an animal." [Example of a negative conjunctive], "if this is a man, it cannot be a mineral."

A hypothetical proposition is called disjunctive if we pronounce in it that two propositions exclude (literally deny or refute) each other, either both in [case of] truth and [in case of] falsity or in one of the two only, or that their mutual exclusion is denied, e. g. "this number is either even or odd." "That this man is either u writer or a negro, is not admissible."

31. In the conjunctive the judgment is occupied with deciding whether or not the two propositions of which it consists are connected, and in the disjunctive whether or not they are separated or exclusive of each other.

FIRST SECTION.

ON THE CATEGORICAL (PROPOSITION).

FIRST INQUIRY.

Its parts and kinds.

40. The categorical proposition consists of three parts: the part on which judgment is passed,—which is called subject; the one by which judgment is passed,—which

is called predicate; the relation between the two, showing the bearing of the predicate to the subject—which is called judicial relation; and the word which expresses it is called copula, as "is" in the sentence "Zayd is informed." Such a proposition is called ternary. In some cases, which are very easily intelligible, the copula is omitted, and the proposition is called binary.

- 41. If the relation is of such a description that you can say that the subject is in agreement [with the predicate], the proposition is called affirmative, as man is an animal; and if it is of such a description that you can say that it is not in agreement it is negative, as a man is not a horse.
- 42. If the subject of a categorical proposition is a definite individuum, it (the proposition) is called peculiarized or individual (singular). If the subject is a universal, and if the quantity of the singulars (or individua) of which the judgment is true is shown in it, the word expressing the quantity is called wall and the proposition is called fenced or walled-in. It is of four kinds: if it is shown in it that the judgment [applies] to all the singulars, it is [called] an universal [categorical proposition]. This again is either affirmative [or negative: in the affirmative] the wall is "every one," e. g. every fire is hot. In the negative the wall is "no," "none," "not one," e. g. no man is a mineral. If it is shown in it that the judgment [applies] to some things, it is particular, and [again it is] either affirmative, and [in this case] the wall is "some" one," e. g. some animals are men, or one animals a man; or it is negative and the wall is "not all," "some (are) not," e. g. not all animals are men, or some animals are not men.
- 43. If the quantity of the singulars is not shown in it and if we can neither say that it is a universal nor that it is a particular proposition it is called a physical proposition, e. g. "animal" is the genus and "homo" is the species. But if we can say it is universal or particular [but it is not stated] it is called ambiguous, e. g. man is at a loss, or man is not at a loss. Such a proposition is virtually a particular proposition, for if it predicates that man is at a loss, it predicates that some men are at a loss and vive versă.
- · 32. The reason why such a proposition as is mentioned in the text is called a "physical" proposition is clear from the following words of Qotby "in the physical proposition judgment is passed on the nature of the subject itself and not its significates."

#### SECOND INQUIRY.

## On the four fenced Propositions.

44. The expression every C is B, is sometimes employed in reference to the verity, and its meaning is that every possible (imaginable) singular which may exist and is C, is B by reason of its existence; i. e. whatever is the substrate of C is also the substrate of B. [Such a proposition is called verity-proposition القضية الحقيقية [Such a proposition is called verity-proposition sometimes the expression is used in reference to actual existence, and it means that every C in actual existence, be it at the time of the judgment or before or after

- it, is B in actual existence, [such a proposition is called actuality-proposition عند التفاعة]. The difference between these two views is evident, for if no square exists in reality, still we are correct in saying every square is a figure in regard to the first view, but not in regard to the second. And if no figure did exist but squares, we would be correct in saying every figure is a square by the second view. From this you can deduce rules regarding the other fenced propositions.
- 33. The subject of a proposition is expressed in Arabic by the letter jym, which in this case is pronounced ja and written without a dot, but for the sake of distinction from part of its tail is cut off. It answers to the Greek y, and the Latin C. The predicate is expressed by B. If hamzah is used as a symbol it is pronounced da, and in certain cases a dál is written in instead of the hamzah, as 35 "therefore D."
- 34. The commentator says: If we say C is B there are two things to be observed; we may mean the notion and verity of C, or the significates of C. If we meant to say that the notion of C is equal to the notion of B, all that we should learn from the proposition would be that the two terms are synonymous. It is therefore clear that the expression C is B means that all the individua of which C is true are B, that is to say that the notion of B applies to them. That of which C is true, i. e. the significates of C is called the essence of the ومف الموضوم and the notion and verity of C is called the attribute or title of the subject وأت الموضوع It is called title, because as we learn from the title of a book what its contents are, so from the notion of a term. The title of a term is either the very essence of it (the essence of its significates,) as "homo" is the essence of Zayd, 'Amr, Bakr, &c., or it is a part of the essence as "animal" is in reference to the Zayd, Bakr and other individua; the animal nature being only a part of the quiddity of Zayd, &c. Or it is external to it, as if we say every thing that walks is an animal. The imports of propositions are therefore reducible to two knots and 1. The knot of (arbitrary) appointment; -in this its own attribute is predicated of the subject (Kant calls this the analytical judgment.) 2. The knot of predication ;-in this the attribute of the predicate is predicated of the essence (significates) of the subject, (this is the synthetical judgment of Kaul.) The former is a "limitative sentence" تركيب تقييدي (Kant calls it an explanatory judgment,) and the latter is an "informing sentence" تركيب خبرى (i. e., it tells you some thing new, it gives you information regarding the subject. Kant calls it Erweiterungsurtheil, i. e., enlarging judgment, for it enlarges our knowledge of the subject.) Three things are here to be observed,
- 1. The essence (significates) of the subject. Under this term are not to be understood the singulars of C absolutely [but relatively]. If C is a species, or if it is such a difference or property as is co-extensive with the species, the individual singulars are to be understood under "every C," and if it is a genus or a co-extensive general accident, the individual singulars and the specific singulars [أقراق النوعية] are to be understood: e. g. what we predicate of "omnis homo" or "omnis rationalis" or "omnis ridens," we predicate solely of Zayd, 'Amr. &c., but what we predicate of "omne animal," "omne ambulans" we predicate both of the individual singulars, Zayd, 'Amr. Bucephalus, &c., and also of the natura specifical [applied Characteristics of the species,) of homo and equus, &c. Hence the schoolmen say what one universal predicates of another is predicated of the species and of the singulars under it عمل بعض الكليات على بعض الما المناوعة المناوعة
- 2. The predicability of the attribute about the subject. The opinions on this point are divided. Faryaby says that possibility constitutes predicability without regard to actual existence. Avicenna on the other hand thinks that actual existence, present, past or future, constitutes predicability, c. g. according Faryaby, if we predicate B of every black man, it means every man who may happen to be black even Europeans, for it is not impossible that they be black; but according to Avicenna the judgment would not apply to Europeans, because there is no instance on record that they were black, nor is there any reason to suppose that they will ever be so. The opinion of Avicenna is the one which is generally received.
- 3. Predicability of the predicate about the essence (significates) of the subject. It may be necessary, contingent, perpetual, actual, &c., as will be explained in the paragraph on modals.

Now if we say every imaginable C if it should exist will be found to be B, the judgment does not refer to the existing individua of C only but also to its hypothetical significates, and it is true though no individuan should exist. This will be intelligible if we say no triangle is a square, because these two terms indicate by appointment cer-

tain figures the definitions of which exclude each other. The same applies to really existing things, e. g: if we say man is not a monkey. The terms man and monkey are applied to certain beings to which certain definitions answer, and as the definition of man (rational) excludes that of a monkey (irrational,) it is impossible that a being be discovered which is a man and at the same time a monkey. The notion of monkey has in fact as arbitrary limits as the notion of a triangle or of a mathematical point.

#### THIRD SECTION.

## On Privatives and Attributives.

- 45. If a negative particle is part of the subject, e. g. an inanimate being is a mineral; or of the predicate e. g. minerals are without intellect (unintellectual); or of both; the proposition is called privative whether it be affirmative or negative. But if no particle forms part of either extremity then the proposition, if it be affirmative, is called attributive and if it be negative indivisible.
- 46. A proposition is affirmative or negative by reason of its affirmative or negative relation (copula) and not by reason of its extremities. If we say "every thing that is not living is without intellect," it is an affirmative proposition though both extremities are nonentities, and if we say "a moving being is not at rest" it is a negative proposition though both extremities have [positive] existence.
- 47. The indivisible negative proposition [e.g. the partner of God is not omnipotent] is more general (contains more) than the affirmative with privative predicate, [e.g. the partner of God is impotent], for the negation may be true though the subject is an nonentity (i. e. though there is no such thing as a partner of God, we can still say if there were one he could not be omnipotent), but the affirmation cannot be true (i. e. if we say the partner of God is impotent, we admit that there is a partner): because affirmation is admissible only in regard to a thing of ascertained (or acknowledged) existence, as for instance in propositions whose subject is an actually existing individuum or in regard to a thing of assumed existence as for instance in propositions whose subject is a verity. If the subject does exist the indivisible negative and affirmative privative propositions are equivalent. The difference in the expression [between the indivisible negative and the affirmative with a privative predicate] is this: in the ternary, if it is affirmative, the copula stands before the negative particle, and, if it is negative, it stands after the particle, [as there are no binary propositions in English; the following sentence, of the text which refers to a peculiarity of the Arabic language is omitted].

#### FOURTH INQUIRY.

#### On Modal Propositions.

48. The relation of the predicates to the subjects, be they affirmative or negative, must have a certain qualification as "necessarily," "perpetually." "not-necessarily" "not-perpetually." Such a qualification is called the *materia* of the proposition, and the word expressing it, is called the mode of the proposition.

- 49. There are thirteen modal propositions into which it is usual to inquire. Some of them are simple, that is to say, their verity is simply an affirmation or negation; and some are compound, that is to say, their verity is composed at the same time of an affirmation and a negation.
  - 50. There are six simple modal propositions.
- 1. The absolute necessary [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject of necessity as long as the essence of the subject exists, as if we say, "every man is of necessity an animal" and " of necessity no man is a stone."
- 2. The absolute perpetual [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject in perpetuity as long as the essence of the subject exists. The preceding affirmative and negative examples apply to this case.
- 3. The general conditioned [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of necessity under the condition of [the continuance of] a certain attribute of the subject, as if we say "every writer is of necessity moving the fingers as long as he writes." "A writer does not keep his fingers at rest as long as he writes."
- 4. The general conventional [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject in perpetuity under the condition of [the continuance of] a certain attribute of the subject. The preceding affirmative and negative examples illustrate this case.
- 5. The general absolute [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is actually affirmed or denied of the subject, as if we say "every man without exception (literally with general absoluteness) is breathing." "Every man without exception (literally with general absoluteness) is not breathing."
- 6. The general possible [proposition]. It pronounces that there is no absolute necessity that what is contrary to the judgment should not be the case, as "by a general possibility fire may be hot." "By a general possibility what is warm is not cold."
  - 51. The compound modal propositions are seven in number.
- 1. The special conditioned. It is the same as the general conditioned with the restriction that the relation of the subject to the predicate is not [enounced to be] perpetual in regard to the essence [of the subject]. If it is affirmative, as "every writer of necessity moves his fingers as long as he writes, but not perpetually," it is composed of the affirmative general conditioned and of the negative general absolute propositions. And if it is negative, as "the fingers of a writer are necessarily not at rest as long as he writes, but not perpetually," it is composed of the negative general conditioned and of the general affirmative absolute.
- 2. The special conventional [proposition] is the same as the general conventional with the restriction that [the relation do] not [take place] perpetually in reference to the essence. If it is affirmative it is composed of the affirmative general conventional and of the negative general absolute, and if it is negative it is composed of the negative general conventional and of the affirmative general absolute. The preceding affirmative and negative examples illustrate this case.

- 3. The not-necessary existencial. It is the same as the general absolute with the restriction that [the relation do] not [take place] of necessity in reference to the essence. If it is affirmative, as "man is actually risible (or it happens that man is risible) but not of necessity (he would be man without that property;)" it is composed of the affirmative general absolute and the negative general possible. And if it is negative, as "man is not actually risible but not necessarily" it is composed of the negative general absolute and the affirmative general possible.
- 4. The non-perpetual existencial. It is the same as the general absolute with the restriction of non-perpetuity in reference to the essence [of the subject]. Whether it be affirmative or negative it is composed of two general absolute [propositions] one of which is affirmative and the other negative. The preceding affirmative and negative examples explain this case.
- 5. The temporal. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject of necessity during a definite period of the existence of the subject, under the restriction of non-perpetuity in regard to the essence [of the subject]. If it is affirmative, as "an eclipse of the moon takes of necessity place during the time the earth is placed between the sun and the moon but not perpetually," it is composed of the affirmative absolute temporal and the negative general absolute. And if it is negative, as "of necessity no eclipse of the moon takes place when the earth, moon and sun are at right angles but not perpetually," it is composed of the negative absolute temporal and the affirmative general absolute.
- 6. The spread [proposition]. It pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject of necessity and during an indefinite period of the existence of the subject, under the restriction of non-perpetuity in reference to the essence [of the subject]. If it is affirmative, as "every man is of necessity breathing at times but not perpetually," it is composed of the affirmative absolute spread [proposition] and the negative general absolute. And if it is negative, as "man is of necessity not breathing at times but not perpetually," it is composed of the negative absolute spread [proposition] and the affirmative general absolute.
- 7. The particular possible [or contingent proposition]. It pronounces that there is no absolute necessity either for the existence or non-existence of the thing (or relation). It makes no difference whether it is affirmative, as "by peculiar possibility every man is a writer (i. e. every man can or may be a writer,)" or negative, as "by peculiar possibility every man is not a writer." It is composed of two general possible propositions, one of which is affirmative and the other negative.

The general rule is that, if a proposition is restricted by non-perpetuity, it indicates that it is a general absolute proposition, and if it is restricted by non-necessity, that it is a general possible proposition disagreeing in mode but agreeing in quantity.

#### SECOND SECTION.

## On the different kinds of hypothetical Propositions.

52. The first part (or the first proposition) of a hypothetical is called antecedent and the second consequent.

It (the hypothetical proposition) is either conjunctive or disjunctive. [See § 39.] The conjunctive (conditional) is either cogent (literally adhesive) [or contingent.] In the cogent the consequent is true under the supposition that the antecedent be true on account of the connexion between them, which is the cause thereof, as for instance, if the two propositions be connected by causation [e. g. if the sun rises day approaches, if day approaches the sun rises; if day approaches the world becomes illuminated—the cause of both phenomena being the rising of the sun;] or correlation [e. g. if Zayd is the father of Bakr, Bakr is his son]. In the contingent [the consequent is true if the antecedent is true] by merely accidental agreement of the two parts (or of the two propositions of which the hypothetical consists) in being true, e. g. if man is endowed with reason, the donkey is endowed with the faculty of braying.

53. The disjunctive [hypothetical proposition] is divided into the veritable disjunctive proposition [the incompatible and the exclusive]. The veritable disjunctive proposition pronounces that its two parts exclude each other (literally deny or refute each other) both in [case of] truth and [in case of] falsity, [i. e. if the one is true the other must be false and also if the one is false the other must be true,] as "this number is either even or odd." The incompatible disjunctive (literally the hypothetical which excludes co-existence) pronounces that the two parts are opposed to each other in truth only, e. g. this thing is either a stone or a tree, [if it is a stone it cannot be a tree, but it may be neither of the two, and therefore if it is not a stone it does not follow that it is a tree]. The exclusive hypothetical (literally the hypothetical which leaves no vacuum) pronounces that the two parts are opposed to each other in falsity only, as "either Zayd is at sea or else he will not be drowned."

Each of these three kinds [of disjunctives] is either antagonistical [or coincidental]. A disjunctive is called antagonistical if the two parts exclude each other in their nature, as in the above examples; and it is called coincidental, if this exclusion is a mere coincidence as if we say "non-writer" of a black man. But if we say the man is either black or a writer it is a veritable disjunctive proposition; if, he is a not-black or a writer, it is an incompatible proposition; and if, he is either black or a not-writer, it is an exclusive proposition.

- 54. Any of these eight [hypothetical] propositions is called negative if that [connexion or exclusion] which is pronounced [to exist] in the affirmative, is denied. If it negatives the cohesion, it is called negative-cogent, if it negatives antagonism it is called negative-antagonistic, and if it denies coincidence it is called negative-coincidental.
- 36. Example "it is certainly not the case that when the sun rises it be night," is negative-cogent, for it denies the existence of a connexion (or cohesion) between sun rise and night, but "if the sun rises it is not night, is affirmative cogent, for it affirms the connexion between sun rise and the negation of the existence of night.
- 55. The affirmative conjunctive proposition is true (i. e. the inference is correct) of two true and of two false [propositions, e. g. if Zayd is a man he is an animal; if Zayd is a stone he is a mineral]; and of one whose truth and falsity is not known [e. g. if Zayd be writing he is moving his fingers], and of a false antecedent and true consequent, [e. g. if Zayd be a donkey he is an animal,] but not the reverse, because from a true [proposition] does not follow a false one.

The affirmative conjunctive is false (nugatory) of two false parts (propositions) and of a false antecedent and true consequent and vice versa, and if it be cogent also of two true [propositions], but if it is coincidental, it is impossible that it be false of two true [propositions].

The veritable affirmative disjunctive proposition is true of one true and one false [proposition], e. g. this number is either even or odd; and it is false (nugatory) of two true and of two false [propositions, e. g. four is either even or divisible by two; three is either pair or divisible by two]. The incompatible is true (holds) of two false [propositions, e. g. Zayd may be a tree or a stone]; and of a true one and a false one, [e. g. Zayd may be a stone or a man]; and it is false (nugatory) of two true ones [e. g. Zayd may be a man or rational]. The exclusive is true of two true [propositions] and of a true one and a false one and it is false (nugatory) of two false ones. The negative is true of what the affirmative is false and it is false of what the affirmative is true.

- 56. The universality of a hypothetical proposition consists in this, that (or a hypothetical proposition is called universal if) the consequent be adherent or antagonistic to the antecedent [at all times] and under all circumstances under which the antecedent can be, that is to say, such circumstances under which the antecedent may be placed by reason of its connexion with things which are compatible with it. The hypothetical proposition is particular if this is the case under some of those circumstances, and it is peculiarized if it is the case under a definite circumstance. The walls (terms indicative) of the affirmative universal are "whenever," "whatever," "when," [c. g. whenever the sun rises it is day], and of the disjunctive "always" [or "at any time," e. g. at any time either the sun is up or it is not day]. The wall of the negative universal is in both cases, (i. e. in the conjunctive and disjunctive) "certainly not" [e.g. when the sun is up it is certainly not night]. The wall of the affirmative particular is in both cases "it will then be," [e. g. it will then be day when the sun rises] and of the negative particular in both cases "it will then not be." An affirmative universal can be rendered negative by the introduction of the negative particle into the wall. The walls of the ambiguous conjunctive are simply "if" "when" and of the ambiguous disjunctive "either--or."
- 57. The hypothetical [proposition] may be composed [1] of two categorical propositions or [2] of two conjunctive ones or [3] of two disjunctive ones or [4] of a categorical and of a conjunctive one or [5] of a categorical and disjunctive one or [6] of a conjunctive and a disjunctive one. Each of the last three kinds if it be conjunctive is sub-divided into two sorts on account of the natural distinction between their antecedent and consequent. But the disjunctives are not thus sub-divided because their antecedent is distinguished from the consequent by appointment only. There are therefore nine divisions (or kinds) of conjunctive hypotheticals and six of disjunctive hypotheticals. You will be able to form examples yourself.
- 37. Examples of the nine conjunctives. 1. Whenever this is a man it is an animal. 2. Whenever it happens that a thing is a man it is an animal, and whenever a thing is not an animal it is not a man. 3. Always whenever it is met with this number will be even or odd, and always it will be either divisible into equal parts or not divisible. 4. (Consisting of a categorical and of a conjunctive proposition,) if sunrise is the cause of day, whenever

the sun rises it is day. 5. (The reverse of the preceding,) as it happens that whenever the sun rises it is day, the being day proves sun-rise. 6. (Consisting of a categorical and a disjunctive proposition,) if this is a number, it will always be either even or odd. 7. (The reverse,) whenever this is either even or odd it is a number. 8. (Consisting of a conjunctive and a disjunctive proposition,) if, always, whenever the sun rises, it is day, it will always be, that either the sun is rising or it is not day. 9. (The reverse,) if it always happens that either the sun is rising or it is not day, whenever the sun rises it is day.

#### THIRD SECTION.

#### RULES CONCERNING PROPOSITIONS.

#### FIRST INQUIRY.

### On Contradiction.

- 58. Contradiction is defined as a difference between two propositions in affirming and denying of such a description, that it follows from the difference itself [without medium,] that the one be true and the other false, [e. g. Zayd is a man, Zayd is not a man. But, Zayd is a man, Zayd is irrational, are not included in this definition, because they are contradictory by a medium.]
- 38. The term used by the Arabs for proposition means decision; and the word which is translated here by contradictory means "rescindens." The commentator says, that which annuls a thing is called its rescindent. In § 27 this term has precisely the same meaning as "contradictory" but this is not always the case. The commentator says the contradictory of the proposition, every man is necessarily an animal, is—it is not the case. The same holds good in all other propositions. In many cases however the contradictory of a proposition has a definite attributive sense, but this is not always the case. It may however happen that the contradictory has a co-extensive adherens which has an intelligible attributive meaning, and if this is the case the term contradictory is applied to it (the adharens). The contradictories of propositions become thereby new propositions with a definite meaning. "Contradictory" then is used in this chapter either for the contradictory itself or for an adharens, which is co-extensive with the contradictory isself.
- 59. The contradiction of two peculiar (singular) propositions is not ascertained (established), unless the subject and predicate are identical, [example of the contrary: Zayd stands, Amr does not stand.] The identity of the former (subject) comprizes the unity of the condition, [example of the contrary: a body is visible, if it be white, a body is not visible, if it be black;] and the unity of "part" and "all" (quantity of the proposition,) [example of the contrary: Africans are black, that is to say some of them; the Africans are not black, that is to say not all of them.] The identity of the predicate comprizes unity of time and place, [example of the contrary: Zayd sleeps at night or in bed, Zayd wakes at day time or in the bázár,] unity of relation, [example of the contrary: Zayd is father, i. e. of 'Amr; Zayd is not father, i. e. of Bake,] unity of possibility and reality, [example of the contrary: wine inebriates in a basin, i. e. it may inebriate; wine does not inebriate in a basin, it does not do so actually.]

If the two propositions be fenced, it is requisite, in addition to the above, that there be a difference in quantity, for two particulars are true, [e. g. some animals are men, some animals are not men,] and two universals are false [e. g. every animal is a man, no animal is a man,] in every matter in which the subject is more general

(more extensive) than the predicate. In the "all" it is requisite that there be a difference in the mode; for two possible (contingent) propositions are true and two necessary propositions false in matter of possibility (contingency).

- 60. The contradictory of the absolute necessary proposition is the general possible, for if the necessity is of necessity negatived, the two propositions will surely be contradictory. The contradictory of the absolute perpetual proposition is the general absolute; because the contradiction of the negative "at no time" is the affirmation "at some times," and vice versā. The contradictory of the general conditioned is the possible temporal, that is to say, the proposition which pronounces that necessity in reference to the attribute [see § 50] is not applicable to the converse, e.g. every body affected with pleurisy will cough at times on account of his illness. The contradictory of the general conventional is the absolute temporal, i. e. the proposition which pronounces that the predicate is affirmed or denied of the subject at some times when the subject is under certain circumstances. The preceding examples illustrate this case.
- 61. The contradictory of a compound proposition is the contradiction of its two parts. This will be evident to you after you have comprehended the verities of compound propositions and the contradictories of simple propositions, for after you have ascertained that the non-perpetual existential proposition is composed of two general absolute propositions, one of which is affirmative and the other negative, and that the contradictory of the absolute is the perpetual, you will understand, that its opposite is the opposite perpetual or the agreeing perpetual.
- 62. If [the compound proposition] is particular, what we have mentioned will not be sufficient to contradict it, for it would be false, were we to say "some bodies are animals but not always." And it would be equally wrong, were we to employ the contradictory of either of the two parts [e. g. no body is ever an animal]. The correct way of forming the contradictory is to place the contradictories of the two parts universally into a dilemmatic sentence, that is to say, every one must be the contradictory of one of the two parts, e. g. every single individuum of the genus 'body' is ever either an animal or not an animal.
- 63. The contradictory of the universal hypothetical is the particular which agrees with it in genus and species, but which is opposed to it in "quale" (quality) and "quantum" (quantity,) and vice versa.

#### SECOND INQUIRY.

## On even Conversion (Conversio Simplex).

64. Even conversion is an expression which means that the first part of a proposition be put second and the second part first, and that the truth and quale remain unaltered, (i. c. that the converted proposition remain true, if the original proposition is true, and that it remain affirmative, if the original one is affirmative, and negative if (negative,) (e. g. every man is an animal—some animals are men; or no man is a stone, no stone is a man.)

- 65. There are seven [modal] forms of negative universal propositions, which cannot be converted, viz., the two temporals, the two existentials, the two possibles and the general absolute; because the most peculiar among them, the temporal, does not admit of conversion, and if the most peculiar cannot be converted the more general ones cannot be converted, for if the more general can be converted, surely the more peculiar can also be converted; for an adhærens of the more general thing, of necessity, also adheres to the more peculiar. We are correct in saying, the moon can by no means be celipsed, when she, the sun, and earth form a right angle, but not always; and we are wrong in saying, by general possibility some lunar eclipses may happen to [another celestial body and] not to the moon. In this example we have chosen the most general mode; for every lunar eclipse operates of necessity on the moon.
- 66. The [negative] absolute necessary and absolute perpetual, become by conversion [negative] universal perpetual, for if it is of necessity, or always true, that no C is B, it is always true that no B is C, else some B would, by general absoluteness, be C, and this, together with the original proposition, would prove that some B is necessarily not B—in necessary propositions, and that some B is always not B—in perpetual propositions. This is absurd.
- 67. The general conditioned and the general conventional become by conversion universal general conventional, for if it is of necessity or perpetually true that no C is B, as long as C exists; no B can ever be C, as long as B exists, else let us suppose that some B is C, whilst it is B, and it follows, if this is taken in connexion with the original proposition, that some B is not B whilst it is B. This is absurd.

The peculiar conditioned and the peculiar conventional are converted into the peculiar non-perpetual conventional. The reason of this process in reference to the general conventional is, that it is an adherent of both kinds of general propositions, (i. c. the general conventional and the general conditioned.) The reason why the converted proposition is peculiar non-perpetual, is, because it is not true that some B is absolutely and generally C, because it is true that no B is always C, and therefore it is converted into "no C is always B," but the original proposition was that every C is B. We have therefore proved our thesis by reductio ad absurdum.

39. Paragraphs 68, 69 and 70, and again 72, 73 and 74, and again 84, 85 and 86, are omitted in the translation, because they contain details on modals which are of no interest. The last named four paragraphs are also omitted in most Arabic text books on Logic, and not studied in Mohammedan Schools.

#### THIRD INQUIRY.

## On Conversion by Contradiction.

71. This expression means to place the contradictory of the second part of a proposition first, and the first part unaltered second. The quale of the new proposition will be the opposite of the original proposition, but it will be equally true, [e. g. every man is an animal, and no not-animal is a man.]

40. Ancient Logicians made the process consist in simply prefixing the negative particle to each term and transposing them, e. g. every man is an animal; all that is not-animal is not-man. Their view has been rejected, because, as it has been stated above, the negative privative proposition is more general than the affirmative attributive.

#### FOURTH INQUIRY.

#### On the Cohesion of Hypotheticals.

75. The affirmative universal conjunctive must be convertible into an incompatible proposition, consisting of the antecedent unaltered and of the contradictory of the consequent, and into an exclusive proposition consisting of the contradictory of the antecedent and of the unaltered consequent, and should it not be thus convertible the adhesion and conjunction are unsound.

The veritable disjunctive proposition must be convertible into four conjunctive propositions. The antecedent of two of them is one of the parts [of the original proposition] unaltered and the consequent is the contradictory of the other part. The antecedent of the other two is the contradictory of one of the two parts and the consequent is the other part unaltered. Every other hypothetical proposition than the veritable must be convertible into another, composed of the contradictories of the two parts.

#### THIRD BOOK.

#### ON SYLLOGISM.

#### FIRST CHAPTER.

### Definition and division of Syllogism.

- 76. Syllogism is a speech composed of propositions, [of such a nature, that] if they are admitted, there follows, from them, taken in themselves, another speech.
- 41. The reader will observe that the term syllogism comprises in Arabic only the two premises and not the conclusion.

The words "taken in themselves" are used in the definition in order to exclude arguments in which a strange premiss is employed as a medium to arrive at a conclusion, as A=B, and B=C; therefore A=C. Instead of equal you may read "substrate" in the above example, c, g., Mckkah is in Arabia, Arabia is in Asia; therefore Mckkah is in Asia. The following example will show that this is not a syllogism: A is different from B, B is different from C—from which nothing can be inferred.

77. A Syllogism is [called] interpellative (hypothetical), if the conclusion itself or its contrary is actually mentioned in it, as "if this be a body, it is spacial." Here the very conclusion is mentioned in it. And if we say "but it is not spacial" it follows that it is not a body. In this instance the contradictory is mentioned in it. A Syllogism is called conjugate if it is not like the preceding, e. g. "every body is composed of parts, every thing composed of parts is temporal," it follows "every body is temporal." Neither the conclusion nor its opposite are actually mentioned in it.

- 42. The hypothetical syllogism is called interpellative, because the conjunction الكن "but" is used in it, which is called the "exceptive conjunction" in Logic, but in grammar it is called "reparative or interpellative conjunction". The latter term appears to me best to express the idea. The sentence following "but" is called "mixed which literally means exception but which I translate by interpellation.
- 78. The subject of the question is called minor [term,] and its predicate is called major, and a proposition which forms part of a Syllogism is called premiss, and the premiss which contains the minor [term] is called minor [premiss], and that which contains the major [term] major [premiss], and the repeated intermediate term is called the middle term, the conjugation (connexion) between the minor and major premisses is called the mood, and the shape resulting from the manner in which the middle term is placed in regard the other two terms is called figure. There are four figures: in the first figure the middle term is the predicate in the minor premiss and the subject in the major premiss; in the second figure it is the predicate in both; in the third figure it is the subject in both; and in the fourth figure it is the subject in the minor premiss.
- 43. If the premisses of a syllogism, says Qotby, are categoric propositions, it is called categoric syllogism القياس الحملي. If the "adhærens" is considered as the result of the syllogism, it is called conclusion المطلوب and if it is yet to be demonstrated by a syllogism, question المطلوب). The minor term is generally less extensive than the major, hence their names.
- 79. In the first figure the minor premiss must be affirmative, for else the minor term is not contained in the middle term. The major premiss must be a universal (proposition), else it may be that some [things] predicated by the major term are not the same which are predicated of the minor term. It [this figure] admits of four conclusive moods. First, from two affirmative universals an affirmative universal conclusion is derived, as "every C is B; and every B is A; therefore every C is A."

Secondly.—From two universals, the minor premiss being affirmative and the major negative, a universal negative conclusion results as every C is B, no B is A, therefore no C is A.

Thirdly.—From two affirmatives, the minor premiss being a particular, results a particular affirmative conclusion, as some C is B, every B is  $\Lambda$ ; therefore some C is  $\Lambda$ .

Fourthly.—From an affirmative particular minor premiss and a negative universal major premiss results a negative particular conclusion, as some C is B, no B is A; therefore some C is not A.

The conclusions of this figure are self-evident.

80. In the second figure the two premisses must be different in quale (one must be affirmative and the other negative;) and the major premiss must be a universal: else (if either of these two conditions is not fulfilled) we get a non-identity which warrants no inference, i. e. from correct premisses, sometimes, you obtain a conclusion which you are able to affirm, and, at another, one which you are obliged to deny.

The conclusive moods are again four. Firstly,—From two universals, the minor premiss being affirmative, a negative universal conclusion is obtained, e. g., every C [man] is B [animal;] no A [stone] is B [animal;] therefore no C [man] is A [a stone.] This can be shown by reductio ad impossibile, i. e., the contradictory of

the conclusion is attached to the major premiss, producing the contradictory of the minor premiss as conclusion, [e. g., if you deny that no man is a stone, let us suppose, some men are stones; under this supposition we have: some men are stones; no stone is an animal; therefore some men are not animals—this is contrary to the admission, that every man is an animal.] [It can also be demonstrated] by conversion of the major premiss, [e. g., every animal is a not-stone,] whereby it is reduced to the first figure.

Secondly.—From two universals, the major premiss being affirmative a negative universal conclusion is obtained, e. g., no C is B; and every A is B; therefore no C is A. This can be demonstrated by reductio ad impossibile; and also by converting the minor premiss, putting it into the place of the major [taking the major as the minor and converting of the conclusion].

Thirdly.—From an affirmative particular minor premiss and negative universal major a negative particular conclusion is deduced, as: some C [men] are B [fair]; no  $\Lambda$  [negro] is B; therefore some C are not  $\Lambda$ . This can be demonstrated by reductio ad impossibile and conversion of the major whereby it is reduced to the first figure. [It can also be demonstrated by supposition:] let us suppose for this purpose that the exact subject of the particular proposition be D [Caucasians], then every D is B, no  $\Lambda$  is B; therefore no D is  $\Lambda$ . Hence we say, some C is D; and no D is  $\Lambda$ ; therefore some C is not  $\Lambda$ .

Fourthly. From a negative particular minor and an affirmative universal major a negative particular conclusion is deduced, as: some C is not B; and every  $\Lambda$  is B; therefore some C is not  $\Lambda$ . It can be demonstrated by reductio ad impossibile; and by supposition, if the negative be compound, (i.  $e_i$  not indivisible, otherwise the subject might have no assignable significates; see § 46.)

81. In the third figure the minor must be affirmative, else there will be non-identity, and one of the two premises must be universal, else some of the things of which the minor term is predicated may be different from some of the things of which the major is predicated, and consequently it leads to no result.

The conclusive moods of this figure are six: First.—From two universal affirmative premisses an affirmative particular conclusion is derived, as, every B is C; and every B is A; therefore some C is A. It can be demonstrated by reductio ad impossibile, i. e. the contradictory of the conclusion is [taken as major premiss and] added to the minor premiss to deduce the contradictory of the major; and [it can also be demonstrated by reduction to the first figure,] which is effected by the conversion of the minor.

Secondly.—From two universals the minor premiss being negative, a negative particular conclusion is deduced, as: every C is B, and no B is A; therefore some C is not A. [It can be demonstrated by reductio ad impossibile and] by conversion of the minor premiss.

Thirdly.—From two affirmative premisses, the major being a universal, an affirmative particular conclusion is deduced, as, some B is C, and every B is A; therefore some C is A. [This can be demonstrated] by reductio ad impossibile and by conversion of the minor, and by supposing the [exact] subject of the particular premiss to be D. Then: every D is B, and every B is A; therefore every D is A, then we say: D is C and every D is A; therefore some C is A; and this was to be demonstrated.

Fourthly.—From an affirmative particular minor premiss and a negative universal major a particular negative conclusion is deduced, as some B is C, and no B is A; therefore some C is not A. This can be demonstrated by reductio ad impossibile and by conversion of the minor and by supposition.

Fifthly.—From two affirmative premisses the minor being universal an affirmative particular is derived, as, every B is C, and some B is  $\Lambda$ ; therefore some C is  $\Lambda$ . This can be shown by reductio ad impossibile and by using the converted major as minor and then converting the conclusion. It can also be shown by supposition.

Sixthly.—From an affirmative universal minor premiss and a negative particular major a negative particular conclusion is derived, as, every B is C, and some B is not A, therefore some C is not A. This can be shown by reductio ad impossibile and by supposition if the negative be compound [see § 46].

82. Fourth figure. In regard to the quality, and quantity, it is necessary that the two premisses be affirmative and the minor premiss a universal; or the two premisses must differ from each other in quality and one of them must be a universal. If this be not the case there will be non-identity which renders it impossible to come to a conclusion. This figure has eight conclusive moods:

First.—From two affirmative universal premisses an affirmative particular conclusion is deduced, as, every B is C, and every A is B; therefore some C is  $\Lambda$ . It is demonstrated by conversion of the arrangement which gives a converted conclusion, [i. e. every A is B, and every B is C; therefore every A is C.]

Secondly.—From two affirmative premisses, the major being a particular, follows an affirmative particular conclusion, as, every B is C, and some A is B; therefore some C is A; the demonstration is the same as in the preceding mood.

Thirdly.—From two universal premisses, the minor being negative, follows a negative universal conclusion, as, no B is C, and every  $\Lambda$  is B; and therefore no C is  $\Lambda$ . The demonstration is the same as above.

Fourthly.—From two universal premisses, the minor being affirmative, follows a negative particular conclusion, as, every B is C, and no  $\Lambda$  is B; therefore some C is not  $\Lambda$ . It is demonstrated by the conversion of the two premisses; [viz. some C is B, and no B is  $\Lambda$ ; therefore some C is not  $\Lambda$ .]

Fifthly.—From an affirmative particular minor and a negative universal major follows a negative particular conclusion, as, some B is C, and no  $\Lambda$  is B; therefore some C is not  $\Lambda$ . It is demonstrated like the preceding.

Sixthly.—From a negative particular minor and an affirmative universal major follows a negative particular conclusion, as, some B is not C, and every  $\Lambda$  is B; therefore some C is not  $\Lambda$ . By conversion of the minor it is reduced to the second [figure].

Seventhly.—From an affirmative universal minor and a negative particular major follows a negative particular conclusion, as, every B is C, and some A is not B; therefore some C is not A. By conversion of the major it is reduced to the third figure.

Eighthly.—From a negative universal minor and an affirmative particular major follows a negative particular conclusion, as, no B is C, and some A is B; therefore some C is not A. It is demonstrated by conversion of the arrangement whereby a converted conclusion is arrived to; the first five moods can also be demonstrated by

reductio ad impossibile, that is to say, the contradictory of the conclusion is added to one of the two premisses in order that a conclusion may be come to, which is the converse of the contradictory of the other premiss [e. g., supposing it be not true that some C is A, then it must be true that no C is A; then let us take this as the major premiss and add, every B is C, as the minor; and it follows, no B is A, and by conversion no A is B]. The second and fifth mood can be demonstrated by supposition. We employ supposition for demonstrating the second mood, and the fifth can then be treated in the same manner. Let some individua of A be D, then it follows that every D is A and every D is B, therefore we say, every B is C, and every D is B, and some C is D, and every D is A, and some C is A; this was to be demonstrated.

83 The ancients considered only the first five moods of this figure as conclusive and they held that owing to non-identity in the conclusion the remaining three were not conclusive, this is the case if both premisses are simple, we therefore make it a condition that the negative premiss be of one of the two kinds of peculiar propositions [i. e. the conditioned or the conventional]. This obviates non-identity.

#### THIRD SECTION.

#### Conjugate Syllogism containing hypothetical premisses.

- 87. These are of five kinds.—The first is composed of conjunctive premisses. The norm of this class is a syllogism in which the two premisses have a complete part (term) in common and in reference to this term syllogisms of this kind are classed under the four figures. If the common term is the consequent in the minor premiss and the antecedent in the major, we have the first figure. If it is the consequent in both we have the second. If it is the antecedent in both we have the third figure. If it is the antecedent in the minor premiss and the consequent in the major we have the fourth figure. The conditions of arriving at conclusions, the number of moods and the quantity and quality of the conclusion of every figure are exactly the same as in the categorical. Example of the first mood: whenever A is B, C is D, and whenever C is D, E is Z, consequently whenever A is B, E is Z.
- 88. Second kind. It is composed of two disjunctive premisses; the norm of this class is a syllogism in which the two premisses have not a complete part in common, as: invariably either every A is B or every C is D; again, either every D is E, or every D is Z, consequently, either every A is B or every C is E or every D is Z. [This conclusion is correct,] on account of the exclusiveness which there exists between the two premisses of the composition [i. e., every C is D and every D is E] and one of the other two premisses [i. e. every A is B and every E is Z].
- 89. Third kind. It is composed of a categoric and conjunctive premiss. The norm of this class is a syllogism in which the categorical proposition is the major and has a term in common with the consequent of the conjunctive [minor]. The conclusion of the syllogism is a conjunctive proposition, the antecedent of which is the antecedent of the conjunctive premiss, and the consequent is the conclusion of the composition between the consequent [in the minor] and the categorical [premiss], e.g., whenever A is B; C is D; farther D is E; therefore, whenever A is B, every C is E.

90. Fourth kind. It is composed of a categorical and a disjunctive premiss and it is of two descriptions. First.—The number of categorical propositions is the same as the number of disjunctions, and each categorical proposition has one term with the parts of the disjunction in common, and the composition is either identical or there is a difference of composition in the conclusion. Example of a case in which the composition is identical: Every C is either B or D or E, and every B is T and every D is T and every E is T; hence it follows that every C is T, because the parts of the disjunction [B, D, E] are true of that term of the categoric premiss which it has in common with the disjunctive premiss. Example in which there is a difference of composition in the conclusion, every C is either B or D or E; but every B is C and every D is T and every E is Z, hence it follows that every C is either C or T or Z, for the reasons just mentioned.

Secondly.—If there are fewer categoric propositions than there are parts of the disjunction, let us suppose there be a categorical proposition of one part and a disjunctive one of two parts, and the categoric proposition have a term in common with the latter, e. g. either, every A is T, or every C is B, but every B is D, hence it follows that either every A is T, or every C is D, on account of the exclusiveness which there is between the premisses of the composition and the term which they have not in common. [If there is no such exclusiveness, the conclusion is not of necessity correct.]

91. Fifth kind. It is composed of a conjunctive and of a disjunctive proposition, and the two premisses have either a complete part in common or an incomplete part. In either case only a syllogism in which the conjunctive proposition forms the minor and the disjunctive, the major, is conclusive. Example of the first case: Whenever A is B, C is D, but invariably either every C is D, or E is Z, hence it follows that invariably either, every A is B or E is Z. If the disjunctive proposition, [either C is D or E is Z] is incompatible, the conclusion is equally incompatible, because if a thing is incompatible with the adherent, either perpetually, or only now and then, it follows of necessity that it be also incompatible with the substrate either perpetually or now and then, (i. e. under certain circumstances;) and if the disjunctive is exclusive, the conclusion is "it happens sometimes;" for if A is not B, then E is Z, for the contradictory of the middle term [C is D] requires the two terms [of the conclusion to be "E is Z" and "the contradictory of A is B."] The question is demonstrated by the third figure.

Secondly.—[If the two premisses have an incomplete part in common, we say] whenever A is B, every C is D, and perpetually either, every D is E, or D is Z; if the disjunctive proposition is exclusive, the conclusion is, whenever A is B, either every C or E, or D is Z.

#### FOURTH SECTION.

#### On the Interpellative Syllogism.

92. It is composed of two antecedents; one of the two is hypothetical and the other is an assertion that one of its two parts is or is not, and from this assertion follows that the other part is or is not. [In order that such a syllogism be conclu-

sive] it is necessary: [First] that the hypotheticals be affirmative; [Secondly] that if the hypothetical is conjunctive, it be cogent (literally adhesive,) [and that, if it is disjunctive,] it be antagonistic; [Thirdly] that either the hypotheticals be universal or that the assertion that one of the parts is or is not be universal (i. e. that it be asserted it is or is not at all times and under all circumstances); unless the time of conjunction or disjunction is also the time regarding which it is asserted that the part is or is not, [e. g. whenever Zayd comes with Bakr in the afternoon, I receive him with honor, he did come with Bakr in the afternoon and therefore he was received by me with honor.]

If the hypothetical which forms part of the interpellative syllogism is conjunctive, from the interpellation of the antecedent follows the consequent as conclusion, and from the interpellation of the contradictory of the consequent follows the contradictory of the antecedent as conclusion. If this is not the case the adhesion is not established. The reverse is not admissible in either of the above two cases, for the consequent may be more general than the antecedent.

If the hypothetical is a veritable disjunctive proposition, [see § 53] and if, in the interpellation any part, whichsoever, is asserted, there follows from it the contradictory of the other part on account of their incompatibility, but if the interpellation consists of the contradictory of any part, whichsoever, there follows from it the other part on account of their exclusiveness.

If the disjunctive hypothetical is incompatible, the conclusion is as in the first case only, (i. e. there follows from it the contradictory of one part, if the other is asserted with interpellation;) because the two parts are incompatible but not exclusive; and if the disjunctive is exclusive, the conclusion is as in the second case only, because the two parts are exclusive but not incompatible, (e. g. either Zayd is on the sea or he is not drowned; but he is not at sea therefore he is not drowned).

#### FIFTH SECTION.

#### Pendents of the Syllogism.

- 93. These are four. First.—The compound syllogism (the Sorites). It is composed of several premisses, some (two) of which lead to a conclusion, which (conclusion) with another premiss leads to another conclusion, and so on until we arrive at the question. The conclusions are either connected, as every C is B, and every B is D, therefore every C is D; again every C is D and every D is A, and therefore every C is A; again every C is A and every A is E, therefore every C is A and every A is E; therefore every C is E.
- 94. Second.—Reductio ad absurdum. The question is proved by disproving the contradictory thereof; e. g. If you deny that some C is not B, let every C be B and let every B be A. Now if this proposition (every B is A) is true, we say if you deny that some C is not B, you must allow that every C is A; but not every C is A, and therefore your assertion is absurd, and there follows not every C is B. This was to be demonstrated.

- 95. Third.—Induction is a judgment that, what is found in most of the parts (dividing members) is universal, e. g. all animals move the lower jaw in cating because oxen, tiger, &c. move it. This does not enable us to arrive at certainty on account of the presumption, that not all are like those, as is the case (in regard to the above example) with the crocodile. [If a thing is found in all the dividing members, it is called القياس العقس enumeratio partium.]
- 96. Fourth.—Example. A judgment is affirmed of a particular (singular) which is applicable to another particular, because they have a meaning [see note 11] in common, e. g. the world is composed of parts and therefore, as in the case of a house, it does not exist from eternity. That the meaning which the two particulars have in common has the nature of a cause is demonstrated by the argument of "concomitancy" and of "division." This last however does not amount to a dilemmatic judgment, such that if one part is false the other must be true, e.g. the cause of destructibility is either composition or such a thing or such a thing; the futility of the two latter assumptions is shown by reductio ad absurdum, and thereby the first is established. Both these arguments are weak. The former because the last [of the four] parts of a complete cause together with all the conditions is called the madár of an effect, but it cannot be called its cause. Division forms a weak argument, because it is impossible to say that nothing else [than the parts enumerated] is the cause, and supposing it be admitted that, what the two things which are analogous, have in common, is the cause in the case cited, it does not follow that it is also the cause of the thing to be proved, for it may happen that a peculiarity of the case cited is the condition for the operations of the cause or that a peculiarity of the thing to be proved renders it impossible that the same cause should be in operation.
- 44. A complete cause consists of four parts or causes 1. العلة المأدية causa materialis, 3. العلة المأدية causa materialis, 3. العلة العارية causa formalis, 4. العلة العارية causa intentionalis. The smith is the first of this four causes in producing a knife, iron is the second, the shape is the third, and the object (cutting,) is the fourth, or, as it is called in the text, the last; (see Maybodzy, Calcutta edition, p. 206.)
- 45. In law the example is called syllogism, and the first particular (singular) is called branch فرم the second particular is called root أصلاً and what they have in common is called cause العلق or the connecting link. The reader will observe in studying the original text of this paragraph that the root is called مقيس عليه and that of which it is the concomitans is called madár مدار tans is called madár

#### CONCLUSION.

#### FIRST INQUIRY.

#### On the matter of Syllogisms.

97. The matter of a syllogism is either a certainty or a non-certainty. There are six certainties. [1] Axioms (or first principles). These are propositions the apprehension of whose two terms is by itself sufficient to convey conviction, e. g. the total is greater than the part. [2] Observata; these are propositions in which we pronounce on the strength of the perception of our external or internal faculties, e. g.

that the sun is giving light, or that we feel fear and anger, [the former propositions of this class are called حسيات sensualia, and the latter رجدانيات sensa.] [3] Experta, these are propositions which are the result of repeated observation enabling us to arrive to certainty, e. g. scamony is a purgative. [4] Acumenalia (guesses); these are propositions which are arrived at by superior acuteness which leads to knowledge, e. g. the light of the moon is reflected from the sun. Acuteness means quickness in passing from [general] principles to results. [5] Testata; these are propositions which rest on abundant testimony regarding a subject of which we know that it is not impossible. Such testimony must be free from suspicion of a conspiracy of the witnesses, e.g. the existence of Makkah and Baghdád. The number of witnesses required to make a fact certain cannot be laid down; but we ought to have a number sufficient to destroy all doubt. Knowledge acquired by experience, acuteness and testimony cannot be an argument against other knowledge. [6]. Propositions accompanied by their demonstrations; in these propositions we come to a judgment by a medium which is not concealed from our intellect at the time we apprehend the terms of the proposition, e. g. four is an even number because it is divisible into two equal parts.

The syllogism which is composed of these six kinds of propositions is called demonstration. It is of two kinds: it is called propteric (from propter quid, \(\tilde{c}\_{\tilde{loot}i}\)), if the middle term is the cause of the relation [of the two terms] both in the intellect and in reality, (i. e. subjectively and objectively,) e. g. the humors of this person are putrid, every person whose humors are putrid suffers from fever, therefore this person suffers from fever. It is called quiatic (from quia,) if the middle term is the cause of the relation in the intellect only, (i. e. merely subjectively,) e. g. this man has fever, every person who suffers from fever has putrid humors, therefore this person has putrid humors, [the presence of fever is the cause of our conviction that the humors are putrid; but in reality it is the effect of the putridity of the humors.]

There are six non-certainties. [1] Nota; these are propositions which are acknowledged by all men, on the ground of general expediency, [e. g. justice is good, oppression is bad,] or on the ground of sympathy, [e. g. to protect the weak is praise-worthy], or on account of propriety, [e. g. exposing the pudenda is wrong,] or on the ground of popular habits, [e. g. the killing of animals is not right with the Hindús,] or on the ground of divine law and humanity. We can distinguish conventional principles from axioms by divesting ourselves of every thing which is not in the mind itself; by doing so we arrive to axioms but not to conventional principles. Some of these principles are true and others are false. Every nation and every profession has its own conventional principles. [2] Admissa; these are propositions which have been admitted by the opponent and upon which the disputation is founded with a view of refuting him, [they may be generally admitted or merely by the disputant, e. g. the questions regarding the sources of the law with divines. syllogism (argument) composed of these two classes is called disputation. Its object is to satisfy an opponent who fails to see the force of an exact demonstration. [3] Accepta, these are propositions which are taken on the authority of a person on faith, on account of his being [supposed to be] endowed with supernatural powers or superior knowledge or religiousness, e. g. maxims which we take from learned or holy

- [4] Presumptions, these are propositions founded on belief, e. g. a man who sneaks about at night is a thief. A syllogism (argument), composed of these two kinds of propositions is called oratorial. Its object is to exhort the hearer to things useful for him, such as good morals and religiousness. [5] Imaginativa, these, are propositions which produce wonderful effects on the mind such as melancholy, joy, &c., e. g. wine is fluid ruby, honey is bitter and nauscous. A syllogism composed of such propositions is called poetry and its object is to impress the soul with a desire or dislike, and it is accompanied by metre and a sweet voice. Preconceptions; being judgments of walnn (and not of reason) they are false propositions regarding things, which are not objects of the senses, e. g. what we can see is all that exists and beyond the world is infinite space. Preconceptions if they were not refuted by reason or revelation would pass for axioms, but their fulsity can be recognized by this that reason assents to them as mere premises of a syllogism; yet upon finding that they lead to a conclusion contradictory of its judgment, it cannot but deny and reject the result. A syllogism consisting of preconceptions is called sophistry, and its object is to silence the opponent.
- 46. Wahm means originally a fancy or thought which we cannot get rid of. It is said in the tradition "he could not help thinking of the marriage with Maymuniah." Hence وهم الصلوة "he could not help thinking of the marriage with Maymuniah." Hence "to cause to forget" to mislead; hence yhûm means a sentence which has two or more meanings of which the less obvious is intended—a pun, because it is an attempt to mislead the reader. Wahm means also a misconception and answers precisely to the German word Wahn, and it is used in places like this, our fear of a dead body is a wahm. In this sense it is frequently used in Hindústány. Philosophers have invented a separate faculty for illusory impressions, and they call this faculty equally wahm as it will be perceived from the text. The commentator says: "wahm is a corporeal [or physical in opposition to mental] faculty of man, by which he perceives such particular [notions] as cannot be perceived by the senses. This faculty follows the senses." According to Jorjány it means instinct; he says that we perceive by it moral qualities such as bravery, liberality, &c., and that it is the faculty which causes the sheep to love its young one, and to fear the wolf.
- 99. Fallacy means an error in the form of syllogism, which renders it inconclusive on account a violation of some important condition in reference to quantity or quality or mode, or of an error in the matter. In a fallacy one of the premisses and the question may be identical, the words used being synonymous, e. g. every man is a person, and every person is risible, therefore every man is risible. Or one of the premisses may be false but resembling truth, owing to the improper use of a word e. g. if we were to say of a painted horse; every horse neighs, this is a horse; therefore it neighs. Or the falsity of the premisses may be owing to a mistake in the meaning, e. g. all what is man and horse is man and all what is horse and man is horse; therefore same men are horse. Or a physical [universal] may be used instead of a [logical] universal, e. g. man is an animal, animal is a genus; therefore man is a genus. Or a conception of the intellect may be taken for a real thing and vice versa. You must observe all these things that you may not fall into error. He who makes use of fallacies is called sophist, if he meets a philosopher with them; but if he meets a disputant with them, he is called cristicos.

#### SECOND INQUIRY.

#### On the parts of which Sciences consist.

100. They are: [First] the subjects (or topics of the science) of which we have spoken above [§ 6]; [Secondly] the principles, that is to say, the descriptions (or definitions) of the subjects and their parts and essential accidents and the premisses [of the sciences. These are of two kinds,] either they are not selfevident and taken by the way of appointment [i. e. taken as granted; regarding "appointment" see § 8.] e. g. connecting any two parts by a straight line; drawing a circle at any distance round any point—or they are self-evident, e. g. quantities equal to another quantity are equal among themselves. [Thirdly] the theorems; these are propositions by which the relation of the predicates to their subjects in the respective science is investigated. Their subjects are either identical with the subjects of the science, e. g. every quantity either has something in common with another quantity or it is heterogeneous. Or they are identical, but contain in addition an essential accident, e. g. every mean quantity is a side which is surrounded by the two extremes; or the subject is the species, [and the subject of the science is the genus, e. g. every line can be divided into two halves; or it is the species together with an essential accident, e. g. if a line stands upon another, the angles on either side are either two right angles or equal to two right angles; or it is an essential accident, e. g. the angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles. The predicates of theorems are external to their subjects, for it is inadmissible that it should be necessary to establish a part of a thing by demonstration. Here ends the Risálah Shamsyyah.

BENGAL MILITARY ORPHAN PRESS.

# ٱلْبَحْثُ الثَّانِي فِي أَجْزَا الْعُلُومِ

٩٨ و هِي مُوضُوعاتُ وَقَدْ عَرَفَتَهَا وَ مَبَاد و هِي حُدُ وَدُ المُوضُوعات و اَجْزَا بُهَا وَاعْرَاهِهَا الذّاتِيَة وَالْمُقَدِّمَات عَيْرُ البَيْنِيَة فِي نَفْسِهَا الْمَأْخُوذَة عَلَى سَبِيْلِ الْوَضْع كَقُولْنَا لِنَا اَن نَصِلَ بَيْنَ كُلَّ نَفْطَنَيْنِ بِعَضَا مُسْتَقَيْم وَان نَعْمَلَ بَايَ بَعْد عَلَى كُلِّ نَقَطَة شِكْنَا دَائِرَة وَالْمُقَدِّمَاتُ الْبَيْنَة بِنَفْسِهَا كَقُولُنا الْمُقَادِيرُ المُسَاوِيَة وَمُسَاوِية وَمُسَائِلُ وَهِي الْقَضَايَا الَّذِي تُطَلَّبُ بِهَا نِسْبَة مُحْمُولًا بَهَا الْمَي وَمُومُوعاتها كَدُ تَكُونُ مَوضُوع الْعِلْم كَقُولِنَا كُل مِقْدَارٍ مُشَارِكُ لا لَيْ الْمُعَلِيقِ الْمُعْرَاتِهَا لاَي مُومُوعاتها كَدُ تَكُونُ مَوضُوعا أَلَا اللهِ السِّبَة بَهُوطِئع مَا يُحيَطُبِهِ الطَّرْفَانِ مُومُوعاتها كُلُونُ مُومُوع وَانِي النَّهِ وَمُومُوعاتها كُونُ تَكُونُ مُومُوعاتها كُلُونُ الْمُعَلِيقِ النَّهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهُ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهُ اللهِ اللهِ اللهُ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهِ اللهُ اللهِ اللهُ الله اللهُ الله اللهِ الْهِ الْهِ الْهُ اللهِ الْهُ اللهِ الْهُ اللهِ اللهِ الْهُ اللهِ اللهِ الْهُ الْمُنْ اللهِ الْهُ الْمُنْ اللهِ الْهُ الْمُؤْلِ اللهِ الْهُ الْمُنْ اللهِ الْهُ الْمُؤْلِ اللهِ الْهُ الْمُنْولِ اللهِ الْمُعْلِي الْمُنْولِ الْهُ الْمُنْ الْهُ الْمُؤْلِ اللهِ الْمُؤْلِ اللهِ الْمُؤْلِ اللهِ الْمُؤْلِ اللهِ الْمُنْولِ اللهِ الْمُؤْلِ اللهِ الْمُؤْلِ اللهِ الْمُؤْلِ اللهُ الْمُؤْلِ اللهِ الْمُؤْلِ اللهُ اللهِ الْمُؤْلِ اللهُ الْمُؤْلِ اللهُ الْمُؤْلِ اللهُ الْمُؤْلِ اللهِ الْمُؤْلِ اللهُ اللهُ الْمُؤْلِ اللهِ اللهُ ا

٩٧ وَ الْمُعْاطَةُ قِياسُ تَفْسُدُ مُوْرَتُهُ بِانَ لاَ يَكُونَ عَلَى هَيْدَةً مُنْتِجَةً لِا خَتِلالِ شَرْط مُعْتَبَرٍ بِحَسَبِ الْمَقْدِةِ اوِ الْمُيْفَيَّةِ اوِ الْمَيْفَيَّةِ اوِ الْمَيْفَيَّةِ اوِ الْمَيْفَيَّةِ اوِ الْمَيْفَيِّةِ اوِ الْمَيْفَةِ اوَ الْحَدْرَةِ الْمَوْرِةِ الْمَانِ مَحَالًا اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِلَ الْمُعْلَى الْمُورِيةِ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِلُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُومُ وَالْمُ الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِلِ الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى وَالْمُولِ الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِي الْمُعْلِى ال

مَعُ اَنَّهَا لَيْسَتْ بِعِلَّةٍ وَامَّا التَّقْسِيمُ فَالْحَصْرُ مَمْنُوعُ لِجَوَازِ عِلَيَّةٍ غَيْرِ الْمَذْكُورِ وَبِيَقْدِيْرِ تَسْلِيمْ عِلَيَّةِ الْمُقْدِيْرِ تَسْلِيمْ عِلَيَّةً الْمُقْدِسُ عَلَيْهِ شَرْطًا الْمُقْدِسُ عَلَيْهِ شَرْطًا لِجُوازِ انَ يُكُونَ خُصُومِيَّةُ الْمُقَيْسِ عَلَيْهِ شَرْطًا لِكُورَا فَا يُكُونَ خُصُومِيَّةُ الْمُقَيْسِ عَلَيْهِ شَرْطًا لِلْعِلَيَّةِ أَوْ خُصُومِيَّةُ الْمُقَيْسِ مَا نِعَةً عَنْهَا •

# وَأَمَّا الْخَاتِمَةُ فَنْهَا بَصْثَانِ الْأَوْلِ فَيْ مَوَادِ الْأَقْيِسَةِ

وه وهي يَقينَيْهَا وَعَيْرُ يَقَيْنَيْهَا وَ الْكُوْرُ وَمُشَاهَدَاتُ وَهِي فَضَايا بَحْكُمُ بِهَا بِقُوى ظَاهِرَةِ آوْ باطنة في الْجَرْمِ وَمُشَاهَدَاتُ وَهِي فَضَايا بَحْكُمُ بِهَا بِقُوى ظَاهِرَةِ آوْ باطنة في الْجَرْمِ وَمُشَاهَدَاتُ وَهِي فَضَايا بَحْكُمُ بِهَا لِمِسَاهَدَة مَنْكُرَّرَة مُفيدة كَالُحُكُم بِأَنَّ السَّمْسُ مُضِينَةٌ وَآنَّ لَنَا خَوْنًا وَغَصَبًا وَمُجَرَّبَاتُ وَهِي فَضَايا بَحْكُمُ فيها لِمِسَاهَدَة مَنْكُرَّرَة مُفيدة للمِنْ السَّمْسُ مُضِينَةٌ وَآنَّ لَنَا خَوْنًا وَغَصَبًا وَمُجَرَّبُاتُ وَهِي قَضَايا بُحَكُم فيها لِمِسَاهَدة مَنْكُرَّرَة مُفيدة لِلْبَعْمِ بِأَنَّ شُوبَ السَّقَعُونِيَا مُوجِبُ الْإِسْهَال وَحَدْسِيَّاتُ وَهِي قَضَايا بُحَكُم فيها لِمُسَاهِدة المُنْفَاد مِنَ الشَّمْسِ وَ الْحَدْسُ هُو سُرْعَةُ الْانْتَقَالِ مِنَ النَّمْسِ مُفيد لِلْمِلْمِ كَالْحُكُم بِنَّ نُوزُ الْقَمْرِ مُسْلَقَادُ مِنَ الشَّمْسِ وَ الْحَدْسُ هُو سُرْعَةُ الْانْتَقَالِ مِنَ النَّمْسِ مَعْدَد الْمِلْمُ كَالْحُكُم بِنَّ نُوزُ الْقَمْرِ مُسْلَقَادُ مِنَ السَّمْ السَّهَ السَّهَادَاتِ بَعْدَ الْعَلْمِ بِعَدَّمِ الْمَقْلِي عَدْمِ الْمَقْلِي عَدْمَ الْمَقَادُاتِ بَعْلَمُ الْمَقْلِي عَدْمَ الْمَقَالِ الْمَقْلِي عَلَى الْفَيْرِ فَيْكُمُ بِوجُودِ مَكَةً وَبَعْدَاذَ وَلَا يَخْتَصُرُ مَبْلَغُ السَّهَادَاتِ نِي عَدْمَ الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِي الْمُعْلِي الْمُعْلِي عَلَى الْفَيْرِ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ مِنْ اللَّوْلُولُ مَعْدَلُ وَهُ الْمَالَعُ فِي اللَّهُ مِنْ اللَّوْلُولُ مَعْدَى الْفَيْلِ عَلَى الْفَيْلِ عَدَا السَّقَة بِي مَا لَا الْمَعْلَى الْفَيْلِ وَلَوْلِ مَعْدَلُ الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِي الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُولِ الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُولِ الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْقِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلَى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِى الْمُعْلِقِي الْمُعْلِى الْ

٩ ٩ وَ أَمَّا غَيْرُ الْيَتَيْدِيَّاتِ فَسِتُ مَشْهُوْرَاتُ وَهِيَ قَضَايَا يُحَكُمُ بِهَا لِاغْتِرَافِ جَدِيْمِ النَّاسِ بِهَا لِمَصْلَعَةِ عَامَّةً آوْ رَقَّةً آوْ حَمِيَّةً آوْ إِنْفِعَالَاتٍ عَنْ عَاداتٍ وَشَرًا ثُعَ وَآدَابٍ وَ الْفَرْقُ بَيْنَهُمَا وَبَيْنَ الْأَوَّلِيَّاتِ آنَّ الْإِنْسَانَ لَوْخُلِيِّ وَ نَفْسَهُ مَعَ قَطْعِ النَّظُرِ عَمَّا وَرَاءً عَقَلِهِ لَمْ يَحْكُمْ بِهَا بَخِلَافِ الْأَوَّيَّاتِ كَقَوْلِنِا الظَّلْمُ تَبَيْمُ وَ الْعَدْلُ حَسَنَى وَ كَشْفُ الغَوْرُةِ مَنْمُومُ مُ وَمَرًا عَاةً الضَّعَفَاءِ مَحْمُودةً ومِنْ هَٰذِهِ مَا يُكُونُ مَادِقًا وَ مَا يَكُونُ كَا ذِبًا

إِنْ لَمْ يَكُنْ وَفَتُ الْإِنْصَالِ وَ الْإِنْفِصَالِ هُو بِعَيْنِهِ وَقَتَ الْوَضِّ وَ الرَّفْعِ وَ الشَّرْطِيَّةُ الْمَوْضُوعَةُ فِيْهِ إِنْ كَانَتُ مُتَّصِلَةً فَاسْتِثْنَاءُ عَيْنِ الْمُقَدِّمِ يُنْتِمُ عَيْنِ النَّالِيْ وَ اسْتِثْنَاءُ نَقَيْضِ النَّالِي يُنْتِمُ نَقَيْضِ النَّالِي يُنْتِمُ نَقَيْضَ الْمُقَدَّمِ وَ إِنْ كَانَتُ وَ النَّالِي النَّلِي النَّالِي النَّالِي النَّهُ النَّالِي النَّالِي النَّالِي النَّالِي النَّالِي النَّالِي النَّالِي النَّالِي النَّالِي النَّيْلُولُ وَالْ النَّالِي الْمُعَلِّلِ الْمُعَلِي النَّالِي النَّلِي النَّالِي النِّلْولِي النَّالِي النَّالِي النِي اللَّلِي اللَّهِ اللَّهُ الْمُنْ الْم

# الْفَصْلُ الْخَامِسُ فِي لَوَاحِقِ الْقِيَاسِ وَهِي أَرْبَعَةُ

٩٣ اَنَدَّالِثُ الْإَسْتِقْرَاءُ وَهُوَالْحُكُمُ عَلَى كُلِّي لُوجُودِهِ فِي اكْثِرِ جُزْئِيًّا تِهِ كَقُولْنَا كُلُّ حَيْوَانِ يُحَرِّكُ مَكُمُ الْأَسْفَلُ عِنْدُ الْمُنْفِعِ لِآنَ الْإِنْسَانُ وَ إِلْبَهَائِمَ وَ السِّبَاعَ كَذَٰلِكَ وَهُولاَيُفِيدُ الْمُقَيْنَ لِاحْتِمَالَ أَنْ لاَيْكُونَ الْمُكُونَ الْمُعَالِمُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ

٩٤ أَنَّوْا مِعْ النَّمْتَيْلُ وَهُوَ اِنْبَاتُ حَكْمَ فِي جُزِئِي لِوُجُودِ فِي جُزِئِي آخَرَ لِمَعْنَى مُشْتَرِكِ بِيَنْبَمَا وَدَرَانِ وَبِالتَّقُسِمُ الْغَلِرِ وَدَرَانِ وَبِالتَّقُسِمُ الْغَلِرِ وَدَرَانَ وَبِالتَّقُسِمُ الْغَلِرِ وَدَرَانَ وَبِالتَّقُسِمُ الْغَلِرِ وَدَرَانَ وَبِالتَّقُسِمُ الْغَلِرِ وَدَرَانَ اللَّهُ وَرَانِ وَبِالتَّقُسِمُ الْغَلِرِ وَدَرَانَ بَاطِلانَ اللَّهُ وَلَيْ اللَّهُ وَلَا يَكُولُونِ بَاطِلانِ بَاطِلانِ اللَّهُ وَلَيْ اللَّهُ وَلَا لَهُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَلَا اللَّهُ وَرَانُ فِلاَنَّ الْجُزْءُ الْأَخِيرُ مِنَ الْعَلَّةِ وَسَائِمُ الشُّرُوطِ مَدَارً لِي النَّوْلُ وَهُو ضَعَيْفُ أَمَّا اللَّهُ وَرَانُ فِلاَنَّ الْجُزْءُ الْأَخِيرُ مِنَ الْعَلَّةِ وَسَائِمُ الشُّرُوطِ مَدَارً

٩ ١ القِسمُ النَّامِ النَّامُ اللَّامِ النَّامِ النَّامِ النَّامِ اللَّامِ الللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ الللَّامِ اللَّامِ الللَّامِ اللَّامِ الللَّامِ الللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ الللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ اللَّامِ الللَّامِ الللَّامِ الللَّامِ اللَّالِي الللَّامِ الللَّامِ الللل

## ٱلْفُصْلُ الرَّابِعُ فِي الْقِيَاسِ الْاِسْتِثْنَا بُي

٩ و هُو مُرَكَّبُ مِن مُقَدِّمَتَيْنِ إِخْدَلْهُمَا شَرْطِيَّةً وَ الْاَخْرَىٰ وَفَعُ لِإَخْدِ جُزْنَيْهَا أَوْ رُفْعُهُ لِيلْلْزَمَ
 وَفَعَ الْآخَرِ اوْ رُفْعَهُ وَيَجِبُ الْنِجَابُ الشَّرْطِيَّاتِ وَ لَزُوْمِيَّةُ الْمُنْطِلَةِ وَ كُلْيَنْهَا أَوْ كُلِّينَّهُا أَوْ كُلِّينَّةً الْوَضْعِ أَوِ الْرَفْعِ

انفِعْلَيَّاتِ وَ النَّانِي اِنْعِكَاسُ السَّالِيَّةِ الْمُسْتَعْمَلَةِ نِيْهِ وَ التَّالِثِ مِنْ النَّانِي الْعَامِّ عَلَى الْعَرْفِي الْعَامِّ عَلَى الْعَبْرِي وَ الْكَبْرِي فِي السَّادِسِ مِنَ الْمُنْعُكِسَةِ السَّوالِبِ وَ الْخَامِسُ كَوْنُ الْكَبْرِي فِي السَّادِسِ مِنَ الْمُنْعُكِسَةِ السَّوالِبِ وَ الْخَامِسُ كَوْنَ الصَّغْرِي الْعَامِّ وَ النَّلْيَجَةُ فِي الضَّوْبَيْنِ الصَّغْرِي فِي النَّامِنِ إِحْدَى الْخَامَّ عَلَيْهَا أَوْ كَانَ الْقَيْاسُ مِن السِّتِ الْمُنْعَكِسَةَ السَّوالِبِ وَ إِلَّا فَعَطْلَقَةُ الْاَوْلِي وَ النَّالِي وَ السَّالِ وَ النَّالِي وَ السَّالِ وَ السَّالِ وَ اللَّهُ وَ وَي السَّالِ وَ الْمَالِي وَ السَّالِ السَّالِ النَّالِي بَعْدَ عَلَى السَّالِ وَ فِي السَّالِ النَّالِي بَعْدَ عَلَى النَّالِي وَ السَّامِ فَي الشَّالِ النَّالِي بَعْدَ عَلَى السَّامِ وَ فِي السَّامِ فَي الشَّالِ النَّالِي بَعْدَ عَلَى النَّالِي وَ السَّامِ وَ فِي السَّامِ وَ السَّامِ وَالْمَالِي النَّالِي السَّامِ وَالسَّامِ السَّامِ وَالْمَالِي السَّامِ السَّامِ السَّامِ وَالْمَالِ السَّامِ وَالسَّامِ السَّامِ السَامِ السَّامِ السَّامِ السَّام

# الفَصلُ النَّالِثُ فِي الْإِقْتِرَانِيَّاتِ الْكَائِنَةِ مِنَ الشَّرِطِيَّاتِ وَلَيَّاتِ الْكَائِنَةِ مِنَ الشَّرِطِيَّاتِ وَهِي خَمْسَةُ أَنْسَام

٥ ٨ الفِسْمُ الأوَّلُ مَا يُتَرَكَّبُ مِنَ الْمُتَصِّلَاتِ وَالْمَطْبُوعُ مِنْهُ مَا كَانَتِ الشِّرْكَةُ فِي جُزْءُ تَا مِ مِنَ الْمُقَدِّمَتَيْنِ وَتَنْعَقِدُ الْاشْكَالُ الْأَرْبَعَةُ فِيهِ لِإِنَّهُ إِنْ كَانَ تَالِيًا فِي الصَّغَرِي مُقَدَّمًا فِي المُعْرَى فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ النَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِيلِمَا فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ النَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِيلِما فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ النَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِيلِما فَهُو الشَّكُلُ النَّالِثُ مُقَدَّمًا فِيلِما فَهُو الشَّكُلُ النَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِيلِما فَهُو الشَّكُلُ النَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِي الشَّكُلُ النَّالِثُ وَإِنْكَانَ مُقَدَّمًا فِيلِما فَهُو الشَّكُلُ النَّالِثُونِ وَالنَّلِيْجَةِ فِي الْكَمِينَةِ فِي الْفَرْفِ وَالنَّلِيْجَةِ فِي الْكَمِينَةِ فِي الْكَيْفِينَةِ فِي كُلِّ شَكُلُ كُنَا فِي الْخَمْلِيَّاتِ مِنْ غَيْرِ فَرْقٍ مِثَالُ الضَّرَبِ الْأَوَّلِ كُلِمَّا كَانَ اللَّالِي فَي الْكَيْفِيةِ فِي كُلِّ شَكْلُ كُنَا فِي الْخَمْلِيَّاتِ مِنْ غَيْرِ فَرْقٍ مِثَالُ الضَّرَبِ الْأَوَّلِ كُلِمَّا كَانَ اللَّهُ وَلَا لَيْ وَلِيلُونَ وَ النَّذَي الْكَانَ اللَّوْرَ وَالنَّيْفِيةِ فِي كُلِّ شَكْلُ كُنَا فِي الْخَمْلِيَّاتِ مِنْ غَيْرِ فَرْقٍ مِثَالُ الضَّرَبِ الْأَوْلِ كُلِمَّا كَانَ اللَّهُ فَي الْمُقَدِّمِ وَلَيْكُولِ الْمُؤْلِقِيلُ اللَّالِي الْمُعْلِقِيلَةِ فِي كُلِّ شَكْلِ كُنَا فِي الْحَمْلِيَّاتِ مِنْ غَيْرِ فَرْقٍ مِثَالُ الضَّرَبِ الْأَوْلِ كُلِمَا كَانَ اللَّهُ وَلَا كُنَا الْمُ

٨٩ اَلْقِسُمُ النَّانِي مَا يُعْرِّكُبُ مِنَ الْمُنْفَصِلاتِ وَ الْمَطْبُوعُ مِنْهُ مَا كَانَتِ الشِّرِكَةُ فِي جُزْءٍ غَيْرِتَامِ
مِنَ الْمُقَدِّمَتَيْنِ كَقُولْنِا وَ ابْمًا إِمَّا كُلُّ الْ اوْكُلُّ جَ وَ وَامَّا كُلُّ وَ \* اَوْكُلُّ وَ زَيْنَتِهُ
المَّاكُلُّ اللهِ اوْكُلُّ جَ \* اَوْكُلُّ وَ زَلِّ مِنْنَاعٍ خُلُو الْوَاقِعِ عَنْ مُقَدِّمَتِي التَّالِيفِ وَعَنْ احْدِ الْاَخْرَيَيْنَ
مَنْفَقِدُ فِيْهِ الْأَشْكُالُ الْأَرْبَعَةُ وَ الشَّرَائِطُ الْمُعْتَبَرَّةُ بِيْنَ الْخَمْلِيَّتِيْنِ مُعْتَبَرَةً هَٰهُنَا بَيْنَ الْمُنْشَارِكَيْنِ •

٨٨ الفِسْمُ الثَّالِثُ مَا يَترَكَّبُ مِنَ الْحَمْلِيَّةِ وَ الْمُتَّصِلَةِ وَالْمُطْبُوعُ مِنْهُ مَا كَانَتِ الْحَمْلِيَّةُ كُبْرَى

بَعْفُ بَ لَيْسَ جَ وُكُلُّ ا بَعْفُ جَ لَيْسَ الْمَعْفُ جَ لَيْسَ الْمَعْرَى لِيُرْتَدُّ إِلَى التَّانِي وَ السَّابِعُ مِن مَن الْبَعْفُ الْمَالِيَةِ جُزْئِيَةً كُبْرَى يُنْتَعُ شَالِيَةً جُزْئِيَةً كُبْرَى يُنْتَعُ شَالِيَةً جُزْئِيَةً كُبْرَى لِينَاعِ وَ التَّامِنُ مِن سَالِيَةً كُبْرَى وَمُوجِبَةً جُزْئِيَةً كُبْرَى لِينَا التَّالِثِ وَ التَّامِنُ مِن سَالِيَةً كُبْرَى وَمُوجِبَةً جُزْئِيَةً كُبْرَى لِينَا التَّالِثِ وَ التَّالِثِ وَ التَّامِي مِن سَالِيةً جُزِئِيَةً كَثُولَنَا لاَ شَيْعُ مِن بَ جَ وَبَعْفُ ا بَ فَبَعْفُ جَ لَيْسَ التَّرْتِينِ لِيَّةً كُبْرَى لَيْسَ النَّانِينِ لِيتَابَ التَّانِي لِيتَابَ الْحَمْسَةِ الأَوْلِ بِالْخُلْفِ وَهُوَ فَمَّ نَقِيفِ النَّيْخِيَةِ إِلَى إِحْدَى الْمُقَدِّمَتَيْنِ لِيتَاسَ النَّانِي لِيقَاسَ النَّانِي لِيقَاسَ اللَّانِينِ لِيتَاسَ النَّانِي لِيقَاسَ اللَّانِينَ وَالْخَامِسُ بِالْفِنْوَاضِ وَ بَيْنَ ذَلِكَ فِي التَّانِي لِيقَاسَ عَيْسِ النَّيْخِينَ وَلَكَ فِي التَّانِي لِيقَاسَ عَلَيهِ الْخَامِسُ وَلَيْكُنِ الْبَعْفُ الَّذِي هُو النَّالِي وَ الثَّانِي وَالْمَعْفُ الَّذِي هُو الْمُلْوبُ وَ الْمُنْقَدِّمُونَ حَصُرُوا الضَّرُوبَ النَّانِي فِي التَّانِي لِيقَاسَ جَ دَوْكُلُّ وَ الْمُنْفُولُ اللَّالِيقِ الْمُعْفُى النَّذِي الْمُعْفُ الَّذِي هُو الْمُلْوبُ وَ الْمُنْقَدِّمُونَ حَصُرُوا الضَّرُوبُ النَّالِيَةِ فِي الْخَيْسَ وَلَيْكُولُ السَّالِيقِ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ الْمُنْفِقُ مُونَ السَّالِيقِ وَ وَكُلُّ وَ الْمُنْفِقُ مُونَ السَّالِيقِ وَذَكُرُوا لِعَدَمِ الْتَلْمَةِ الْخُولِ الْمُنْفُولُ مَن الْعَلَافِ وَ الْمُنْفُولُ مَن الْفَيْسِ مِن بَسِيْطَنَيْنِ وَ نَحْنُ نَشَرُطُ كُونَ السَّالِمِة وَذَكُرُوا لِعَدَم إِنْتَاج الْتَلْمُ وَ الْمُنْفِقُ مَن وَلَاكُونَ السَّالِفِي وَلَو الْمُنْفُولُ مَن الْفَيْسُ مِن الْمُنْمُ وَ الْمُنْفِقُ مُ مَن الْمُؤْلِقُ فَي الْفَيْسُ مِن الْمُنْ الْمُنْ الْمُؤْلِقُ فَي الْفَيْسُ مِن إِحْدَى السَّالِيقِ وَلَالْمُولُولُ الْمُؤْلُولُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْلِقُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْلُولُ الْمُؤْلُولُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُولُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُولُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُ

## الفصل التَّانِي في المُختَلِطَاتِ

١٨ امَّا الشَّكُلُ الْأَوَّلُ فَشَرْطُهُ "بِحَسَب الْجِهَةِ فِعْلِيَّةُ الصَّغْرَى وَ النَّلِيْجَةُ فِيه كَالْكُبْرَى انْكَانَتْ غَيْرَ الْشَيْجَةُ فِيه كَالْكُبْرَى انْكَانَتْ غَيْرَ الْشَشُرُوطَتِينِ وَ الْقُرُورَةُ وَاللَّا وَامْ وَ الضَّرُورَةُ الْمَخْصُومَةُ الْشَفْرُوطَتِينِ وَ الْقُرُورَةُ وَاللَّا وَامْ وَ الضَّرُورَةُ الْمَخْصُومَةُ السَّغُولِ النَّالَةِ وَاللَّا وَالْمَا الْكَانَتِ الْكَبْرِي الْخَاصَّتَيْنِ وَ بَعْدَ ضَمِّ اللَّادَوَامَ الْلِيْهَا الْكَانَتِ الْحَدِي الْخَاصَّتَيْنَ • السَّغُولِ الْكَانَتِ الْحَدِي الْخَاصَّتَيْنَ •

٨٢ و أمَّا الشَّكُلُ الثَّانِي فَشَرْطُهُ بِحَسَبِ الْجِهَةِ امْرَانِ احْدُهُمَا صِدْقُ الدَّرَامِ عَلَى الصَّفْرِي اَوْ كُولُو الْكَبْرِي مِنَ الْقَضَايَا الْمُنْكَفِّةِ السَّوَالِبِ • وَالثَّانِي انْ لا تَسْتَعْمَلُ الْمُنْكَفَةُ إِلَّا مِعَ الضَّرُورِيَّةِ الْمُطْلَقَةِ الْمُطْلَقَةِ الْكَبْرِيَيْنِ الْمُشْرُوطَتَيْنِ وَالنَّبِيْجُةُ دَائِمَةً إِنْ صَدَقَ الدَّوَامُ عَلَى اِحْدَى مُقَدِّمَتَيْهِ وَالَّا فَكَالصَّغْرَى وَالنَّائِيْجُةُ دَائِمَةً إِنْ صَدَقَ الدَّوَامُ عَلَى اِحْدَى مُقَدِّمَتَيْهِ وَالَّا فَكَالصَّغْرَى مَحْدُونًا عَنْهَا قَيْدُ اللَّادَوام وَ اللَّا ضَرُورَةٍ وَ الصَّرُورَةِ آيَّةً ضُرُورَةٍ كَانَتْ •

٨٣ وَ امَّا الشَّكُلُ النَّالِيَّ فَشَرَّطُهُ نِعَايِّةُ الصَّغْرَى وَالنَّتَيْجَةُ كَالْكُبْرَى الْكَانَتِ الْكَبْرَى عَلْمُ الْاَرْبَعِ وَالْآ فَكَعَنْسِ الصَّغْرَى مَحْدُونًا عَنْهُ اللَّادُوامُ إِنْكَانَتِ الْكَبْرَى اِحْدَى الْعَامِنَيْنِ وَمَضْمُومًا اِلَيْهِ اِنْكَانَتُ الْكَبْرَى الْحَدَى الْعَامِنَيْنِ وَمَضْمُومًا اِلَيْهِ اِنْكَانَتُ الْكَبْرَى الْحَدَى الْعَامِنَيْنِ وَمَضْمُومًا اللَّهِ اِنْكَانَتُ الْمُدَى الْعَامِنَيْنِ وَمَضْمُومًا اللَّهِ اِنْكَانَتُ

مه وَ أمَّا الشَّمْلُ الرَّابِعُ نُشَرُطُ إِنْنَاجِهِ بِحَسَبِ الْجِهَةِ ٱمُورَ خَمْسَةً • اَلْأَزُّلُ كُونُ الْقَيِاسِ فَيْهِ مِنَ

الشَّكُلُ الْأَوَّلُ وَ إِنْ كَانَ مَحْمُولًا فِيْهِمَا نَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ التَّا فِي وَ إِنْ كَانَ مَحْمُولًا فِي الصَّغْرَى وَمَوْهُوعًا فِي الْكَبْرَى فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثَ اللَّهُ فِي وَ إِنْ كَانَ مَوْهُوعًا فِيْهِمَا فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثَ وَ إِنْ كَانَ مَوْهُوعًا فِيْهِمَا فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثَ وَإِنْ كَانَ مَوْهُوعًا فِيهِمَا فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثَ وَإِنْ كَانَ مَوْهُوعًا فِي الصَّغْرَى وَمَحْمُولًا فِي الْكَبْرَى فَهُوَ الشَّكُلُ الرَّابِعُ •

٧٧ أَمَّا الشَّكُلُ الْأَوْلُ فَشَرْطُهُ اِيْجَابُ الصَّغَرَى وَالْآلِمَ يَنْدَرِجِ الْأَصْغُرُ فِي الْأَوْسَطِ وَكُلِيَّةُ الْكُبْرَى وَاللَّمْ الْمَعْدُومِ بِهِ عَلَى الْأَصْغُرِهِ وَفُرُوبُهُ النَّاتِجَةُ وَالْاَحْتُمُلُ اَنْ يَكُونُ الْبَعْضُ الْمَحْكُومُ عَلَيْهِ بِالْأَكْبَرِ غَيْرُ الْبَعْضِ الْمَحْكُومِ بِهِ عَلَى الْأَصْغَرِهِ وَفُرُوبُهُ النَّاتِجَةُ الْبَعْضِ الْمَحْكُومِ بِهِ عَلَى الْأَصْغَرِهِ وَفُرُوبُهُ النَّاتِجَةُ الْمُنْوَى الْبَعْضُ الْمَحْكُومِ بِهِ عَلَى الْأَصْغَرِهِ وَفُرُوبُهُ النَّاتِجَةُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهُ كَالَّالِهُ كَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهُ عَلَيْهُ عَلَيْهُ عَلَيْهُ كَثُولُونَا كُلُّ جَبَ وَكُلُّ بَ الْعَلَيْ مِنْ مِنْ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهُ كُلُولُونَا كُلُّ جَبَ وَكُلُّ بَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهُ عَلَيْهُ كُلُولُونَا كُلُّ جَبَ وَلَا شَعْمُ عَنِ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهُ عَلَيْهُ كُلُولُونَا كُلُّ جَبَ وَلَا شَعْمُ عَنِ مِنْ عَلَيْهُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهُ كُلُولُونَا كُلُّ جَبَ وَلَا شَعْمُ عَنْ عَلَى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهُ كُلُولُونَا عَلَيْهُ كُلُولُونَا بَعْضُ جَبَ وَلَا اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهُ كُلُولُونَا عَلَى اللَّهُ عَلَيْكُولُونَا اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَى اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللْهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللللَّهُ الللللَّهُ اللللَّهُ الللَّهُ الللللَّهُ اللللْهُ الللللْهُ اللللَّهُ اللللَّهُ الللْهُ اللَّهُ الللللَّهُ ا

٧٨ وَأَمَّا الشَّكُلُ التَّانِي فَشَرَطُهُ اخْتِنَافَ مُقَدِمَتَيْهُ بِالْكَيْفِ وَكُلِيَّةُ الْكَبْرَى وَإِلَّا يَحْصُلُ الْإِخْتَلَافَ الْمُخْرَى وَهُوْ مَنْ الْقَيْاسِ مَعَ ايْجَابِ النَّيْجَةِ تَارَةٌ وَمَعَ سَلْبِهَا اخْرَى و وَهُرُوبُهُ النَّيْجَةِ ايْكُ الْبَعْ الْمُرَى الْمُبْرَى الْمُبْرَى الْمُبْرَى الْمُعْرَى مُوجِبَةً يُنتَبِعُ سَالِبَةً كُلِيَّةً كَقُولُنَا كُلُّ جَ بَ وَلا شَيْقَ مِنْ السَّعْرَى السَعْرَى السَّعْرَى السَّعْرَى السَّعْرَى السَّعْرَى السَّعْرَى السَّعْرَى السَالِية السَّعْرَى السَّعْرَى السَّعْمَ السَلْعَة السَلِية عُرْئِيَةً وَالسَلْسَ السَّعْمَ السَلَالِية عُرْئِيَةً السَلِية عُرْئِيةً السَّعْمَ السَلْعَة السَلْمُ السَلْعَة السَلِية عُرْئِيةً السَلِيمَ السَّعْمَ السَلَالِة عُرْئِيةً السَلِيمَ السَّعْمَ السَلْعَ السَلِيمَ السَلْمُ السَلِيمَ السَّعْمَى السَلِيمَ السَلِمَ السَلِيمَ السَلِيمَ السَلِي

٩٧ أمَّا الشَّكُلُ التَّالِثُ نَشَرْطُهُ الْبَجَابُ الصَّغْرَى وَ الإَّ يَحْصُلُ الْإِخْتِلَافُ وَكُلِيَّةً إحديى مُقَدِّ مَنَيْهِ

ج لاَدَائِمًا نَفَرْضُ الْمَوْمُوعُ لَا فَهُوَ لَيْسَ بَ بِالْفِعْلِ وَدَ جَ فِي بَعْضِ اَوْقَاتِ كُوْنِهُ لِيْسَ بَ وَلَّهُ لَيْسَ بَ فَهُو جَ فِي بَعْضِ اَحْيَانِ لَيْسَ بَ وَهُوَ الْمُدَّعَى هَ وَامَّا الْوَقْتِيَّانِ وَ الْوَجُودِ يُنَانِ فَتَنْعَكِسُ مُطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً لاَنَّهُ امْدَى لاَ شَيْقَ مِنْ جَ بَ بِاحْدَى عَلَاهِ الْجِهَاتِ الْوَقْتِيَّانِ وَ الْوَجُودِ يُنَانِ فَتَنْعَكِسُ مُطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً لاَنَّهُ امْدَى لاَ شَيْقَ مِنْ جَ بِالْحَدَى عَلَاهِ وَ الْجَهَاتِ الْوَقْتُومُ وَ الْمُؤْمُوعُ لَا نَهُو لَيْسَ بَ بِالْفِعْلِ وَ جَ بِالْفِعْلِ وَ مَ بِالْفِعْلِ وَ جَ بِالْفِعْلِ وَ مَ السَّوَا فِي السَّوَا فِي السَّوَا فِي السَّوَا فَي السَّوَا فَي السَّوْ السَّوْطِيَّةُ مُوجِيدَةً كَانَتُ الْمُعْلِ وَ هُوَ السَّرَطِيَّةُ مُوجِيدَةً كَانَتُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِ وَ هُوَ السَّرَاطِيَّةُ مُوجِيدَةً كَانَتُ الْمُعْلَى وَهُ وَ السَّرَاطِيَّةُ مُوجِيدَةً كَانَتُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلَى وَهُو السَّرَاطِيَّةُ مُوالِمِ وَ هُكُذَا بَيْنَ عُكُوسِ جُزْئِيَّاتِهَا ه وَ امَّا بَوَا قِي السَّوَا فِي وَالشَّرْطِيَّةُ مُو السَّرَاطِيَّةُ الْمُعْلِ وَ هُو السَّرَاطِيَّةُ مُنْ الْمُعْلِى وَ هُو السَّرَاطِيَّةُ مُولِقَالِ اللَّهُ وَالْمَالِيَةُ الْمُعْلَى وَالْمَالِولَالِهُ وَالْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِدُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمَالِي وَالْمُؤْمِ الْمِؤْمُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُومُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمَالِمُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمِؤْمُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُومُ الْمُؤْمِ الْ

# ٱلْبَصْتُ الرَّابِعُ فِي تَلَازُمِ الشَّرْطِيَّاتِ

# اَلْمَقَالَةُ النَّا لِثَقُ فِي الْقِيَاسِ وَفِيهَا خَمْسَٰةُ فُصُولِ الْفَصْلُ الْاَ وَلُ فِي تَعْرِيْفِ الْقِيَاسِ وَأَتْسَامِهِ

عه الْقِيَاسُ قُولُ مُولُّفُ مِنْ قَضَايًا إِذَا سُلِّمَتْ لَزِمَ عَنْهَا لِذَا تَهَا قُولُ آخَرُهُ

٧٥ وَهُوَ إِشْتِثْنَائِي اِنْكَانَ عَيْنُ النَّلْفَجَةِ أَوْ نَقِيْضُهَا مُذَكُورًا فِيْهِ بِالْفَعْلِ كَقُولِنَا انْ كَانَ هَٰذَا جِسْبًا فَهُوَ مُنَّعَيِّزُو هُوَ بِعَيْنِهِ كَثُولُوا اِنْ كَانَ هَٰذَا لِيَنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِعِشْمٍ وَ نَقِيضُهُ مَذَكُورً فِيهِ وَ لَوْ قُلْنَا لِيَنَّهُ لَيْسَ بِعَشْمِ اللهِ اللهُ لَيْنَ مِنْ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ عَلَى اللهُ اللهُ عَلَى اللهُ اللهُ عَلَى الله

٧٧ وَ مَوْضُوعُ الْمَطْلُوبِ يُسْمَّى اَصْغَرَ وَمُحْمُولُهُ أَكْبَرُ وَالْقَضِيَّةُ الَّذِي جُعِلَتْ جُزْءَ قِيَاسٍ تُسَمَى مَقَدِّمَةً وَالْمُقَدِّ مَةُ النِّهِي فِيبًا الْاَمْعُرُ الْصُغْرَى وَ النِّنِي فِيبًا الْاَكْبُرُ الْكُبُرَى وَ الْمَيْمُ حَدًّا اَوْسَطَ وَالْمَيْمُ الْكُبُرُ الْكُبُرَى وَ الْمَيْمُةُ الْحَامِلَةُ مِنْ كَيْفَيَّةً وَفَعِ الْحَدِ الْأَرْسَطِ عَنْدَ الْحَدَّيْنِ ﴿ وَالْهَيْمُةُ الْحَامِلَةُ مِنْ كَيْفَيَّةً وَفَعِ الْحَدِ الْأَرْسَطِ عَنْدَ الْحَدَّيْنِ ﴾

٧٠ وَأَمَّا الْمُوْجِبَاتُ فَإِنَ كَانَّتُ كَلِيَّةٌ فَسَنِعُ مِنْهَا وَهِي النِّي لا تَنْعَسُ سَوَائِبِهَا بِالْعَمْسِ الْسَتَجِي لَا تَنْعَبُسُ وَتَّتَ التَّرْبِيْعِ لاَ دَا لَيْ دُونَ عَلَيْهِ لِمَا عَرَفَتَ وَتُنْعَبُسُ الضَّرُورَةِ وَ وَالْمَا كُلَّ جَ بَ فَدَائِمًا لاَ شَيْعَ مِنَا لَيْسَ بَ فَهُو جَ بِالْفِيلِ وَهُو مَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ بَعْضُ مَا لَيْسَ بَ فَهُو جَ بِالْفِيلِ وَهُو مَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ بَعْضُ مَا لَيْسَ بَ فَهُو جَ بِالْفِيلِ وَهُو مَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ بَعْضُ مَا لَيْسَ بَ فَهُو جَ بِالْفِيلِ وَهُو مَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ بَعْضُ مَا لَيْسَ بَ فَهُو جَ بِالْفِيلِ وَهُو مَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ بَعْضُ مَا لَيْسَ بَ فَهُو جَ بِالْفِيلِ وَهُو مَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ بَعْضُ مَا لَيْسَ بَ فَهُو جَ عِلَى اللهُ وَامَّ الْمُشْرُوطَةُ وَالْمُوفِيَّةُ الْعَامَلِيسَ بَ فَهُو جَ حَيْنَ هُولَيْسَ بَ وَهُومَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ الْمُوفِيَّةُ الْعَامِ الْعَنْفِيمَ مِنَا لاَ لَيْسَ بَ وَهُومَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ مَا لَيْسَ بَ وَهُومَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ مَا الْمُعْرَوقِيَّةُ الْعَامِ وَالْقَامِ وَالْمَالِقُ مَنْ الْمَعْلِ وَهُومَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ مَا لَيْسَ بَ عَبُو جَعِينَ هُولَالْمِسَ بَ وَهُومَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ مَعْمَلُ وَاللَّالَّا وَوَامَ اللَّالِقُ مَالَيْسَ بَ وَهُومَعَ الْآصَلِ يُلْتَعِ مَا الْعَلَى الْمَعْلِ وَالْمَالِقُ وَالْمَالِولَ الْمَالِقُ وَالْمَالِ وَيَالِقُولُ الْمَعْلِ عَلَيْكُ مَا الْعَلَى لِهُ عَلَى الْمَعْلِ عَلَى الْمَعْلِ لِو مُولِي الْمَعْلِ لِهُ عَلَى الْمَعْلِ عَلَيْمَ لِ مُؤْمِو الْمَوْمُوعِ هُذَا لَمُنْ الْمَعْلِ لِو مُؤْمِ الْمَوْمُ وَ الْمُؤْمُوعِ هُذَا اللّهُ وَالْمَالِ وَيَالْوَمُو وَ الْمُؤْمُومُ وَ الْمُؤْمُوعُ عَلْمَالَ لِمُ مُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمُ وَ الْمُؤْمُوعِ عَلَيْلَ الْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُ لَو الْمُؤْمُ وَ الْمُؤْمُومِ عَلَالُهُ وَالْمَا لِولَا مُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمُ وَالْمَالِولُ وَالْمِلُولُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُومُ وَالْمَالِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ عَلَا اللْمُؤْمُ وَالْمَالِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمَالِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ عَلَالِهُ وَالْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَلْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُ الْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمَا الْمُ

٧١ وَإِنْ كَانَتُ جُزُنِيَّةً فَالْخَا صَّنَانِ تَنْعَكِسًانِ عُرْفِيَّةً خَاصَّةً لاَنَّهُ إِذَا صَدَى بالضَّرُورَة اوْدَا نِمَا بعض لا وَإِنْ كَانَتُ جُزُنِيَّةً فَالْخَاصَةُ لاَنْهُ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ الل

٧٧ وَ أَمَّا السَّوَالِبُ كُلِيَّةً كَانَتْ أَوْ جَزْئِيَّةً فَلَا تَنْعَيسُ كَلِيَّةً لِإِ حَتِمَالِ كَوْنِ نَقِيْفِ الْمَحْمُولِ أَعَمَّ مِنَ ٧٢ وَ أَمَّا السَّوَالِبُ كُلِيَّةً كَانَتْ أَوْ أَمُدَى بِالضَّرُورَةِ الْوَدَائِمَا لاَ شَيْئَ مِنْ جَ بَ مَا ذَامً

مَن قَ قُلُ جَ بَ بِإِحْدَى الْجِهَاتِ الْآرَبِي الْمَدْ كُورَةِ فَبَعَفَى بَ جَ حَيْنَ هُو بَ وَالْآفَةَ مَنْ مِن بَ جَ فِي الْفَرُورَةِ اَوْ دَائِمًا فِي الْفَرُورَةِ وَ الدَّالُهُ وَ مَادَامَ مَا ذَامَ بَ وَهُومَ عَلَا لَا مُؤْمِنَ الْأَصْلِ حَيْنِيَّةً مُطْلَقَةً مَقَيْدَةً بِاللَّا دَوَامِ أَمَّا الْجَوْئَيَةُ الْمُطْلَقَةَ مَقَيْدَةً بِاللَّا دَوَامِ أَمَّا الْجَوْئَيَةُ الْمُطْلَقَةَ مَقَيْدَةً بِاللَّا دَوَامِ أَمَّا الْجَوْئَةِ الْمُطَلَقَةَ مَقَيْدَةً بِاللَّا دَوَامِ أَمَّا الْجَوْئَيَةُ الْمُطْلَقَةَ مَقَيْدةً بِاللَّا وَمَن الْأَصْلِ وَهُو قُولُنَا بِالصَّرُورَةِ وَالْمَا كُلُقَ جَ لِللَّهِ فَلِي الْجَوْرُ الْآوَلِ مِن الْأَصْلِ وَهُو قُولُنَا بِالصَّرُورَةِ وَالْمَا كُلُّ جَ بِ بِالْإِطْلَاقِ مَا الْجَوْرُ الْآوَلِ مِن الْأَصْلِ وَهُو قُولُنَا بِالصَّرُورَةِ وَالْمَا كُلُّ جَ بَ بِالْإِطْلَاقِ مَا وَامَّا فَي الْجُرْءُ الْآوَلِ مِن الْأَصْلِ وَهُو قُولُنَا اللَّهُونَ الْمُلْقَقُ مَن جَ بِ بِالْإِطْلَاقِ الْعَلْمَ فَيْلُومُ الْجَوْرُ اللَّا الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِقُ مِن جَ بِ الْوَلَقِي الْمُؤْمِقُ وَالْمَا الْمُؤْمِقُ وَلَا الْمُؤْمِقُ وَالْمَا وَالْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ وَالْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُؤْمِولِ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمُومُ وَالْمُؤْمُومُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِنَ الْمُؤْمِنَ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُومُ وَالْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمِولُولِ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمِقُ الْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُؤْمُومُ وَالْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُ الْمُؤْمِقُولُ الْمُؤْمِنَ الْمُؤْمِلُ الْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ وَالْمُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُلُومُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُومُ الْمُؤْمُومُ الْمُؤْمُومُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُولُ الْمُؤْمِولُومُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُ

# البَعثُ النَّا لِثُ فِي مَكْسِ النَّقيضِ

٩٤ وُهُوعِدَارَةً عَنْ جَعْلِ الْجُزْءِ الْأُولِ مِنَ الْقَضِيَّةِ نَقِيْفَ النَّانِي وَالنَّانِي عَيْنَ الْأَوْلِ مَعَ مُخَالفَةِ الْأَمْلِ فِي الْكَيْفِ وَ مُوانَقَتِهِ فِي الصِّدَقِ . و قُتْ التَّرْبِيْعِ لاَ دَائِمًا وَ كَدَبَ قُولُنَا بَعْضُ الْمُنْخَسِفِ لَيْسَ بِقَمْرٍ بِالْاِمْكَانِ الْعَامُ الَّذِي هُو اَعَمَّ الْجَاتِ لِآنَ كُلُّ مُنْخَسِفٍ مَنْ الْاَعَمَّ الْمُنْعَسِ الْاَعَمَّ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَمِّ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَمِّ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَمِّ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعَلِّمِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعَلِّسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعِلَّسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعْمِسُ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعْمِسِ الْمُعِلَّمِ الْمُعْم

الله الله الله ورَيَّةُ وَالدَّائِمَةُ الْمُطْلَقَتَانِ فَتَنْعَكِسَانِ دَائِمَةٌ كُلَيَّةٌ لِإِنَّهُ اِذَا صَفَقَ بِالضَّرُورَةِ أَوْ دَا ئِما لاَ شَيْقَ مِنْ بَهِ وَ اللهِ فَتَنْعَكِسَانِ دَائِمَةٌ كُلَيَّةٌ لِإِنَّهُ إِذَا مُنَا اللهُ اللهِ عَلَى اللهُ ا

٩٥ وَ أَمَّا، الْمَشُرُوطُةُ وَ الْعُرُويَّةُ الْعَامَّتَانِ فَتَنْعَكِسَانِ عُرُفِيَّةً عَامَّةً كُلِيَّةً لَا نَهُ اِذَا مَدَى بِالضَّرُورَةِ اَوْ ذَائِمًا لاَ شَيْقَ مِن بَ جَ مَادَامَ بَ وَ اِلّا فَبَعْضُ بَ جَ حَيْنَ هُو بَ وَ هُو مَعَ الْاَشْدِي مِنْ جَ بَ مَادَامٌ جَ فَذَائِمًا لاَ شَيْقَ مِن بَ جَ مَادَامٌ بَ وَ اللّا فَبَعْضُ بَ جَ حَيْنَ هُو بَ وَ هُو مَعَ الْاَصْلِ يُنْتَعِ بَعْضُ بَ لَيْسَ بَ حَيْنَ هُو بَ وَهُو مُحَالً • وَامَّا الْمَشْرُوطَةُ وَالْعُرُفِيَّةُ الْحَامَّتَانِ فَتَنْعَكِسَانِ الْاَسْدُ عَنْ بَعْضُ بَ لَيْسَ بَ حَيْنَ هُو بَ وَهُو مُحَالً • وَامَّا الْمُشْرُوطَةُ وَالْعُرُفِيَّةُ الْحَامَّةُ فَلَكُونِيَا لاَرْمَةٌ لِلْعَامِّتَيْنِ وَامَّا اللّهُ دَرَامُ في الْبَعْضِ عُرْفَيْهُ الْعَامِّقَةُ فَلَكُونِيَا لاَرْمَةٌ لِلْعَامِّتَيْنِ وَامَّا اللّهُ دَرَامُ في الْبَعْضِ امَّا اللهُ دَوْلَهُ فَلَاعِلَةِ الْعَامِّقَةُ فَلَكُونِيَا لاَرْمَةٌ لِلْعَامِّتَيْنِ وَامَّا اللّهُ دَرَامُ في الْبَعْضِ امَّا اللهُ دَوْلَهُ مِنْ بَ جَ دَائِمًا فَتَنْعَكِسُ إِلَى لاَ شَيْمَ مِنْ بَ جَ دَائِمً فَيَا فَتَنْعَكِسُ إِلَى لاَ شَيْمَ مِنْ بَ جَ دَائِمًا فَلَكُونِيَا فَلَكُونَا فَلَا فَيَا اللهُ وَلَا اللهُ وَالْمُ الْعَلَى الْمَالَةِ فَلَا اللهُ وَالْمَالَةُ فَيْفُ مِنْ جَ وَالْمُولُ فَيْلَا فَعَلَامُ فَي الْمَعْلِ هُذَا خُلُهُ فَي مِنْ بَ جَ دَائِمًا فَيْنَا فَلَا فَلَا فَلَا فَلَا فَلَا مُنْ الْمُعْلِى اللّهُ وَلَالِمُ الللّهُ وَلَا لَاللّهُ لَاللّهُ لَا مُنْ اللّهُ مُولِ الللّهُ فَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ الْمُعْلِقُ لَا اللّهُ وَلَا لَاللّهُ مَا اللّهُ وَلَا لَا لَا لَا لَا عُلْمُ الللّهُ فَيْسُ لِلللّهُ اللّهُ وَلَا مُعْلَى مُنْ اللّهُ وَلَا لَاللّهُ وَالْمُعْلِقُ الْمُعْلِقُ لَا مُنْ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ لَا اللّهُ لَوْ الْمُعْلِقُ اللّهُ اللّهُ لَاللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ الللهُ اللّهُ اللللّهُ اللّهُ اللللّهُ الللللّهُ الللللّهُ الللللّهُ الللللّهُ الللللّهُ اللللللّهُ الللللللْفُولُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللل

99 وَإِنْ كَانَتْ جُزْنِيَّةٌ فَالْمَشُرُوطَةٌ وَ الْعُرُويَّةُ الْخَاصَّنَانِ تَنْعَكِسُانِ عُرْفِيَّةٌ خَاصَّةٌ لِاَّنْ الْفَرُورَةِ الْخَاصَّةُ وَلَيْكُ الْفَرُورَةِ الْفَرُورَةِ الْمَالَمُ عَلَى اللهُ الْمَالَمُ عَلَى الْمَالُمُ عَلَى اللهُ ا

٩٧ وَ اَمَّا الْمُوْجِبَةُ كُلِيَّةً كَانَتْ أَوْ جُزْئِيَّةً فَلاَ تَنْعَيْسُ كُلِيَّةً اَمَلاً لِإِخْتِمَا لِي كَوْنِ الْمُحْمُولِ اَعَمَّ مِنَ ٱلْمُوْجُوعِ الْمُحَمُولِ اَعْمَّ مِنَ ٱلْمُوجُوعِ الْمُحَمِّلُ وَاللَّا اِللَّا الْمُدَّةُ وَالدَّا لِمُدَّ وَاللَّا الْمُدَّالِ اللَّا اللَّالُ مُثَانِ تَنْعَيْسُ حِيْنِيَّةً مُطْلَقَةً لا إِنْهُ إِذَا

رَبِي ٱلْسَخْمُورُكَيْنِ وَبُدَّمَعَ ذَلِكَ مِنَ الْبَغْتِافِ بِالْكَيْئِةِ بِعِدْقِ ٱلْيُرْفِئَيْنِ وَكِذَبِ الْكَلِّيَّانِينِ بَيْ كُلِّ مَاذَّةً يَكُونُ النُّوْمُوعُ فِيْهَا أَمَّ مِنَ الْمُضُولِ وَوَبُدَّ مِنَ الْبَغْتِقْفِ بِالْبِينِةِ فِي الْكُلِّ لِعِدْقِ الْمُكُنِّلَهِ فِي وَكِذَمِهِ الضَّرُورِيَّكِيْنِ فِيْ مَادَّةِ الْإِمْكِي .

وَنَقِيْفُ الشَّرُورِيَّةِ الْمُطْلَقَةِ الْمُنْكِنَةُ الْعَامَةُ فِي سَلْسِ وِالشَّرُورَةِ مَعَ الشَّرُورَةِ مِمَا يَتَلَافَعَنَانِ جَرْمًا و وَنَقِيْفُ الدَّالِيَةِ الْمُطْلَقَةُ الْعَامَةُ فِي السَّلَبِ فِي كُلِّ الْوَقَاتِ يُنَافِيْهِ الْمُشْرِونِةِ الْعَامَةُ الْسَيْئِيَّةُ الْمُنْكِنَةُ اَعْنِي النَّيْ حَمِّ فَيْهَا بِرَفِي فِي النَّقِي وَبِالْعَلْسِ وَوَلَقِينَا لَا لَمُشْرُوطَةِ الْعَامَةِ الْسِينِيَّةُ الْمُنْكِنَةُ اعْنِي النَّيْ حَمِّ فَيْهَا بِرَفِي السَّيْرِ وَمَا اللَّي عَمْ فَيْهَا اللَّي عَمْ فَيْهَا اللَّي عَمْ فَيْهَا اللَّي عَمْ فَيْهَا اللَّيْسُ وَاللَّهُ مَنْ بِهِ ذَاتُ الْمُعْلَقِةُ اعْنِي النَّيْسُ عَلَى النَّيْ عَمْ فَيْهَا اللَّي عَلَي اللَّي عَمْ فَيْهَا اللَّي عَمْ فَيْهَا اللَّي عَمْ فَيْهَا اللَّي عَمْ فَيْهَا الْمُؤْتِقِ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُنْ الْمُؤْتِقِ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُؤْمِقِ وَمِثَالُقِالَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُؤْمِ وَمِثَالُهُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقِينَ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقِينَ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقِينَ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقِينَ اللَّهِ عَنْهُ فِي بَعْفِي الْمُعْلِقِينَ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقِينَا الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقِينَ اللَّهِ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقِينَ اللَّهِ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقِينَ اللَّهِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُعْلِقِينَا الْمُعْلِقِينَ الْمُعْلِقِينَا الْمُعْلِقِينَا الْمُعْلِيلِي الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقِينَ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقِينَا الْمُعْلِقَالِقَالِقَالِقَالِقَالِقَالَةُ الْمُعْلِقِينَا الْمُعْلِقَالِقَالِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَةُ الْمُعْلِقَالِقَالِقَالِقِينَا الْمُعْلِقَالِقَالِقَالِقَالَةُ الْمُعْلِقَالِقَالِقَالِقِينَا الْمُعْلِقِيلُولِي الْمُعْلِقَالِقُلِقَالِقُولِقُلُقِلْمُ الْمُعْلِقِيلُولُكُولِقُلُولُولِيلُولُكُولُولُولُولُولُولِيلُولُو

٩٢ وَ أَمَّ الشَّرْطِيَّةُ مَنَفِيْفُ الْكَلِيَّةِ مِنْهَا الْجُزْئِيَّةُ الْمُوَافِقَةُ فِي الْجِنْسِ وَالنَّوْمِ وَالْمُعَالِفِلاَنِي الْكَينِ وَالْنُمَّ وَبِالْمُكْسِ .

# النُّسُثُ النَّانِي فِي الْعَكْسِ الْمُسْتَوِي

وَ هُو عِبَارَةً عَنْ جَعْلِ الْجُوْدِ الْكِلْهِ مِنَ الْقَضِيَّةِ ثَانِياً وَالنَّانِي اَوَّامَعُ بِقَادِ الصِّنْقِ وَالْكَيْفِ بِسَا لِمِمَاهِ

اللهُ إِمَّا السَّوَالِبُ فَلِي كَانَتْ كُلِيَّةً فَسَنِعُ مِنْهَا وَهِيَ الْوَقْتِيَّنَانِ وَ الْوَجُودِيَّنَانِ وَالْمُعْتَلَةِ وَالْمُطْلَقَةُ الْعَامَّةُ الْعَامَّةُ الْعَامَةُ وَمُعْلَامُ الْعَلَيْدَ الْمُعْلَامُ الْعَلَيْدِ الْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَاللّهُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُولِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ الْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعِلَمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ وَالْمُعِلَمُ الْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعِلَمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعِلَمُ وَالْمُعِلَمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعُلِمُ وَالْمُعِلَمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ وَالْمُعِلَمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ الْمُعِلِمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ وَالْمُعِلِمُ وَالْ

إِثِمَا لَيْهُ أَكُذُ بِهَا عَنْ مَا دِ تَيْنِ مُحَالً • وَ الْمُنْفَصِّلَةُ الْمُوجِبَةُ الْسَعِيْقِيَّةُ تَصْدُى عَنْ مَادِي وَ كَاذِبٍ وَ تَكَذِبُ عَنْ مَادِي وَ كَاذِبٍ وَ تَكَذِبُ عَنْ مَادِي وَ كَاذِبٍ وَ تَكَذِبُ عَنْ مَادِي وَ مَا نِعَةُ الْجَدْجِ تَصْدُى عَنْ كَاذِبِي وَ تَكَذِبُ عَنْ مَادِي وَ كَاذِبٍ وَ تَكَذِبُ عَنْ مَادِي وَ كَاذِبٍ وَ تَكَذِبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَ تَكَذِبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَ تَكَذِبُ عَنْ مَادِ تَنْ مَادِ تَنْ مَادِ تَنْ مَادِ تَنْ مَادِي وَ كَاذِبٍ وَتَكَذَبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ مَنْ كَاذِبٍ وَتَكَذِبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَ تَكَذِبُ عَنْ مَادِي وَكَاذِبٍ وَتَكَذِبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَتَكُذِبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَ لَكُوبَ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَ تَكُذِبُ عَنْ مَادِي وَ كَاذِبٍ وَتَكُذِبُ عَنْ كَاذِبُ وَلَكُوبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَتَكُذِبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَ لَكُوبَ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَ تَكُذِبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَ لَكُوبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَ لَكُوبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَ تَكُذِبُ عَنْ كَاذِبِ وَ لَكُوبُ عَنْ كَاذِبُ وَ عَنْ كُوبُ عَلْكُونُ عَلَيْ كُونُ عَنْ كُوبُ عَنْ كُوبُ عَنْ كُوبُ عَنْ كُوبُ عَنْ كُوبُ عَالْكُوبُ عَلَاكُ عَلَيْكُونُ عَنْ كُونُ عَلْكُونُ عَلَاكُ عَلَاكُونُ عَلَيْكُوبُ عَلَاكُونُ عَلَاكُ عَلَاكُونُ كُوبُ عَلْكُونُ كُونُ كُونُ

٥٩ وَكُلِيَّةُ الشَّرْطِيَّةِ الْ يَكُونَ النَّالِيُ لَا رَمَّا اَوْ مُعَانِدًا لِلْمَقَدَّمِ طَلَى جَبِيعِ الْاَوْضَاعِ النَّبِي يَمْنِي الْجَبَيْقُ النَّهِي يَمْنِي الْجَبَيْقُ الْمَعْدُ وَالْجَوْنِيَّةُ اللَّهِ الْمُورِ النِّي يَمْنِي الْجَبَيْقُ عَلَى الْمُعْمَدُ وَالْجَوْنِيَّةُ اللَّهِ الْمُورِ النِّي يَمْنِي الْمُعْمَدُ وَالْمَخْصُوطَةُ اللَّهُ كَذَالِكَ عَلَى وَفَعِ مَعَيْنِ وَالْجُونِيَّةِ اللَّهِ الْمُورِ النَّهِ اللَّهُ اللَّهِ الْمُعْمَدُ وَلِي الْمُنْفَصِلَةِ ذَالِبًا وَسُورُ السَّالِيةِ الْمُلِيَّةِ فِيهِمَا وَمُتَى وَفِي الْمُنْفَصِلَةِ ذَالِبًا وَسُورُ السَّالِيةِ الْمُلْقِةِ فِيهِمَا وَلَا يَكُونُ وَ السَّالِيةِ الْمُؤْمِنِي الْمُنْفِقِةِ فِيهِمَا قَدُ لَا يَكُونُ وَ السَّالِيَةِ الْمُؤْمِلِيَةِ فَيْلِمِا قَدُ لَا يَكُونُ وَ السَّالِيةِ الْمُؤْمِلِيَةِ فِيهِمَا قَدُ لَا يَكُونُ وَ السَّالِيةِ الْمُؤْمِلِيَةِ فَيْلِمِا قَدُ لَا يَكُونُ وَ السَّالِيةِ الْمُؤْمِدِ اللَّهُ لِيَعْمَا لَوْدُ إِلَى وَاذَا فِي الْمُنْفِقِلِةِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِي خَرْفِ السَّالِيَةِ الْمُؤْمِ السَّالِيةِ الْمُؤْمِدِ السَّالِيةِ الْمُؤْمِلِيَةِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيَةِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيَةِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيَةِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيَةِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيَةِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيَةِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيَةِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيَالِيَا فَي النَّامِلِيَةِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيَا وَالْمُؤْمِلِيَالِيقِ السَّالِيقِيقِ السَّالِيقِيقِ السَّالِيقِيقِ السَّالِيقِيقِ السَّالِيقِ السَالِيقِ الللَّهُ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيقِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيقِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيقِ السَالِيقِ وَالْمُؤْمِلِيقِ الللْمُؤْمِلِيقِ السَالِيقِ السَالِيقِ السَالِيقِ اللْمُؤْمِلِيقِ السَالِيقِ السَالِيقِ السَالِيقِ السَالِيقِ السَالِيقِ السَالِيقِ السَالِيقِ الْمُؤْمِلِيقِ السَالِيقِ السَال

## ٱلْفَصْلُ النَّالِثُ فِي أَمْكَامِ الْقَضَايَا وَفِيهِ أَرْبَعَهُ مَبَاحِثَ

## ٱلْبَصْتُ الْأُولَ فِي الْتَنَاكُضِ

ه و حَدُّوهُ بِأَنَّهُ إِغْتَهُ وَتُهُ فَضِيَّتُنِي بِالْأَنْجَابِ وَ السَّلْبِ اَعَيْثُ بِعَثْنَى يَقَتَفِي الدَّتِهُ اللهُ يَعُولُنَ إِلَّا اللهُ ا

الثابط

الفَصْلُ الثَّانِي فِي أَفْسَامِ الشَّرْطِيَّةِ

٩٥ الْجُزْدُ الْأَوْلُ مِنْهَا يُسَمَّى مُقَدَّمًا وَالنَّانِي تَالِيًّا وَهِي إِمَّا مُتَصِلَةً أَوْ مُنْفَصِلَةً أَمَّا الْمُتَصِلَةَ فَإِمَّا لُوْمِيةً وَهِي النَّصَلَةُ الْوَقْمِيةِ الْمُقَدِّمِ لِمُلَّقَةٍ بَيْنَهُمَا تُوْجِبُ ذَلِكَ كَالْعِلَيَّةِ وَالتَّصَايُفِ وَهِي النَّعَ بَيْنَهُمَا تُوجِبُ ذَلِكَ كَالْعِلَيَّةِ وَالتَّصَايُفِ وَإِمَّا النَّعَامِينَ عَلَى الْجَنْدِي عُلَى الْجَنْدِقِ كَقُولُهَا إِنْ كَانَ الْإِنْسَانُ نَاطِقًا وَ إِمَّا الْجَنْدِي عُلَى الْجَنْدَقِ كَقُولُهَا إِنْ كَانَ الْإِنْسَانُ نَاطِقًا وَ إِمَّا الْجَنْدُونَ عَلَى الْجَنْدَقِ كَقُولُهَا إِنْ كَانَ الْإِنْسَانُ نَاطِقًا وَاللَّهَا وَاللَّهَا وَالْمُولُ الْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَى الْجَنْدِقِ كَقُولُهَا إِنْ كَانَ الْإِنْسَانُ نَاطِقًا وَاللَّهَا وَاللَّهَالُ اللَّالَاقِ عَلَيْهِ اللَّهِ اللَّهَالُ اللَّهَالَ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِنَ اللَّهُ الْمُلِي اللَّهُ اللَّالَّالِ الللللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللللْمُ اللَّهُ الللللللَّه

وه وَسَالِبَةً كُلِّ وَاحِدَةٍ مِنْ هَٰذِهِ الْقَصَابِ النَّمَانِ هِيَ الَّتِي يُرْفَعُ فِيْهَا مَا حُبَمَ بِهِ فِي مُوجِيْتِهَا فَسَابِنَةً الْمُنْفِقُ وَسَالِبَةً لَا يَعْنَافِ مَسْلِي سَالِبَةً وَسَالِبَةً وَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ وَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ مَسْلِي سَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ فَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ وَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ مَسْلِي سَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ فَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ وَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ وَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ وَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ مَسْلِيةً الْمُنْفِقُ وَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ وَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ وَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ مِنْ اللّهُ وَمِنْفُولُولُهُ مَا مُنْفِقُ وَسَالِبَةً مِنْ مُنْفِقُ وَسَالِبَةً الْمُنْفِقُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ وَالْمُنْفِقُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ الل

وه وَ الْتَلْصِلَةُ الْمُوجِيدُ تَصَافِيْ مِنْ مَادِقِيْنِ وَ عَنْ كَاذِينِي وَعَنْ مَعِيْمُولِ الْعِبْدِيّ وَ الْكِذِبِ وَعَنْ مَعْمُولِ الْعِبْدِيّ وَالْكِنْبِ وَعَنْ مَعْمُولِ الْعَبْدِيّ وَالْكِنْبِ وَعَنْ مَادِقِيْنِ مِلْكُوبِهِ وَالْكِنْبِ عَلَيْهِ مِنْ الْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَيْهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَيْهِ مِنْ الْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَيْهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ فَوَالْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَيْهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَيْهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ فَالْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَيْهِ وَمِالْمُؤْمِنِ فَا وَالْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَيْهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَيْهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ فَالْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَيْهِ وَمِنْ الْمُؤْمِنِ وَمِالْمُؤْمِنِ فَا وَالْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَيْهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَمُؤْمِنِهِ وَمِالْمُؤْمِنِ فَا وَالْمُؤْمِنِ عَلَيْهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَمُؤْمِنِ وَمُؤْمِنِهِ وَمِالْمُؤْمِنِ وَمُؤْمِنِهِ وَمُوالِمُومِ وَمِالْمُؤْمِنِ وَمُؤْمِنِهُ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَمُؤْمِنِهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَمُؤْمِنِهُ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَمُؤْمِنِهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَمُعْلِمُ وَالْمُؤْمِنِهِ وَمُوالْمُؤْمِنِهُ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَمُؤْمِونِ وَمُؤْمِنِهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَمُوالِمُؤْمِنِهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِهِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِينِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِي وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِيلِي وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِونِ وَالْمُؤْمِونِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِونِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِونِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِونِ وَالْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ

#### संधि

الْوَجُوْدِيَةُ الْأَضُرُورِيَّةُ وَهِيَ الْمُطْلَقَةُ الْمَاسَّةُ مَعَ تَهُذِ الْأَضُرُورَةِ بِصَعَبِ النَّاصِ وَهِيَ إِنْ كَانَتُ مَوْجِئِةً كَقُولِنَا كُلُّ اِنْسَانٍ مَامَّةٍ وَمَنْ الْفَصُرُورَةِ فَقُرْكِيْبُهَا مِنْ مُوجِبِّةٌ مُطْلَقَةٍ عَامَّةٍ وَسَالِيَةٍ مَنْكِئَةً عَامَّةٍ مَنْ اللَّهُ عَامَّةٍ مَنْ اللَّهُ عَامَةً عَامَةً مَنْ اللَّهُ عَامَةً مَنْ اللَّهُ عَامَةً وَمُوجِبَةً مُنْكِنَةً عَامَةً ه

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الْوَجُوْدِيَّةُ الْأَدَائِمَةُ وَهِيَ الْمُطْلَقَةُ الْعَامَّةُ مَّعَ ثَيْدِ الأَّدَوَامِ بِعَسْبِ النَّاتِ وَهِيَ سَوَاءٌ كَانْتُ مُوْجِيدٌ أَوْ سَالِبَةً فَتَوْكِيْبُهَا مِنْ مُطْلَقَتَهِي عَامَّتَهُي إِخْدَافُهَا مُوْجِيدٌ وَ الْخُوْفِ سَالِيكُ وَ مِثَاثُهُا إِلْهُمَابًا وَسَلَبًا مَامَرٌ ه

#### الخامسة

الوَّتَنِيَّةُ وَهِيَ النَّيْ تُعَمُّ فِيْهَا فِصَّرَوْرَةِ تُبُوْتِ الْمَعْمُولِ لِلمُوْمُوعِ اوْسَلِيهِ عَنْهُ فِي وَفْتِ مُعَيِّي مِنْ اوْقَاتِ وَجُودِ الْمَوْمُوعِ مُقَيَّدًا بِاللَّادَوَامِ بِعَسَبِ النَّاتِ وَهِي انْ كَانَتْ مُوجِبَةً كَقُولِنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ كُلُّ تَمْرِ مُنْفَصِفً وَقْتَ مَيْلُولَةِ الْأَرْضِ بَيْفَةُ وَبَيْنَ الشَّنْسِ لَا دَائِنًا فَلْرَكِيْبَهَا مِنْ مُوجِبَةٍ وَقَتِيَّةٍ مَطْلَقَةٍ مُطْلَقَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً مِنْ الْقَبْرِ بِمُنْفَسِفٍ وَقْتَ التَّرْبِيْعِ وَشَالِبَةً وَقَتِيَّةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامَةٍ عَمَّا لَهُ اللَّهُ وَيَعْلَقُهُ مُطْلَقَةً عَامَةٍ عَامَةً عَامَةً وَالْمَالِقَةَ وَمُوجِبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامَةٍ عَامَةً وَاللَّهُ وَتُوبُهُ مُطْلَقَةً عَامَةٍ عَامَةً وَاللَّهُ مُنْ الْفَتَرِ إِمُنْفَعِيمُ وَقَتِيلًا مُطْلَقَةً وَمُوجِبَةً مُظْلَقَةً عَامَةٍ وَاللَّهِ وَقَتِيلًا مُطْلِقَةً عَامِيلًا وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَتُوبُهُ مُطْلَقَةً عَامَةٍ عَامَةٍ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَتُوبُهُ مُطْلَقَةً عَامَةً عَامِهُ اللَّهِ مُطْلِقَةً عَامِهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ مُنْ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ عَامِهُ فَيْ اللَّهُ مُنْ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ عَلَيْهُ مُنْ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ عَامِيلًا عَلَيْهُ عَلَيْكُ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْكُ اللَّالَةُ عَلَالًا لَعْلَقِ عَلَالًا اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْكُ عُلَوالًا اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّالَةُ اللَّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الل

### السادسة

المُنْتَشِرَةُ وَهِيَ النِّي تَحْمُ فِيهَا بِضُرُورَةٍ تُبُوْتِ الْسَعْنُولِ لِلْمُؤْمُوعِ أَوْسَلَيْهِ عَنْهُ فِي وَقْتِ غَيْرِ مُعَيَّي مِنْ اَوْقَاتِ وَجُوْدِ النَّوْمُوعِ مَعَيْدًا بِالقَّدَوَامِ فِحَسَبِ النَّاتِ وَهِي إِنْكَانَتُ مُوجِبَةً كَفَوْلِنَا بِالشَّرُورَةِ مَنْ اللَّهُ وَاللَّهِ مَعْلَقَةً عَامَّةً كُلُّ إِنْسَالِهِ مُتَنَفِّسُ فِي وَقْتِ مَا قَوْلِنَا بِالشَّرُورَةِ لَا شَيْقَ مِنَ الْاَنْسَانِ بِيُتَنَفِّسِ فِي وَقْتِ مَا قَوْلِنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ لَا شَيْقَ مِنَ الْاَنْسَانِ بِيتَنَفِّسِ فِي وَقْتِ مَا قَوْلِنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ لَا شَيْقَ مِنَ الْاَنْسَانِ بِيتَنَفِّسِ فِي وَقْتِ مَا قَوْلِنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ لَا شَيْقَ مِنَ الْاَنْسَانِ بِيتَنَفِّسِ فِي وَقْتِ مَا قَوْلِهَا مِن مَنْ فَيْنِ فِي مَنْ الْنَعْمُ فَي مِنْ الْنَسَانِ بِيتَنَفِّسِ فِي وَقْتِ مَا قَوْلِهَا مِنْ مَنْ فِي مَا لِللَّهِ عَالَيْهِ مَنْ الْنَسَانِ بِيتَنَفِّسِ فِي وَقْتِ مَا قَوْلِهَا مِنْ مَنْ فِي مَا لَانْسَانِ بِيتَنَفِّسِ فِي وَقْتِ مَا قَوْلِهَا مِنْ اللَّهُ مَنْ فَيْ فَي مَنْ الْفَيْرُ وَهِ لِنَا مِنْ مَنْ فِي مَالِهُ وَاللَّهُ عَامَةً عَامِيّة مُنْلِقَةً وَمُ اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ مُنْ الْمُعْتَى وَالْمَعْ فَي مُنْلِقَةً وَمُوالِقَةً وَمُوالِقَةً عَامِيّةً عَامَةً وَاللَّهِ عَلَيْهِ مُنْلُقِهِمْ وَاللَّهُ مُنْ اللَّهُ فَاللَّهُ عِلْمُ لِلْهُ عَلَى إِلَيْنَا اللَّهِ مُنْلِقِهُ مُنْ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهِ مُنْفَعِهُ وَاللَّهُ عَلَالَةً عَامِيّةً مُنْ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقِي اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقِةُ وَاللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُنْ اللَّهُ اللْهُ اللَّهُ الْمُعْلِقِيلُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللْهُ اللَّهُ الْمُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّلِيلُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ ال

بِقَرْطِ رَمْفِ الْنَوْفُوعِ كَقُولْنَا بِالشَّرُورُةِ كُلُّ كَا تِبِ مُتَعَرِّكُ الْأَمَائِعِ مَا دَامٌ كَا تِبَا وَبِالضَّرُورَةِ لَا شَيْقَ مِنَ الْكَاتِبِ بَصِائِي الْأَمَائِعِ مَا دَامٌ كَاتِبًا .
 مِنَ الْكَاتِبِ بَصِائِي الْأَمَائِعِ مَا دَامٌ كَاتِبًا .

## الرابعة

الْعُرْفِيَّةُ الْعَامَّةُ وَ هِيَ النَّنِي تُحْتُمُ فَيْهَا بِدَوَامِ تُبُوْتِ الْمَعْمُولِ لِلْمُوْمُوْعِ أَوْ سَلْبِهِ عَنْهُ بِشَرْطٍ وَصْفِ

# . أَلْخَامِسَةُ

الْمُطْلَقَةُ الْعَامَّةُ وَ هِيَ النَّيْ تُحْمَمُ إِنْهَا بِتُبُوْتِ الْمَحْمُولِ لِلْمُوْمُوْعِ أَوْ سَلْبِهِ عَنْهُ بِالْفِعْلِ كَقَوْلِنَا بِالْمُطْلَقَةُ الْعَامِّ كُلُّ الْمُسَانِ بِبَنَّفَقِسِ .

### ألساد سة

الْمُنْكِنَةُ الْعَامَّةُ وَ هِيَ الَّذِي تَحْكُمُ فِيهَا بِارْتِفَاعِ الضَّرُورَةِ الْمُطْلَقَةِ عَيِ الْجَانِبِ الْمُخَالِفِ لِلْحُكُم كَقُولِنَا بِالْأَمْكَانِ الْعَامِّ لَا شَيْنَى مِنَ الْحَارِّ بِبَا رُدٍ .

# ا و وَأَمُّا الْمُرَكِّبَاتُ فَسَبُّع

## أَلْأُوْلَى

الْمَشُوْوَطُةُ الْخَاصَّةُ وَهِي الْمَشُرُوطُةُ الْعَامَّةُ مَّعَ فَيْدِ اللّا دَوَامِ بِحَسَبِ الذَّاتِ وَهِيَ إِنْ كَانَتَ مُوْجِبَةً كَقُولِنَا بِالضَّرُورَةِ كُلُّ كَاتِبِ مُتَحَرِّكُ الْاَمَائِعِ مَا دَامَ كَاتِبًا لَا دُوابُنَا فَلَوْ كَيْبُهَا مِنْ مُوْجِبَةٍ مَشُرُوطُةٍ عَامَّةً وَسَالِبَةً مُطْلَقَةٍ عَامَّةٍ مَ مُطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً مَ مُطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً مَ الْكَاتِبِ بِسَاكِنِ الْاَصَابِعِ مَا دَامُ كَاتِبًا لاَ دَائِمًا فَتَوْكِبُهُمَا مِنْ سَالِبَةً مَشُرُوطَةً عَامَّةً وَ مُوجِبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامَّةً .

#### ا لثانية

ا الْعُرْقِيَّةُ الْخَاصَّةُ وَهِي الْعُرْقِيَّةُ الْعَامَّةُ مَعْ قَيْدِ اللَّادَوَامِ بِحَسَبِ الذَّاتِ وَهِيَ إِنْ كَانَتْ مُوجِبَةً فَتَرْكِيْبُهَا مِنْ مَالِيَةً عَرَقَيَّةٍ عَامَّةً وَمُوجِبَةً فَتَرْكِيْبُهَا مِنْ سَالِيَةٍ عَرَقَيَّةٍ عَامَّةً وَمُوجِبَةً مُطْلَقَةً عَامِّةً وَمِثَالُهَا إِنْجَابًا وَسَلَبًا مَامَلً .

دُونَ الْإِنْجَابِ فَإِنَّ الْإِنْجَابَ لَا يَصِحُ إِلَّا عَلَى مَوْجُودُ مُحَقَّقٍ كَمَا فِي الْعَارِجِيَّةِ الْمُوْفُوعِ آوْمُقَدَّرٍ \* كَمَا فِي الْعَلْقِيَّةِ الْمُوفُوعِ آمَّا إِذَا كَانَ الْمُوفُوعُ مُوْجُودًا فَائِمُنَا مُثَلًا رِمِثَانِ • وَالْفَرْقُ بَيْنَهُمَا فِي اللَّفْظِ آمَّا فِي اللَّفْظِ آمَّا فِي اللَّفْظِ آمَّا فِي اللَّفْظِ آمَّا فَي اللَّفْظِ آمَّا فَي اللَّفَظِ آمَا اللَّهُ وَالْقَضِيَّةُ مُوْجِبَةً إِنْ تُدِمَّتِ الرَّابِطَةُ عَلَى حَرْفِ السَّلْبِ وَسَالِبَةً إِنْ الْجَرَّتُ عَلَىٰ وَآمَا فَي اللَّهُ اللَّهُ وَآمَا فَي اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ الْمُنْ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللللْمُ اللَّهُ اللللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللْلَهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللللْمُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللللَّهُ اللللْمُ اللَّهُ الللللْمُ اللَّهُ الللللْمُ اللَّهُ الللللللْمُ اللللْمُ الللللْمُ الللْمُولَى اللْمُولِلْمُ اللللْمُولِلْمُ الللللللْمُ الللللْمُ اللللْمُ اللَّهُ اللللْمُ اللللْمُ ا

# ٱلْبَعْثُ الرَّابِعُ فِي الْقَضَايَا الْمُوَجَّهَةِ

مُ الدَّرَامِ وَاللَّاضُورَةِ وَاللَّدَوَامِ وُ تُسَمَّى تِلْكَ الْكَيْفِيَّةِ اِيْجَابِيَّةً كَانَتِ النِّسْبَةُ اوْ سَلْبِيَّةً كَانَتُورُوَةٍ وَاللَّفَظُ الدَّالُ عَلَيْهَا يُسَمَّى وَ الكَيْفِيَّةُ مَادَّةً الْقَضِيَّةِ وَاللَّفَظُ الدَّالُ عَلَيْهَا يُسَمَّى جَبَةَ الْقَضِيَّةِ وَاللَّفَظُ الدَّالُ عَلَيْهَا يُسَمَّى جَبَةَ الْقَضِيَّةِ وَاللَّفَظُ الدَّالُ عَلَيْهَا يُسَمَّى جَبَةَ الْقَضِيَّةِ •

وع وَ الْقَضَايَا الْمُوجَّهَةُ النَّبِيْ جَرَتِ الْعَادَةُ بِالْبَحْثِ عَلْهَا وَعَنْ اَحْكَامِهَا ثَلَثَ عَشَرَةَ قَضِيَّةً مِلْهَا بَسِيطَةً وَهِيَ النَّبِيْ حَقِيقَتُهَا تَرَكَّبَتْ مِنْ بَسِيطَةً وَهِيَ النَّبِيْ حَقِيقَتُهَا تَرَكَّبَتْ مِنْ النَّبِيْ حَقَيْقَتُهَا تَرَكَّبَتْ مِنْ النَّبِي مَعًا .

# اللَّهُ اللَّلَّا اللَّهُ اللّ

ألأولى

الصَّرُورِيَّةُ الْمُطْلَقَةُ وَ هِنِي الَّتِيْ تُحْكُمُ مِيْهَا بِضُرُورَةِ تُبُوْتِ الْمَحْمُولِ لِلْمَوْمُومِ أَوْ سَلْبِهِ عَنْهُ مَا دَامَ ذَاتُ الْمَوْمُوعِ مَوْجُودَةً كَقُولْنَا بِالضُّرُورَةِ كُلُّ إِنْسَانٍ حَيْوَانُ وَبِالضُّرُورُةِ لِتَشْفِي مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ بِحَجُرٍ •

#### اَلثًا نِيَةً

الدَّائِمَةُ النَّطْلَقَةُ وَ هِنِي الَّتِيْ تُحْكُمُ فِيْهَا بِدَوَامِ ثُبُوْتِ الْحَثْمُوْلِ لِلْمَوْضُوْعِ اوَ سَالِبِهِ عَنْهُ مَا ذَامَ قَاتُ الْمَوْضُوْعِ مَوْجُودَةً وَمِثَا لَهَا إِنْجَابًا وَ سَلْبًا مَا مَرَّ •

#### ألفًا لفة

الْمُشْرُوطَةُ الْعَامَّةُ وَ هِنِي الَّتِي تُعْكُمُ فِيْهَا فِضُرُورَةٍ تُكُونِ الْمُعْمُولِ لِلْبَرْضُوعِ أَوْ كَالْبِهِ عَنْهُ

# ٱلْبَحْثُ النَّانِي فِي تَحْقِيقِ الْمَحْصُورَاتِ الْأَرْبَعِ

وَا فَوْلَنَا كُلُّ جَ بَ تُسْتَعْمَلُ ثَارَةً بِحَسَبِ الْحَقِيقَةِ وَمَعْنَاهُ أَنَّ كُلُّ مَا لُو وَجِدٌ كَانَ جَ مِنَ الْاَفْرَادِ السَّكَيْنَةِ فَهُو مَلْزُومُ بَ فَهُو مَلْزُومُ بَ وَتَارَةً بِحِسَبِ الْخَارِجِ وَمَعْنَاهُ كُلُّ جَ فِي الْخَارِجِ وَالْفَرْقُ بَيْنَ الْإِعْتِبَارِينِ مَعْنَاهُ أَوْبَعْدُهُ فَهُو بَ فِي الْخَارِجِ وَ وَالْفَرْقُ بَيْنَ الْإِعْتِبَارِينِ كُلُّ جَ فِي الْخَارِجِ وَ الْفَرْقُ بَيْنَ الْإِعْتِبَارِ الْأَوْلِ عَلَيْهُ أَوْبَعْدُهُ فَهُو بَ فِي الْخَارِجِ وَ الْفَرْقُ بَيْنَ الْإِعْتِبَارِ الْأَوْلِ عَلَيْهُ أَوْلَهُ مَا أَوْ فَلِلْهُ الْحَارِجِ لَصَعَ آنَ يَقَالَ كُلُّ مُرَبَّع شَكْلُ بِالْإِعْتِبَارِ الْأَوْلِ لَكُونَ النَّانِي وَ لَوْلَمَ يُوجَدُ مِنَ الْاَشْكَالِ فِي الْخَارِجِ إِلَّا الْمُرَبِّعُ لَصَعْ آنَ يُقَالَ كُلُّ مُرَبَّع مَنَ الْاَشْكَالِ فِي الْخَارِجِ إِلَّا الْمُرَبِّعُ لَصَعْ آنَ يُقَالَ كُلُّ مُرَبِّع مَن الْاَشْكَالِ فِي الْخَارِجِ إِلَّا الْمُرَبِّعُ لَصَعْ آنَ يُقَالَ كُلُّ مُرَبِّع مَن الْاَشْكَالِ فِي الْخَارِجِ إِلَّا الْمُرَبِّعُ لَصَعْ آنَ يُقَالَ كُلُّ مَنْكُم مُورَبِعُ بِالْاعِيدِةِ اللَّهُ مِنْ اللَّهُ مِنْ اللَّهُ مِن الْاَسْكَالُ فِي الْخَارِجِ إِلَّا الْمُرَبِّعُ لَصَعْ آنَ يُقَالَ كُلُّ مُرَبِع مَن الْاَسْكَالِ فِي الْخَارِجِ إِلَّا الْمُوبَعِدُ الْمَالَقِيقَةُ وَالْمُؤْمِ الْوَالْمِ الْمُعْتَوْمِ اللَّهُ الْمُؤْمِ وَلَا لَازُلِ وَ وَعَلَى هٰذَا فَقِسِ الْمُخْصُورُاتِ الْبَاقِيقَةَ وَالْمُؤْمُ وَالْوَلَ الْمُؤْمِ وَالْمَالِقِيقَةُ وَالْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُومِ الْفَالِقُولِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْوَلِي الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُعْلِقِيقِيقِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ وَالْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْعُرْمُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُومُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمِ الْمُؤْمُ الْمُؤْمُ

# ٱلْبَعْثُ الثَّالِثُ فِي الْعُدُولِ وَالتَّعْصِيلِ

٣٥ خَرْفُ السَّلْبِ إِنْ كَانَ جُزْءًا مِنَ الْمُوضُوعِ كُقُولْنِا اللَّحْيُّ جَمَادُ أَوْمِنَ الْمَحْمُولِ كَقُولِنَا اللَّحْيُّ جَمَادُ أَوْمِنَ الْمُحَمُولِ كَقُولِنَا اللَّحْيُّ جَمَادُ أَوْمِنَ الْمُحَمُولِ كَقُولِنَا اللَّحْيُّ جَمَادُ لَا عَالِمُ أَوْمِنْهُمَا جَمِيْعًا سُبِيعِ الْقَضِيّةِ مَعْدُولَةً مُوجِبَةً كَانَتْ الرَّسَالِبَةُ وَإِنْ لَمْ يَكُن جُزْءَ شَيْعِي مِنْهُمَا سُيِّيَتُ مُحَصَّلَةً إِنْكَانَتْ مُوجِبَةً وَبُسِيطَةً إِنْ كَانَتْ سَالِبَةً .

الله وَ الْإِعْتِبَارُ بِالْجَابِ الْقَضِيَّةِ وَ سَلِبِهَا بِالنِّسْبَةِ النَّبُوتِيَّةِ وَالسَّلْبِيَّةِ لَابِطَرْفَي الْقَضِيَّةِ فَإِنَّ قُولُنَا كُنْ مَا لَيْسَ بِعَيْ فَهُو لَعَالَمُ مُوْجِبَةً مَعُ اللَّ طَرْفَيْهَا عَدَمِيَّانٍ وَقُولَنَا لِاَشْدَى مِنَ الْمُتَعَرِّكِ بِسَاكِي مَا لَيْسَ مَعْ اللهُ عَرْفَيْهَا عَدَمِيَّانٍ وَقُولَنَا لِاَشْدَى مِنَ الْمُتَعَرِّكِ بِسَاكِي مَا لَيْسَ مَعْ اللهُ مَعْ اللهُ عَلَيْهِ مَعْ اللهُ عَلَيْهِ مُعَ اللهُ عَلَيْهِ مَعْ اللهُ عَلَيْهِ مَعْ اللهُ عَلَيْهِ اللهُ اللهُ عَلَيْهِ اللهُ اللهُ عَلَيْهِ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ عَلَيْهَا وَجُودِيًا اللهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللللّهُ اللللللللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللللّ

٣٧ وَ السَّالِلَةُ الْبَسِيْطُةُ أَمَّ مِنَ الْمُوْجِبَةِ الْمُعْدُولَةِ الْتَحْمُولِ لِصِدْقِ السَّلْبِ عِنْدُ عَدَمِ الْمُوْهُوعِ

#### الْمَقَالَةُ الثَّانِيةُ

نِي الْقَضَايَا وَ اَحْكَامِهَا وَ نِيْهَا مُقَدِّمَةً وَلَلْنَهُ نُصُولِ أَمَّا الْمُقَدِّمَة نَفِي تَعْرِيْفِ القَضِيَّةِ وَ اَتْسَامِهَا الأوليَّةِ .

٣٩ الْقَضِيَّةُ قُولُ يَصِمُّ أَنْ يُقَالَ لِقَائِلِهِ إِنَّهُ مَا دِقُ نِيْهِ اَوْ كَا ذِبُ رَهِي حَمْلِيَّةُ اِنِ انْحَلَّتُ اللهِ الْحَلَّتُ اللهِ الْحَلَّمُ اللهِ وَشُرْطِيَّةً اِنْ لَمْ تَنْحَلُّ .

وع وَ الشَّرَطِيَّةُ إِمَّا مُتَّصِلَةً وَهِيَ التَّبِي يُحُكُمُ نِيهَا بِصِدْقِ قَضِيَّةٍ أَوْلاَ صِدْقِهَا عَلَى تَقْدِيْرِ مِدْقِ تَضِيَّةٍ أَهْرُ عِلَا لَكُونَ فَيُا إِنْ كَانَ هَٰذَا إِنْسَاناً فَهُو جَمَادٌ وَ الْمَا مُنْفَصِلَةٌ وَهِيَ النَّنِي كَقُولِنَا إِنْ كَانَ هَٰذَا إِنْسَاناً فَهُو جَمَادٌ وَ الْمَا مُنْفَصِلَةً وَهِيَ النَّبِي يَحْكُمُ فَيْهَا بِالتَّنَافِي بَيْنَ الْقَضِيَّتَيْنِ فِي الصِّدْقِ وَ الْكِذْبِ مَعًا أَوْ فِي احَدِهِمِا فَقَطْ اوْبِنَفْيِهِ كَقُولِنِا يُحْكُمُ فَيْهَا بِالتَّنَافِي بَيْنَ الْقَضِيَّتَيْنِ فِي الصِّدْقِ وَ الْكِذْبِ مَعًا أَوْ فِي احَدِهِمِا فَقَطْ اوْبِنَفْيِهِ كَقُولِنِا إِمَّا اللهِ لَنَانُ الْعَدَدُ رَوْجًا أَوْفُرُدًا وَلَيْسَ إِمَّا أَنْ يَكُونَ هَٰذَا الْإِنْسَانُ السُودَ اوْكَاتِبًا ه

# ٱلفَصْلُ الْأَوَّلُ فِي الْحَمْلِيَّةِ وَفِيْهِ ٱرْبَعَةُ مَبَاحِثَ ٱلْبَصْثُ الْأَوَّلُ فِي ٱجْزَائِهَا وَٱتْسَامِهَا \*

٣٩ وَهٰذِهِ النِّسْبَةُ إِنْ كَانْتُ نِسْبَةُ بِهَا يَصِمُّ أَنْ يَقَالُ انَّ الْمُوضُوعُ مُحْمُولُ فَالْقَضِيَّةُ مُوجِبَةً كَقُولُنَا الْإِنْسَانُ حَيْوَانُ وَإِنْكَانَتُ نِسْبَةٌ بِهَا يَصِمُّ أَنْ يُقَالَ إِنَّ الْمُوضُوعُ لَيْسَ بِمُحْمُولُ فَالْقَضِيَّةُ سَالِبَةً كَقُولُنَا الْإِنْسَانُ لَيْسَ بِحُجُورٍ •

سم و مَوْضُوعُ الْحَدْلِيَّةِ إِنْ كَانَ شَخْصًا مُعَيَّنَا سُبِيَتْ مُخْصُومَةٌ و سُخْصِيَّةٌ • وَ اِنْ كَانَ كُلِيًّا فَانِ بُيْنَ فِيْهَا كَيْبًا كَيْبًا كَانِهُ بُيْنَ فَيْهَا كَيْبًا سُورًا سُبِيَتْ مَخْصُورَةٌ و مُسَوَّرَةٌ و هِيَ اللَّفْظُ الدَّالُ عَلَيْهَا سُورًا سُبِيَتْ مَخْصُورَةٌ و مُسَوَّرَةٌ و هِيَ ارْبَعُ وَلَّهُ اِنْ بُيْنَ فِيهَا اللَّا لَا تُعْرَادِ فَهِي كُلِيَّةً وَهِي امّا مُوجِبَةً وَسُورُهَا كُلُّ كُقُولِنَا كُلُّ نَارِحَارَةً وَ اللَّهُ الدَّالُ الْسَيْنَ وَلا وَاحِدٌ مِنَ الْإِنْسَانِ بِجَمَادٍ • و إِنْ بُيِّنَ فِيهَا أَنَّ الْكُمْ الْاَنْسَانِ بِجَمَادٍ • و إِنْ بُيِّنَ فِيهَا أَنَّ الْكُمْ

بِالنَّفَسِّ يُمَنَّى دَاخِلًا فِيَّ جَوَابِ مَا هُوَ كَالْجِسْمِ النَّامِيْ وَ الْعَسَّاسِ وَ الْمُتَّحَرِّكِ بِا لَإِرَادَةِ الدَّالِ عَلَيْهَا الْحَيْوَانُ بِالتَّضَيِّ .

٣٥ وَالْجِنْسُ الْعَالِي جَارُ أَنْ يَكُونَ لَهُ فَصْلَ يَقْوِمُهُ لِجَوَارِ تَرَكِّدِهِ مِنْ آمْرَنِي مُتَسَادِيَنِي آوَ الْمُورِ مُنْسَادِيَةٍ وَ يَجِبُ آنَ يَكُونَ لَهُ فَصْلَ يَقَسِّمُهُ • وَالنَّوْعُ السَّافِلُ يَجِبُ آنَ يَكُونَ لَهُ فَصْلُ يَقَسِّمُهُ • وَالنَّوْعُ السَّافِلُ يَجِبُ آنَ يَكُونَ لَهَ فَصُلُ يَقَسِّمُهُ • وَالْمُتُوسِطَاتُ يَجِبُ آنَ يَكُونَ لَهَا فَصُولُ تُقَوِّمُهَا وَفُصُولُ تُقَسِّمُهُ • وَالْمُتُوسِطَاتُ يَجِبُ آنَ يَكُونَ لَهَا فَصُولُ تُقَوِّمُهَا وَفُصُولُ تُقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ تُعَلِي وَكُلُّ فَصَلِ يَقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ مَنْ غَيْرِ عَلَي وَكُلُّ فَصَلِ يُقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَوْمُ السَّافِلَ مِنْ غَيْرِ عَلَي وَكُلُّ فَصَلِ يُقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ مُنْ عَيْرٍ عَلَي وَكُلُّ فَصَلِ يُقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ مُهُو يَقَسِّمُ السَّافِلَ مُنْ عَيْرٍ عَلَي مِنْ غَيْرِ عَلَى إِنْ الْعَالِي مِنْ غَيْرِ عَلَى مَنْ غَيْرَ عَلَى السَّافِلَ مُنْ يَوْلِهُ لِهِ اللَّهُ إِنْ مَنْ مَنْ مِنْ غَيْرِ عَلَى مِنْ غَيْرِ عَلَى مِنْ غَيْرِ عَلَى اللَّهُ لَلَهُ مَنْ مُنْ عَلَى اللَّهُ السَّافِلَ مُنْ الْمَالِي مِنْ غَيْرِ عَلَى اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ مَنْ اللَّهُ الْمُنْ الْعُلُولُ لَهُ اللَّهُ اللَهُ اللَّهُ اللَهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللللْمُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَل

## الْفُصْلُ الرَّابِعُ فِي النَّعْرِيْفَاتِ

٣٩ اَلْمُعْرِفُ لِلشَّيْفِ هُوَالَّذِي يَسْتَلْزِمُ تَصُورُهُ تَصُّورُ ذَلِكَ الشَّيْفِ أَوِامْتِيَازَهُ عَنْ كُلِّ مَاعَدَاهُ ،
وَهُولاَ يَجُوزُ اَنْ يَكُونَ نَفْسَ الْمَاهِيَّةِ إِنَّ الْمُعْرِفَ مَعْلُومٌ قَبْلُ الْمُعْرَفِ وَالشَّيْفُ لَا يُعْلَمُ تَبْلُ نَفْسِهِ وَلاَ اَعْمُ وَالْعَلْمُ عَلَا اللّهُ وَلاَ اللّهُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ وَاللّهُ عَنْ اللّهُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ وَاللّهُ عَنْ إِنَادَةِ اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَاللّهُ اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَلا اللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَلَا اللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَالللللّهُ وَاللّهُ وَ

٣٧ وُيُسَمَّى حَدَّا تَامًا إِنْ كَانَ بِالْجِنْسِ وَالْفَصْلِ الْقَرِيْبَيْنِ وَحَدًّا نَاقِصًا إِنْ كَانَ بِالْفَصْلِ الْقَرِيْبِ
وَحَدَّةُ أَوْ بِهِ وَبِالْجِنْسِ الْبَعِيْدِ و وَرَسْنًا تَامًّا إِنْ كَانَ بِالْجِنْسِ الْقَرِيْبِ وَ الْحَامَّةِ وَ رَسْنًا نَا قِصًا الْ ِكَانَ بِالْجِنْسِ الْقَرِيْبِ وَ الْحَامَّةِ وَ رَسْنًا نَا قِصًا الْ كَانَ بِالْجَنْسِ الْقَرِيْبِ وَ الْحَامَّةِ وَ رَسْنًا نَا قِصًا الْ كَانَ بِالْجَنْسِ النَّعَيْدِ ه

٣٨ وَ يَجِبُ الْإِحْتِرَازُ عَنْ تَعْرِيْفِ الشَيْمِ بِمَا يُسَاوِيْهِ فِي الْمَعْرِفَةِ وَ الْجَهَالِةِ كَتَعْرِيْفِ الْحَرَكَةِ بِمَا لَيْسَ بِسُكُونِ وَالزَّوْجِ بِمَا لَيْسَ بِشُكُونِ وَالزَّوْجِ بِمَا لَيْسَ بِفُودٍ وَعَنْ تَعْرِيْفِ الشَّيْمِ بِمَا لَا يُعْرَفُ الْآبِهِ سَوَاةً كَانَ بِمَرْتَبَةٍ وَاحِدَةٍ كَمَا يُقَالُ الْمُشَابَعَةُ الْقَالُ الْمُشَابَعَةُ الْقَالُ الْمُشَابَعَةُ الْقَالُ الْمُشَابِعَةُ الْمُسَابِعَةُ الْمُسَابِعَةُ الْمُسَابِعَةُ الْمُسَابِعَةُ الْمُسَادِيَانِ هُمَّا الشَّيْئَانِ اللَّهَ الْ الْمُشَابِعَةُ وَحَدِيْمِ ثُمَّ يُقَالُ الْمُشَادِيَانِ هُمَّا الشَّيْئَانِ اللَّهَ الْ لَا يَعْمُ لَلْمُسَادِيَانِ هُمَّا الشَّيْئَانِ اللَّهَ الْ لَا يَعْمُ لَلْ الْمُسَادِيَانِ هُمَّا الشَّيْئَانِ اللَّهَ الْ الْمُسَادِيَانِ هُمَّا الشَّيْئَانِ اللَّهَ الْمُسَادِيَانِ الْمَسَادِيَانِ هُمَّا الشَّيْئَانِ اللَّهُ اللْعُرِقُ اللْعُلِيْمِ اللْعُلِيْمِ اللْعُلِيْمِ اللْعُلِيْمِ اللْعُلِيْمِ اللْعُلِيْمِ اللْعُلِيْمِ اللْعُلِيْمِ اللْعُلِيْمُ اللَّهُ اللْعُلِيْمُ اللْعُلِيْمُ اللْعُلِيْمُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللْعُلِيْمُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللْعُلِيْمُ اللَّهُ اللْع

وْ اللَّا عَدَمِ كَانَّ يَهِنْهُمَا تَبَايِنَ كُلِي وَإِن مُدْقاً مِمَّا كَالَّا نُسَّانِهِ وَ اللَّا فَرْسِ كَانَ بَيْنَهُمَّا ثَبَايُن جَزَبِي فَرُورَةَ مِدْقِ احَدِ الْهِتْبَا بِنَيْن مَعَ نَقِيْفِ الْآخَرِ فَقَطْ فَالنَّبَايُنُ ٱلْجُزْئِيُّ لَازِمُّ جَزْمًا •

## الوابع

## الخامس

- م النَّوْعُ كَمَا يُقَالُ عَلَى مَا ذَكُرْنَا أُو يُقَالُ لَهُ النَّوْعُ الْحَقِيْقِيُّ فَكَذَٰلِكَ يُقَالُ عَلَى كُلِ مَاهِيةٍ يُقالُ عَلَى كُلِ مَاهِيةٍ يُقالُ عَلَى كُلِ مَاهِيةٍ يُقالُ عَلَى عَيْرِهِا الْجِنْسُ فَيْ جَوابِ مَا هُوَ تُولاً أَرَّلِياً وَ يُسَتَّى النَّوْعَ الْإِضَاقِيُّ •

مَاسَ وَ مَوَاتِبُ الْآجْنَاسِ آيَضًا هَذِهِ الْآرَبَعُ الْمِنَ الْعَالِيّ كَالْجَوْهُرِ فِيْ مَوَاتِبِ الْآجْناسِ يُسَمَّى جُنسَ الْآجْناسِ لَا السَّامِلِ كَالْجَنَاسِ آلِكُفْلُ إِنْ قُلْنَا جُنسَ الْآجْنَاسِ لَا السَّامِلِ كَالْجَيْوَانِ وَمِثَالُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْمَقْلُ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْجَمْمُ النَّامِيْ وَالْجِسْمُ وَمِثَالُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْمَقْلُ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْجَنْمَ الْآمِيْ وَالْجِسْمُ وَمِثَالُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْمَقْلُ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْجَوْمُ اللَّهُ الْجَوْمُ اللَّهُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْمَقْلُ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْجُومُ اللَّهُ الْمُفْرَدِ الْمَقْلُ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْمُفْرَدِ الْمَقْلُ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْمُفْرَدِ الْمَقْلُ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْمُفْرَدِ الْمُقْلَلُ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْمُفْرَدِ الْمُقْلَلُ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْمُفْرَدِ الْمُقْلَ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْمُفْرَدِ الْمُقْلَ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْمُفْرَدِ الْمَقْلُ إِنْ قُلْنَا الْمُفْرَدِ الْمُقْلِ إِنْ قُلْمُ اللَّهُ اللّهُ الللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ اللللللّهُ الللّهُ الللّهُ اللّهُ الللللّهُ الللّهُ اللل

٣٣ و النَّوْعُ الْإِضَانِيُّ مَوْجُودُ بِدُونِ الْحَقِيْقِيِّ كَالْاَنْوَاعِ الْمُتُوسِطِّةِ وَالْحَقِيْقِيِّ مَوْجُودُ بِدُونِ الْإِضَانِيِّ الْإِضَانِيِّ الْمُانِيِّ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُعَلِّقِيِّ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُعَلِّقِ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُنْفِعِ الْمُنْفِعِ الْمُنْفِعِ الْمُنْفِعِ السَّافِلِ وَ السَّافِلِ وَ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُنْفِعِ السَّافِلِ وَ السَّافِلِ وَالسَّافِلِ وَالسَّافِلِ وَالْمُنْفِعِ السَّافِلِ وَالْمُنْفِعِ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُنْفِعِ الْمُنْفِعُ الْمُنْفِقِ السَّافِلِ وَالْمُنْفِقِ الْمُنْفِقِ الْمُنْ

مَام وَ جُزْءُ الْمُقُولِ فِي جَوابِ مَاهُو إِنْ كَانَ مَذْكُورًا بِالْمُطَابَقَةِ يُسَنَّى وَاقِعًا فِي طَرِيقِ مَا هُو كَالْحَيْرَانِ او النَّاطِقِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ الِنَّي الْخَيْوانِ النَّاطِقِ الْمَقُولِ فِيْ جَوَابِ السُّوالِ بِمَا هُو عَي الْإنْسَانِ • وَالْ كَانَ مَذْكُورًا وَ قُفْ يَكُونُ مُمْكِنَ الْوُجُودِ لَكِنَ لَهُوجُدُ كَالْمَنْقَادِ . وَقَدْ يَكُونُ الْمَوْجُودُ مِنْهُ وَ احداً فَقُطْ مَعَ امْتِنَاعِ غَيْدٍة كَالْبَارِيْ تَعَالَى اَوْمَعُ إِمْكَانِهِ كَالشَّمْسِ ، وَقَدْ يَكُونُ الْمَوْجُودُ مِنْهُ كَثَيْرًا إِمَّا مُتِنَاهِياً كَالْمُواكِبِ السَّبْقِيِّ السَّهَّارَةِ اَوْ غَيْرَ مُتَنَاء كَالنَّفُوسِ النَّاطِقَة ،

# الثاني

٢٩ إِذَا قُلْنَا لِلْعَيْوَانِ مَذَلًا بِانَّهُ كُلِي فَهُنَكَ أَمُورُ ثُلْنَةً الْعَيْوَانُ مِنْ حَيْثُ هُوَهُوَ وَكُونُهُ كُلِينًا وَالْمَرْبُّ فِلْلَهُ كُلِينًا مَنْطِقِينًا وَالنَّانِي كُلِينًا مَنْطِقِينًا وَالنَّانِي كُلِينًا عَقَلِينًا • وَالْكَلِي الطَّبَعِيُ الطَّبَعِي كُلِينًا مَنْطِقِينًا وَالنَّانِي كُلِينًا عَقَلِينًا • وَالْكَلِي الطَّبَعِي الطَّبَعِي مَوْجُودُ • وَ أَمَّا مَوْجُودُ • وَ أَمَّا الْمَعْبُونِ الْمُوجُودِ فِي الْعَالِي وَالْمَوْجُودِ مَوْجُودُ • وَ أَمَّا الْكَلِيدُ وَالْمَالِي الْمُوجُودِ فَي الْمَنْطِقِ • وَ أَمَّا الْكَلِيدُ وَالْمَالِي الْمُؤْمِنِ وَهُودُ هُوا فَي الْمُؤْمِنِ وَالْمَالِي الْمُؤْمِنُ فِيهِ خَارِجُ عَن الْمَنْطِقِ •

## الله لِثُ

٢٧ أَلْكُلِيّاً فِ مُنْسَادِياً فِ إِنْ مَدَى كُلَّ وَاحِدٍ مِنْبُمَا عَلَى كُلِّ مَا مَدَى عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ كَالْإِنْسَانِ وَ النَّاطِقِ وَ وَبَيْنَبُمَا عُمُومٌ وَخُصُومٌ مُطْلُقًا إِنْ مَدَى اَحَدُ هُمَا عَلَى كُلِّ مَا مَدَى عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ مِنْ غَيْرِ عَلَى كُلِّ مَا مَدَى عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ مِنْ غَيْرِ عَلَيْ كَا لَا مُعَنَى عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ فَقُطْ كَا لَكُونَهُ وَ وَمُنْبَانِنَانِ إِنْ لَمْ يَضَدُّقُ شَيْعٌ مِنْهُمًا عَلَى شَيْعٍ مِمَّا يَصَدُّقُ عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ لَقُطْ كَا لَحَيْوَانِ وَ الْبَيْعَى • وَمُنْبَايِنَانِ إِنْ لَمْ يَضَدُّقُ شَيْعٌ مِنْهُمًا عَلَى شَيْعٍ مِمَّا يَصَدُّقُ عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ كَالْانْسَانِ وَ الْفَرْسِ • وَالْفَرْسِ • وَمُنْبَايِنَانِ إِنْ لَمْ يَضَدُّقُ شَيْعٌ مِنْهُمَا عَلَى شَيْعٍ مِمَّا يَصَدُّقُ عَلَيْهِ الْآخُرُ

 مِالنِّسْبُةِ إِلَى الْإِنْمَانِ وَثَلَثَةً أَجْوِبَةٍ إِنْ كَأَنَ بَمِيْداً بِمَرْتَبَتَيْنِ كَالْجِسْمِ وَ ٱرْبَعَةُ ٱجْوِبَةٍ إِنْ كَأَنَ بَمِيْداً بِثَلْثِ مَوْاتِبَ كَالْجُوْهَرِ وَعَلَى هٰذَا الْقِيَاسُ •

٣٠ وَ إِنْ لَمْ يَكُنُ ثَمَامَ الْجُزُّ المُشْتَرَكِ بِيَنْهَا وَبِيْنَ نَوْعِ آخَرُ فَلَا بُدُّ أَنْ لَا يُكُونَ مُشْتَرَكًا أَفَلًا أَوْ يُكُونَ بَعْضًا مِنْ تَمَامِ الْمُشْتَرَكِ مُسَاوِيًا لَهُ وَإِلَّا لَكَانَ مُشْتَرَكًا بَيْنَ الْمَاهِيَّةِ وَبَيْنَ نَوْعٍ آخَرُولَا يَجُوزُ أَنْ يَكُونَ تُمْامُ الْمُشْتَرِكِ بِالنِّسْبَةِ إِلَى أَنْلِكُ النَّوْعِ لِآنَ الْمُقَدِّرَ خِلَانُهُ بَلْ بَعْضَهُ وَلاَ يَنْسَلْمَلُ بَلْ يَنْتَهِي إِلَى مَا يُسَاوِيْهِ فَ قَمْامُ اللهُ الْمَنْ فَضَلاً وَ فَي خَلْسِ أَوْ فِي وُجُودٍ فَكَانَ فَضَلاً وَ فَي مُشَارِكِهَا فِي جِنْسِ أَوْ فِي وُجُودٍ فَكَانَ فَضَلاً وَ فَي مُشَارِكِهَا فِي جِنْسِ أَوْ فِي وُجُودٍ فَكَانَ فَضَلاً وَ

٢١ وَرَسُمُوهُ بِاللّهُ كُلِي يُحْمَلُ عَلَى الشَّيْمِ فِي جَوَابِ آبُّ شَيْقٍ هُوَفِي جَوْهُو فَعَلَى هَذَا لَوْ تُرَكَّبَ حَقَيْقَةً مِنْ اَمْرَيْنِ مُتْسَاوِيَةِ كَانَ كُلُّ مِنْهُمَا فَصْلًا لَهَا لِأَنَّهُ يُمَيِّزُهَا عَنْ مُشَارِكِهَا فِي الْوَجُودِ • كَانَّا عُنْ مُشَارِكِهِ فِي الْجِنْسِ قَرِيْبُ اِنْ مَيَّزُهُ عَنْ مُشَارِكِهِ فِي الْجِنْسِ قَرِيْبُ اِنْ مَيَّزُهُ عَنْهُ فِي جِنْسٍ قَرِيْبُ الْ مَيْوَلُهُ عَنْ مُشَارِكِهِ فِي الْجِنْسِ قَرِيْبُ اِنْ مَيَّزَهُ عَنْهُ فِي جِنْسٍ قَرِيْبُ كَا لَنَّاطِقِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ وَ بَعِيْدُ إِنْ مَيْزُهُ عَنْهُ فِي جِنْسِ بَعِيْدٍ كَا لَحَسَّاسِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ وَ بَعَيْدُ إِنْ مَيْزَهُ عَنْهُ فِي جِنْسٍ بَعِيْدٍ كَا لَحَسَّاسِ لِلْإِنْسَانِ وَ

٢٣ وَ أَمَّا الثَّالِثُ فِإِن امْتَنَعَ انْفَكَاكُهُ عَيِ الْمَاهِيَّةِ فَهُو اللَّازِمُ وَ اللَّا الْمَفَا رِقُ وَ اللَّازِمُ قَدْ يَكُونُ لَازِمًا لِلْمَاهِيَّةِ كَالرَّوْجِيَّةِ لِلْاَرْبَعَةِ وَهُوَ المَّابِيِّ وَ هُوَ الَّذِي يَكُونُ لَازِمًا لِلْمَاهِيَّةِ كَالرَّوْجِيَّةِ لِلْاَرْبَعَةِ وَهُوَ المَّابِيِّ وَ هُوَ الَّذِي يَكُونُ لَازِمًا لِلْمَاهِيَّةِ كَالرَّوْجِيَّةِ لِلْاَرْبَعَةِ وَهُوَ اللَّابِيِّ وَ هُوَ الَّذِي يَكُونُ تَصَوِّرِ مَلْوُومِ بَيْنَهُمَا كَالْاَنْقِسَامِ بِمُنْسَاوِييْنِ لِلْارْبَعَةِ وَ اللَّا عَيْرَبَيِن وَمُو اللَّذِي وَسَطَ كَتَسَاوِى الرَّوَايَا الثَّلْثِ لِلْمَثَلَّتِ وَقَدْيقَالُ وَهُو النَّذِي بَاللَّرُومُ بَيْنَهُمَا إِلَى وَسَطَ كَتَسَاوِى الرَّوَايَا الثَّلْثِ لِلْقَائِمَتَيْنِ لِلْمُثَلَّتِ وَقَدْيقَالُ وَهُو اللَّهُ فِي بِاللَّرُومُ بَيْنَهُمَا إِلَى وَسَطَ كَتَسَاوِى الرَّوَايَ الثَّلْثِ لِلْمُثَلِّتِ وَقَدْيقَالُ وَهُو اللَّهِ فَي بِاللَّرُومُ مِنْ تَصُوّرٍ مَلْرُومِ تَصَوَّرُهُ وَ الْآولُ اللَّهُ وَ الْقَرْضُ الْمُفَارِقُ إِلَّا لَمُ اللَّالِي وَاللَّهُ مِن تَصُور مِلْ اللَّوْلِ كَالسَّيْنِ وَ السَّبَابِ وَ السَّبَابِ وَ الشَّبَابِ وَ السَّبَابِ وَ السَّبَالِ عَلَيْهِ الْمَالِقُ لِلْمَالَةِ فَي الْوَالِ كَالسَّيْنِ وَ السَّبَابِ وَ السَّبَابِ وَ السَّبَابِ وَ السَّبَابِ وَ السَّبَابِ وَ السَّبَابِ وَالْمَالِقُ الْمَالِقُ لَالْمَالِقُ الْمَالِقُ الْمَالِقُ الْمَالِقُ وَالْمَالِقُ الْمَالِقُ الْمَالِقُولِ الْمَالِقُ الْمَالِقُ الْمَالِقُ الْمَالَاقِي الْمَالَقِي الْمَالَاقِ الْمَالِقُ الْمُلْمِلُ وَالْمَالِقُ الْمَالْمَ الْمَالِقُ وَالْمَالَاقِ الْمَالِقُ الْمَالْمُ الْمَالْمُ الْمَالْمُ الْمَالْمَالَّالَ اللَّهُ الْمَالْمُ الْمَالْمُ الْمَالِقُ الْمَالَّاقُ الْمَالِقُ الْمَالْمُ الْمَالَقُولُ الْمُعَلِقُ الْمُؤْولِ الْمَالَاقُ الْمَالِقُ الْمَالْمُ الْمُعَلِقُ اللَّالَّ الْمُولِقُ اللَوْلِ الْمَالِقُ الْمَالْمُ الْمُؤْولُ الْمُعْرِقُ اللْمُولِ وَالل

٢١٠ وَكُلَّ وَاحِدٍ مِنَ اللَّزِمِ وَ الْمُفَارِقِ إِنِ اخْتُصَّ بِافْرَادِ حَقِيْقَةً وَاحِدَةً فَهُوَ الْعَامَّةُ كَالضَّاحِكِ وَ إِلَّا فَهُو الْعَامِّ وَالْعَرْضُ الْعَامُ كَالْمَاشِي وَتُرْسُمُ الْعَامَّةُ بِانَهَا كُلِيَّةً مُقُولَةً عَلَى مَا تَحْتَ حَقَيْقَةً وَاحِدَةً فَقَطْ قَوْلًا عَرْضِيًّا وَالْعَرْضُ الْعَامُ بِاللَّهُ كُلِيَّ مُقُولً عَلَى افْرَادِ حَقَيْقَةً وَاحِدَةً وَ غَيْرِهَا قُولًا عَرْضِيًّا فَالْكَلِيَّاتُ إِذَنْ خَمْسَةً نَوْعً وَجِنْسُ وَالْعَرْضُ الْعَامُ بِاللَّهُ كُلِيَّ مُقُولً عَلَى افْرَادِ حَقَيْقَةً وَاحِدَةً وَ غَيْرِهَا قُولًا عَرْضِيًّا فَالْكَلِيَّاتُ إِذَنْ خَمْسَةً نَوْعً وَجِنْسُ وَالْعَرْضُ عَامًّ هُ وَعَرْضُ عَامًّ هُ

اَلْفُصْلُ الثَّالِثُ فِي مَبَاحِثِ الْكُلِّيِّ وَ الْجُزْئِيِّ وَهِي خَمْسَةُ الْفُصْلُ الثَّالِثُ فِي خَمْسَةً

الْلُوْلُ ٥١ اَلْكَاتِيُّ قَدْ يِكُونُ مُمْتَنَعُ الْرَجُودِ فِي الْخَارِجِ لاَ لِنَفْسِ مَفْهُومِ اللَّفْظِ كَشَرِيْكِ البَارِيْ عَزَّ اِسْعَهُ هُ إِنْ لَمْ يُغْرَكَ مُومُوعُهُ إِلْالًا يُسَمِّقُ بِالنِّسْفِةِ إِلَيْهِ حَقِيقَةً وَ بِالنِّسْفِةِ إِلَى الْمَنْقُولِ إِلَيْهِ مُجَازًا كَالْسَدِ بِالنِّسْفِةِ إِلَى الْمُنْقُولِ إِلَيْهِ مُجَازًا كَالْسَدِ بِالنِّسْفِةِ إِلَى الْمُنْزَانِ الْمُقْتَرِسِ وَالرَّجُلِ الشَّبَامِ .

١٥ وَ كُلَّ لَفَظِ فَهُو بِالنِّشَبَةِ إِلَىٰ لَفُظٍ آخَرَ مُرَادِفُ لَهُ إِنْ تُوَافَقًا فِي الْمَعْنَى وَمُبَايِنُ لَهُ إِنِ

# ٱلْفَصْلُ النَّانِي ﴿ فِي الْمَعْانِي الْمُفْرَدَةِ

١٦ كُل مَفْهُوْمٍ فَهُوَ جُزْمُي إِنْ مَنَعَ نَفْسُ تَصَوَّرِةٍ عَنْ وُقُوْعِ الشِّرْكَةِ فِيْهِ وَكُلِّيُّ إِنْ لَمَ يَمْنَعُ وَاللَّفْظُ النَّالُ عَلَيْهِمَا يُسَمَّى جُزْنِيا وَكُلِيًا بِالعَرْضِ •

المَّوْ النَّوْعُ سَوَاءً كَانَ لَمُتَعَدِّدُ الْشَخَاصِ وَهُوَ الْمَقُولُ فِي جَوَابِ مَا هُوَ بِعَسْبِ الشِّرْكَةِ وَ الْخُصُومِيَّةِ مَعَا كَالْا نَسَالَ أَوْ غَيْرَ مُتَعَدِّدِ الْأَشْخَاصِ وَهُوَ الْمَقُولُ فِي جَوَابِ مَا هُوَ بِعَسْبِ الشِّرْكَةِ وَ الْخُصُومِيَّةِ مَعَا كَالْإِنسَالَ أَوْ غَيْرَ مُتَعَدِّدِ الْأَشْخَاصِ وَهُوَ الْمَقُولُ فِي جَوَابٍ مَا هُوَ بِعَسْبِ الْخُصُومِيَّةِ الْحَضْةَ كَالشَّسْسِ كَالْإِنسَالَ أَوْ غَيْرَ مُتَعَدِّدِ الْأَشْخَاصِ وَهُو الْمَقُولُ فِي جَوَابٍ مَا هُوَ بِعَسْبِ الْخُصُومِيَّةِ الْحَضْةَ كَالشَّسْسِ فَهُو إِنْ ثَالِي مَا هُو الْمَالِي وَ احِدٍ أَوْ عَلَىٰ كَثَيْرِينَ مُتَقِقِينَ بِالْحَقَائِقِ فِي جَوَابٍ مَا هُو .

١٨ وَ إِنْ كَانَ النَّانِيْ فَإِنْ كَانَ تَمَامَ الْجُزْءِ الْمُشْئَرَكِ بَيْنَهَا وَ بَيْنَ نَوْعِ آخَرُ فَهُو الْمَقُولُ فِي جَوَابِ
مَا هُوَبِعُسْبِ الشِّرْكَةِ الْمُعْضَةِ وَيُسَمَّى جِنْسًا وَ رَسَّمُوهُ بِأَنَّهُ كُلِيٍّ مَقُولٌ عَلَى كَثِيْرِيْنَ مُخْتَلِفِيْنَ بِالْحَقَائِقِ

ا وَهُوَ قُرِيْبُ إِن كُانَ الْجَوَابُ عَن الْمَاهِيَّةِ وَهُنَ بَعْضَ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا فِيهِ هُوَ الْجَوَابُ عَنْهَا وَعَنْ كُلِّ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا فِيهِ هُوَ الْجَوَابُ عَنْهَا وَعَنْ كُلِّ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا فِيهِ عَنْهُا وَعَنْ الْبَعْضِ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا فِيهِ عَنْهُا وَعَنْ الْبَعْضِ مَا يُشَارِكُهَا فِيهِ عَنْهُا وَعَنِ الْبَعْضِ النَّعْضِ النَّعْضِ النَّعْضِ النَّامِي اللهِ كَانَ بَعْيِداً بِمَرْتَبَةً وَ احدَةً كَالْجِسْمِ النَّامِي عَنْهُا وَعَنِ الْبَعْضِ النَّعْضِ النَّعْضِ النَّعْضِ النَّعْضِ النَّعْضِ النَّعْضِ النَّامِي إِنْ كَانَ بَعْيِداً بِمَرْتَبَةً وَ احدَةً كَالْجِسْمِ النَّامِي

تَقَدِيْمُ الْأَوْلِ عَلَى النَّانِي وَضَعَالِتَقَدَّمِ النَّصَوْرِ عَلَى النَّصْدِيْقِ طَبَعًا لِنَّ كُلَّ تَصْدِيْقِ لِبَدَّهَ مِنْ تَصَوَّرِ الْمَعْنُومِ عَلَيْهِ بِذَاتِهِ أَوْبِا مْرِصَا دِقِ عَلَيْهِ وَ الْمَعْقُومُ مِ بِهِ كَذَٰ لِكَ وَ الْحَيْمُ لِا مَتِنَا عِ الْعُيْم

# أَمَّا الْمَقَالاَتُ فَثَلْثُ \* الْأُولَى فِي الْمُفْرَداتِ وَفِيْهَا أَرْبَعَةُ فُصُولِ الْفُصُلُ الْأَوْلُ فِي الْاَلْفَاظ

و دَلاَلِةُ اللَّفظِ على المتعنى بتوسط الوَضع له مطابقة كد لائة الإنسان على الْحيوان النَّاطق و بتوسطه لما دَخَلَ فيه تَضَمَّن كَدَلاَتِه على النَّعْلِق و بتوسطه لما خَرَجَ عَنْهُ الْتَزَامُ كَدَلاَتِه على تابلِ العلم وَصَفْعة الْتَعَابَة .
 و يُشتَرَطُ في الدَّلاَتة الإنتزاميَّة كُونَ الْخَارِجِيِّ بحَالة يَلزَمُ مِن تَصَوَّرِ الْمَسَمَّى في النَّلاَة الإنتزاميَّة كُونَ الْخَارِجِيِّ بحَالة يَلزَمُ مِن تَصَوَّرِ الْمَسَمَّى في النَّلاَة في النَّسَمَى في الْخَارِج تَحَقَّقهُ فيه وَ إِلَّا لاَمتناع فَهُمُهُ مِن اللَّفظ وَ لا يُشترَطُ فيها كَرْنَه بَعَائة يَلزَمُ مِن تَحَقَّق النَّسَمَى في الْخَارِج تَحَقَّقهُ فيه كَدَلاَة لفظ الْعَلَى عَلَى الْبَصَر مَع عَدَم النَّلاَ رَمّة بيَنْهُمَا في الْخَارِج .

11 وَ الْمُطَابَقَةُ لاَ تَسْتَانِهُم النَّصَمَّى كَمَا فِي الْبَسَائِطِ وَ أَمَّا اسْتِلْزَامُهَا الْاِلْتِزَامُ فَغَيْرُ مُتَيَقَّى لِنَّ وُجُودَ لاَرِم لِكُلِّ مَاهِيَّةٍ يَلْزَمُ مِنْ تَصَوَّرُهَا تَصَوَّرُهُ عَيْرُ مَعْلُومٍ • وَمَاتِيْلَ مِنْ آنَ تَصَوَّرُ كُلِّ مَاهِيَّةٍ يَسْتَلْزُمُ تَصَوَّرُ اتَّهَا لَا لِيَ مَاهِيَّةٍ يَلْزَمُ مِنْ فَضَارَامُ النَّصَمِّ الْالْتِزَامُ وَامَّا هُمَا فَلاَ يُوْجَدُانِ إِلَّا مَعُ المُطَابَقَةِ لِيَسْتَ عَيْرُهَا فَمَمْنُوهُ وَمِنْ هَذَا تَبَيَّى عَدَمُ اسْتِلْزَامِ النَّصَمِّ الْالْتِزَامُ وَامَّا هُمَا فَلاَ يُوْجَدُانٍ إِلَّا مَعُ المُطَابَقَةِ لِاسْتَعَالَةِ وُجُودِ النَّابِعِ مِنْ حَيْثُ اتَّهُ تَابِعُ بِدُونِ الْمُفْبُوعِ •

١٢ وَ الدَّالَ بِالْمُطَابَقَةِ إِنْ قُصِدَ بِجُرْهِ الدَّلَا لَةُ عَلَى جُزْءِ مَعْنَاءُ فَهُوَ الْمُرَكَّبُ كُرَامِي الْحِجَارَةِ وَ إِلَّا فَهُو الْمُفَرَّدِ وَ هُو الْمُؤَدِّدِ وَ الْمُؤْدِدِ وَ حُدَّةُ فَهُو الْاَدَاةُ كَفِي وَلاَ وَ إِنْ صَلَحَ لِذَٰلِكِ فَإِنْ دَلَّ بَهِيْئَتُهُ عَلَى فَهُو الْمُفْرَدِ وَ حُدَّةُ فَهُو الْاَدَاةُ كَفِي وَلاَ وَ إِنْ صَلَحَ لِذَٰلِكِ فَإِنْ دَلَّ بَهِيْئَتُهُ عَلَى رَمَانِ مُعَيَّى مَنَ الْأَرْمِنَةِ النَّلْقَةِ فَهُو الْكُلِمَةُ وَ إِنْ لَمْ يُدُلِّ فَهُو الْإِسْمُ •

في ثُبَيّه و كِنَابَيّه و مُلَنْزِمًا انْ لا أَخِلَّ بِشَيْقِ يُعْتَدّبه و مَعْ زِيَادَاتِ شُويْفَةً و نَكْتِ لَطَيْفَةً مِنْ عِنْدي و مُنْبِعًا للْعَقِ الصَّرِيْمِ الَّذِي لاَيَاتِيْهِ الْبَاطِلُ مِنْ بَيْنِ يَدَبِهِ لاَ مَنْ خَلْفَه و وَسَّيْنَهُ بِالرِسَالَة مَنْوَكِا لِللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ الللللَّهُ الللَّهُ اللَّهُ اللَّهُ

٣ وَ لَيْسُ الْكُلُّ مِنْ كُلِّ مِنْهُمَا بَدِيْهِيًّا وَ إِذَّ لَمَا جَهِلْنَا شَيْئًا وَلاَ نَظْرِيًّا وَ الْأَلْدَارَ أَوْ تَسَلْسَلَ .

٥ بَلِ الْبَعْفُ مِنْ كُلِّ مِنْهُما بَدْبِهِي وَ الْبَعْفُ نَظْرِي يَخْصُلُ مِنْهُ بِالْفَكْرِ وَهُو تَرْتَيْبُ امُوْرِ مَعْلُومَةً لِلْنَادَى اللهَ الْبَعْفُ مِنْ لَكِ الْمَاتَفَةِ بَعْضِ الْعَقَلِاءِ بَعْضَا فِي مُقْتَضَى أَفْكَارِهِمْ لِلنَّادَى الْبَالْقَلَاءِ بَعْضَا فِي مُقْتَضَى أَفْكَارِهِمْ لِللَّادَى الْبَالْوَلِي الْمَاتَفَةُ بَعْضِ الْعَقَلاءِ بَعْضَا فِي مُقْتَضَى أَفْكَارِهِمْ لِللَّا الْمَالَقُ الْمَالَةُ اللَّهُ الْمُنْ الْمُلَاقِي الْمُنْ الْمُنْ الْمُنْ الْمُنْ الْمُنْ الْمُنْ الْمُنْ اللهُ اللهُ مَنْ الْفَالِدِ مِنَ الْفَكْرِ الْوَاقِعِ فَيْهَا وَهُو الْمَنْطِقُ وَرَسَعُوهُ بِاللَّهِ اللَّهُ اللهُ قَانُونِيَّةً مَنْ الْفَكْرِ الْوَاقِعِ فَيْهَا وَهُو الْمَنْطِقُ وَرَسَعُوهُ بِاللَّهُ اللهُ قَانُونِيَّةً وَالْمُنْ اللهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللّهُ اللّهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللّهُ الللهُ الللللهُ اللللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ اللهُ اللهُ اللّهُ الللللهُ اللللهُ اللللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ اللهُ الللهُ اللللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ اللهُ الللهُ اللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ اللللهُ الللهُ اللهُ الللهُ الللهُ اللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ الللهُ اللهُ

٩ وَلَيْسَ كُلُهُ بَدِينِهِيًّا وَ إِلَّا لَاسْتُغَنِيَ عَنْ تَعَلَّمِهِ وَلاَ نَظْرِيًّا وَ اللَّا لَذَارَ أَوْ تَسَلَسَلُ بِلَ بِعَضُهُ بَدِينِيًّ وَبعَضُهُ وَالعَلْمِيُّ وَبعَضُهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّالَةُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ واللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللَّالِمُ وَاللَّهُ وَاللّ

# ألْبَعْثُ الثَّاني فِي مُوضُوعِ السَّنْطَقِ

٧ مُوضُوعُ كُلِّ عِلْمٍ مَا يُبْعَثُ فِيهِ عَنْ عَوَارِضِهِ النَّبِي تَلْعَقُهُ لِما هُو هُو اَيْ لِذَاتِهِ أَوْ لِجُزْنُهِ أَوْ لِمايساوِيةٍ.
 و مُوضُوعُ الْمَنْطِي الْمَعْلُومَاتُ النَّصَوْرِيَّةُ وَ النَّصُدِيقَيَّةً لِنَّ الْمَنْطِقِي يَبْعَثُ عَنْهَا مَن حَيْثُ البَّا تُوصِلُ إلى مَجْهُولِ تَصَوْرِيٍّ أَوْ تَصَدِيقِي وَ مِن حَيْثُ يَتُوفَّفُ عَلَيْهَا الْمُوصِلُ إلى التَّصُورِ كَنَوْنِهَا كُلِيقًا أَوْ جُرْئِيةً وَ دَاتِيَّةً أَوْ جُرْئِيةً وَ دَاتِيَّةً أَوْ جُرْئِيةً وَ دَاتِيَّةً الْمُوصِلُ إلى التَّصَدِيقِ إِما تَوَقَفُا قَرِيبًا كَنَوْنِهَا قَضَيَّةً وَ مِنْ حَيْثُ يَتَوَقَفُ عَلَيْهَا الْمُوصِلُ إلى التَصَدِيقِ إِما تَوَقَفُ قَرِيبًا كَنَوْنِهَا قَضَيَّةً وَ مَنْ حَيْثُ لَعَلَيْهَا الْمُوصِلُ إلى التَصَدِيقِ إِما تَوَقَفًا قَرِيبًا كَنَوْنِهَا قَضَيَّةً وَ إِمَا تَوَقَفًا بَعِيدًا كَنَوْنَهَا مَوْضُوعَات وَ مَحْمُولات .
 ر عَمْسَ فَضِيَّةً أَوْ نَقَيْفُ قَضِيَّةً وَ إمَّا تَوَقَفًا بَعِيدًا كَنَوْنَهَا مَوْضُوعَات وَ مَحْمُولات .

٨ وَ قُدْ جَرِتِ أَنْعَادَةً بِأَنْ يُسَمُّو الْمُوصِلَ إِلَى النَّصُورِ قَوْلًا شَارِحًا وَالْمُوصِلَ إِلَى النَّصْدِيقِ حُجَّةً وَ يَجِبُ

## بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الْحَمْدُ لِلّهِ الّذِي آبَدَعَ نظامَ الْوَجُودِ • وَ اخْتَرَعَ مَاهِيَّاتِ الْشَيَاءِ بِمُقْتَضَى الْوُجُودِ • وَ انشَا بِقُدْرَتِهِ انْوَامِ الْجُواهِ لِ الْحَمْدِ الْعَقْلِيَّةِ • وَ الصَّلُوةُ عَلَى ذَوَاتِ الْاَنْفُسِ الْقَدْسِيَّةِ • الْجُواهِ لِ الْعَقْلِيَّةِ • وَ الصَّلُوةُ عَلَى ذَوَاتِ الْاَنْفُسِ الْقَدْسِيَّةِ • الْجُواهِ إِلَيْكَ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى آلِهِ وَ اصْحَامِهِ الْمَعْجِزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى آلِهِ وَ اصْحَامِهِ اللّهِ مَا اللّهِ وَ اصْحَامِهِ اللّهَ اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى آلِهِ وَ اصْحَامِهِ اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى آلِهِ وَ اصْحَامِهِ اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى اللّهِ وَ اصْحَامِهِ اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى اللّهِ وَ السَّامِةِ اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى اللّهِ وَ اللّهِ وَ الْحَدْدِ فَيَامِ اللّهُ وَاللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجَزَاتِ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ • وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ • الْمُعْجَزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجَزَاتِ • الْمُعْجَزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجِزَاتِ • وَ عَلَى اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجَزِيْنِ اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجَزَاتِ • الْمُعْجَزَاتِ • الْمُعْجَزَاتِ • الْمُعْجَزَاتِ • الْمُعْجَزَاتِ • الْمُعْجَزِيْنِ اللّهَاتِ اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجَزِيْنِ اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْجِزِيْنِ اللّهِ وَالْمِنْ الْعُلْمَالِي الْعَلَامِ الْمُعَالِمِ اللّهِ وَالْمُعَالِمِ اللّهِ وَالْمِنْ الْمُعْرِقِيْقِيْمِ اللّهِ وَ الْمُعْرَادِ اللّهِ وَالْمُعْرِقِيْمِ وَالْمِلْمِ الْمُعَالِمُ الْمُعْرِقِيْمِ وَالْمُعْرِقِيْمِ وَالْمِلْمُ الْمُعْمِيْرِ فَالْمُعْرِقِ وَالْمُعْمِلِيْمُ الْمُعْمِلْمُ الْمُعْمِيْر

التَّابِعِينَ لِلْحُجْمِ وَ الْبَيِّنَاتِ •

قال الويس اسفرنجر التيرولي المصنف نفائس المآثر مولانا نجم الدين كاتبي قزويني كه حكيم متبحر است و در حكمت شاگرد اثير الدين ابهري است شرح تلخيص و شرح محصل و حكمت عين و رسالة شمسيه و جامع الدقائق از مصنفات اوست و فاتش روزجمعه ثالث رجب سنة خمس و سبعين وستمائة

الذيل الاول وفيه رسالتان في علم المنطق الرسالة الاولى وهي الرسالة الشمسية لنجم الدين ابن بكرين علي بن عمر الكاتبي القزويني

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